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Yeltsin Meets With Transcaucasian Leaders

LD0810101793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0940 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Oct—A meeting of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the supreme leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia—Geydar Aliyev, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and Eduard Shevardnadze respectively—started in the Grand Kremlin Palace at noon today.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned from well-informed sources, that, first and foremost, the meeting is discussing the situation in the Transcaucasian region. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev are taking part in the meeting for the Russian side.

Shevardnadze: Georgia To Join CIS

LD0810115393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1140 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Oct—Georgia has decided to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. Eduard Shevardnadze told journalists this after today's meeting with Boris Yeltsin.

Shelepin: Moscow Seeking Revision of CFE

LD0710135293 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 7 Oct 93

[By Moscow correspondent Manfred Quiring]

[Text] Contrary to reports from NATO sources, Russia does not intend to secede from the treaty on the reduction of conventional forces and weapons in Europe (CFE).

This assurance was given by Mikhail Shelepin, head of the Conventional Weapons Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, yesterday in an interview with BERLINER ZEITUNG. On the contrary, his country intends to adhere rigorously to the treaty, since it regards it as the basis of security in Europe.

At the same time, Shelepin confirmed that Moscow is seeking a revision of the treaty, which was signed in 1990. To quote verbatim, the Russian diplomat said that it is a matter of "adapting the treaty to the current political circumstances." Shelepin said the reason for the Russian suggestion is the political realities, which have completely changed since the time when the treaty was signed. The treaty was signed in 1990 by what was still the USSR, which today no longer exists—just like the Warsaw Pact.

Russia believes the crisis in the Caucasus region in particular has compelled it to take this step. Due to the conflicts taking place there, the north Caucasian military district needs "to have more of certain weapon types." Only 700 tanks are permitted in this region, for example.

The joint consultation group, created within the framework of the disarmament treaty, met yesterday in Vienna to discuss the Russian request. Russia's withdrawal would mean the end of the CFE treaty. Observers evaluate the measure taken two weeks ago as a further attempt by Russian President Yeltsin to allay the fears of the military, which plays a decisive role in the Moscow power struggle.

Turkish Embassy Denies Khasbulatov Contact

PM0710155593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Oct 93 First Edition p 4

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "Khasbulatov Did Not Phone the Turkish Embassy"]

[Text] The press counselor at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, Hasbi Akal [name as transliterated], has denied rumors that in the last hours of the storming of the White House Ruslan Khasbulatov asked the Turkish ambassador to grant him political asylum.

"The embassy had no contacts with Khasbulatov," H. Akal stated.

Yeltsin Visit to Japan To Last 2 Days

LD0710192293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1740 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The official visit to Japan to be paid by President Boris Yeltsin on October 11-13 will be "extremely intensive and concise". Boris Yeltsin will spend no more than two days on Japanese soil, a high-ranking member of the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax.

On Thursday, he said, a group arrived in Tokyo to finally coordinate the visit's program with Japanese officials. "So far we can say for sure only that President Yeltsin will meet with the emperor Akihito and hold talks with Prime Minister Morihiro Hosakawa. A reception in honor of the Russian leader will be given in the emperor's palace," the diplomat said. "Visits to museums or universities are out of the question. The president simply has no time for this."

According to Interfax's interviewee, by Friday evening Russian and Japanese experts intend to conclude the drafting of documents to be signed during the visit. "There will be over ten, but no more than 15 of them, as announced from the beginning," he said.

According to the diplomat, President Yeltsin's decision to go to Tokyo despite the recent tragic developments in Moscow is "a bold move." "In the first place, the Japanese cannot fail to duly appreciate this decision. Secondly, having proclaimed support for what the Russian president did, they will evidently not want to complicate the situation for him and refrain from focusing attention on the territorial dispute, though it will be discussed during the visit, of course," he concluded.

Resumption of ROK-DPRK Talks Welcomed

SK0710115993 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1000 GMT 6 Oct 93

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Delegates of South and North Korea held a meeting at Panmunjom on 5 October and discussed an exchange of presidential envoys of the two sides. Regarding this, station commentator Valeriy Cherkov writes:

The meeting itself has great significance. South-North dialogue, which had been successfully held for two years, was severed and frozen early this year because Pyongyang unilaterally gave it up while opposing the ROK-U.S. Team Spirit joint military exercise. Moreover, the DPRK made a decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and not to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] inspections of its nuclear facilities [haek taesang].

As a result, not only the Korean peninsula's situation, but also the Asia-Pacific region's overall situation became extremely cold. The situation was eased to a degree by Pyongyang's suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT in June. Pyongyang, however, has not completely removed its decision to withdraw from the treaty, and the issue of international inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities remains (?as an apple of discord). Regretfully, the issue does not seem to be resolved soon. The DPRK Foreign Ministry's recent statement proves this. The DPRK rejected the IAEA's 1 October proposal for early resumption of cooperation between Pyongyang and the IAEA.

However, I think the South-North dialogue held at Panmunjom yesterday [5 October] can serve as a turning point in normalizing South-North relations.

Although they have not agreed on the date of the DPRK presidential envoy's arrival in Seoul, the resumption of South-North dialogue itself is enough to satisfy us. Because without such dialogue, neither the normalization of South-North relations nor the solution of the issue regarding nuclear safeguards, the most important question on the Korean peninsula, would be possible. Only when the nuclear safeguards issue is completely resolved, can other pending issues of the Korean peninsula be solved. The resumption of South-North dialogue provided an excellent opportunity for easing tensions between South and North Korea.

PRC Nuclear Test Threatens Complete Ban

PM0710153193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

[Manki Ponomarev article: "Lest There Be a Chain Reaction..."]

[Text] The report about China carrying out an underground nuclear weapons test even crowded out materials about events in Russia on the pages of the world press. This is not surprising. For over a year now the nuclear powers have been observing a moratorium on nuclear explosions. In summer this year U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that Washington was extending this moratorium for at least another 15 months. On the same day, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin confirmed that Russia would take an analogous stance and that it too does not intend to renew nuclear testing. France and Great Britain also shared this point of view. Only China took an evasive stance and did not join the official moratorium. But even China had not tested nuclear weapons since September 1992.

And now this restraint has been cast aside by the Beijing leadership. A very powerful nuclear explosion—on the order of 1 megaton, according to the information of a number of agencies—went off at the Lop Nor test range in Northwest China.

But the point is not just the force of the Chinese explosion, although it was, of course, very substantial. The point is that this explosion may serve as a detonator and initiate, as nuclear physicists say, a chain reaction of nuclear tests in other countries. The Washington Administration, the NEW YORK TIMES reports, has already given instructions for preparations for resuming U.S. testing, which officials at the Defense Department, the Security Council, and the State Department are advocating. You can easily imagine that other countries may also resume testing. After all, in declaring a moratorium they stipulated that a condition of its observance is that no one whatsoever should resume nuclear explosions.

It is impossible to believe that Beijing did not realize what consequences its step would entail. It recently received several warnings on this account. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership decided to ignore them. Why? The Chinese themselves claim that it is first and foremost the countries that have the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons that should restrict their activity in developing them. And China, they say, only has a limited amount of such weapons. What strange logic! It works out that, with the aim of saving humankind from the nuclear threat, China must reach the level of other nuclear powers, that is, build up nuclear weapons.

There is another side to this question. Quite recently at the Conference on Disarmament in Paris, its participants,—representatives of 39 states—agreed that at the next session of the conference, in January of next year, talks should start on a complete and universal ban on nuclear testing. But if the moratorium on this is rescinded what talk can there be of a ban?

And not only that. The fate of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the validity of which runs out in 1995, is being called into question. Preparations for its indefinite extension are already under way. But the nuclear explosion at Lop Nor is a mine placed under the treaty's future.

The world community is expressing angry indignation at Beijing's actions. It remains only to pin hope on the force of reason of leaders of nuclear powers, who must prevent the chain reaction generated by the explosion in China from becoming irreversible.

Kozyrev: Foreign Policy To Remain Unchanged

PM0710173693 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev by IZVESTIYA's diplomatic observer Maksim Yusin; place and date not given: "Andrey Kozyrev: Six Months Ago Rutskoy Told Me: 'I Hate Them, These Red-Browns'"]

[Text] [Yusin] Mr. Minister, how will the Supreme Soviet's disappearance from the political scene affect Russian diplomacy?

[Kozyrev] Foreign policy will remain unchanged. We have always pursued the president's line. True, some of our decisions were not correctly perceived in the world. For instance, when we advocated a considered approach in the Yugoslav conflict, many people thought this was the result of pressure from the Supreme Soviet, which supported the Serbian national patriots. But in fact we were proceeding solely on the basis of Russia's national interests. Our position will not change in this respect. If necessary, Russia may even use its veto in the Security Council—when, say, it comes to the question of lifting the embargo on arms deliveries to the Balkans.

[Yusin] How, in your opinion, will the situation in Russia develop in the coming months?

[Kozyrev] I have faith in the people's common sense. You remember, on the eve of the April referendum many people were afraid: Would the voters not turn out, would they vote the wrong way? But in the event people made the right choice. I think the same thing will happen this time.

One of the main problems in our political life is the lack of a real center. All those small but noisy political groups that called themselves the center disappeared immediately after the crisis broke out. Some joined the "red-browns," others had the decency or the political flair not to take part in the adventure and to go over to the president's camp. Rutskoy, the Civic Union in its various variations, Zorkin, "Smena—New Policy," Oleg Rumyantsev—all of them turned out to be only an illusory center.

How rapidly the evolution occurred! It was only six months ago that Rutskoy told me: "I hate them, these red-browns." And Khasbulatov said much the same at that time: "I am more afraid of them than of you."

Now that the illusory center has exposed itself, a real, durable center must be created. It could take the government's economic wing as its basis—from Gaydar to Chernomyrdin, which would provide quite a good combination of theorists and practitioners. The Democratic Russia leaders could join the new center, so could people like Volskiy and Yavlinskiy...

[Yusin] And Yuriy Skokov, who only recently was described as the leader of some kind of "third force" capable of becoming the arbiter between the Congress and the president?

[Kozyrev] Skokov is a man of a different stamp. Along with Rutskoy, a very dangerous phenomenon entered our life—political amateurism, oversimplification. A plant director tells the government and the president how to run the state. A former airman lectures the prime minister on how to implement economic reform. Much the same happened with Skokov: A man with very limited experience thought he was a strategist capable of leading the Security Council.

[Yusin] You have just returned from the Kremlin, from a session of the Security Council. What questions were discussed?

[Kozyrev] There was one item on the agenda—the formulation of military doctrine. I put forward a proposal to create effective peacekeeping forces. Regional and global security problems are being tackled right now in the hot spots: Tajikistan, Abkhazia, the Balkans, Somalia... In order to maintain its prestige, Russia should participate in the international community's peacekeeping efforts.

This applies in particular to the "nearby foreign countries." Our inability to launch peacekeeping operations quickly creates a vacuum which terrorists can fill, as in Abkhazia. Moreover, there is a danger of losing geopolitical positions that took centuries to gain. We have plenty of neighbors in Asia who are prepared to send gunmen and weapons into the former Soviet republics—even in the guise of peacekeeping forces. It is these states, and not the United States as our "patriots" think, that aim to force Russia out of the region and restrict its influence.

[Yusin] How would Moscow's relations with the "nearby foreign countries" have developed if the defenders of the White House had come to power?

[Kozyrev] Rutskoy's and Khasbulatov's last desperate call was to recreate the Soviet Union. But how could that be achieved? Only by force of arms. The people to carry this out were already in readiness. For instance, the Dniester gangsters who arrived to defend the House of Soviets. They have nothing in common with the real defenders of the interests of the inhabitants of the Dniester Region. These are people who have made a profession of war.

It is too soon to write off the "war party," it is continuing to whip up interethnic conflicts on Russia's borders. We should oppose this party with military might, in order to stifle at birth forces that could subsequently unleash a new war and take thousands of lives.

[Yusin] What steps will Russia take to resolve the situation in Abkhazia, where the "war party" you were just speaking of has secured total victory by seizing Sukhumi?

[Kozyrev] Russia will demand that the Abkhaz leadership return to the terms of the Sochi agreement and resolve the question of Abkhazia's status by peaceful means. And only then will it be possible to talk about lifting sanctions. Russia should be prepared to carry out peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia.

This region is a zone of our vital interests. If Russia loses its positions there, other forces could take our place, and that will inevitably lead to destabilization in the North Caucasus. If we permit the disintegration of Georgia today, tomorrow the same danger will threaten Russia. A highly dangerous precedent will be created.

[Yusin] How effective have Russia's sanctions against Abkhazia proved?

[Kozyrev] Unfortunately, not everyone has complied with the sanctions in every respect. The dyarchy in the country played a major role in this. The Supreme Soviet supported the extremists in the Abkhaz conflict. Now I think it will be possible to impose order.

Kozyrev Visit to Vienna Canceled

LD0710202393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1444 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] As Interfax learned from Russia's Foreign Ministry, at the request of President Boris Yeltsin Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev cancelled his visit to Vienna, where he was to join Friday's conference of the leaders of European Council member states. "The request was prompted by the need to resolve several important foreign-policy issues," Interfax's source explained.

At the summit in Vienna Russia will be represented by First Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoliy Adamishin.

Major, Kohl Reiterate Support for Yeltsin

AU0710134593 Paris AFP in English 1326 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, Oct 7 (AFP)—European leaders John Major and Helmut Kohl reiterated their support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin in personal telephone conversations Thursday, following this week's bloody political drama in Moscow.

British Prime Minister John Major assured Yeltsin of his "support and solidarity" for the steps he had taken to defend democracy, the Kremlin said.

The British premier also offered to send a parliamentary delegation to observe legislative elections in Russia due to take place on December 12, the president's press service said in a statement.

Yeltsin thanked Major for his backing and said the British Parliament could depend on the "democratic and open character" of the elections to a new Russian federal legislature.

Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl also discussed the current situation in Moscow with Yeltsin Thursday and gave him his full backing, Germany's government spokesman Dieter Vogel said.

Yeltsin, speaking on the telephone, guaranteed that democratic reforms would continue, Vogel added.

Since 1988, Germany has been the most ardent advocate of Western support for Russia.

Western leaders including U.S. President Bill Clinton pledged their support for Yeltsin soon after the political crisis began September 21 following the President's decision to dissolve the Soviet-era parliament and his calling of early elections for December 12.

Yeltsin declared Thursday a national day of mourning for the estimated 170 victims of Sunday's and Monday's violence in Moscow.

ITAR-TASS on Major Call

LD0710130093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1225 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—President Yeltsin had a telephone conversation with British Prime Minister John Major today on the initiative of the latter, President Yeltsin's press service reports.

John Major expressed support for and solidarity with the action taken to defend democratic gains and suppress the putsch in Moscow. The British prime minister said that a British parliamentary delegation would like to act as observers during elections to the Russian Federal Assembly.

Yeltsin thanked John Major and said that British legislators would be able to see for themselves that forthcoming elections to the Federal Assembly would be democratic and open.

Yeltsin Decrees

Yeltsin Orders Investigation of Moscow 'Mutiny'

LD0710204893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1142 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The Kremlin, Moscow, 7 Oct— On Investigating the Armed Mutiny [myatezh] in the City of Moscow.

A mutiny was raised in Moscow on 3 October 1993. Armed groups, led and directed by extremist leaders of the former Supreme Soviet and other persons holding official positions, carried out attacks on important state installations, and caused mass disorders, accompanied by murders, vandalism, and arson. The blood of many innocent people flowed—civilians, servicemen, militiamen, and journalists, including foreign correspondents. Heavy material damage has been caused.

At the present time, measures are being taken to deal with the consequences of the mutiny and to re-establish normal life in the city. The state is affording the necessary assistance to casualties and to the families of those killed.

The organizers of and active participants in the mutiny have been detained. The General Procuracy has begun criminal proceedings. Investigations are under way. After the completion of preliminary enquiries, the criminal cases will be transferred to the Military Collegium of the Russian Federation Supreme Court, as well as to other federal and local courts.

For the purposes of re-establishing law and order, I decree:

1. The Procurator General of the Russian Federation (A.I. Kazannik), the security minister of the Russian Federation (N.M. Golushko), and the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Federation (V.F. Yerin), are to provide, for swift and full disclosure of crimes, identification of the guilty parties, and correct implementation of the law in order that each organizer, leader, and active participant in the mutiny should receive just punishment, and so that not one innocent party should be subjected to criminal prosecution.

2. The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation is to establish the necessary conditions for examining in court without delay, cases related to the mutiny that have been investigated.

3. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Security Ministry of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation are to make provision for the defense of judges, injured parties, witnesses, and other participants in judicial inquiries, as well as of court buildings.

4. The Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation is, within a period of two weeks, to allocate the additional financial, material, and technical means necessary for the implementation of this decree.

5. The decree comes into force from the moment of signature. [no signature as received]

Decree on 'Legal Regulation' Issued

LD0710213793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1315 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, 7 Oct (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed a decree "On Legal Regulation During the Period of Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation." The president's press service has issued the full text of the decree:

DECREE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
ON LEGAL REGULATION DURING THE PERIOD OF STAGE-BY-STAGE
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

In order to prevent the unauthorized publication of normative enactments that are out of keeping with the legislative enactments of the Russian Federation, to effect the operational regulation of economic processes within the country, to ensure state and public security, to protect civil rights and freedoms, and also to implement the Federation Treaty, I DECREE:

1. The validity is confirmed on the territory of the Russian Federation of the laws of the Russian Federation and of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation that were adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation before 21 September 1993 and came into force in accordance with established procedure, and also of the legislation of the former Soviet Union, insofar as it does not contradict the legislation of the Russian Federation adopted since 12 June 1990.

2. It is to be established that, until the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation starts work, legal regulation as regards questions of the republican budget of the Russian Federation, federal taxes and dues, banking, external-economic and investment activities, currency-financial and customs regulation, monetary emission, land reform, ownership, federal state service, and the social protection of the population, which have been assigned to the jurisdiction of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and the Russian Supreme Soviet, is effected by the president of the Russian Federation.

Legal regulation as regards the aforementioned questions is effected by normative enactments issued in the form of decrees of the president of the Russian Federation.

3. Enactments by the president of the Russian Federation envisaged by Paragraph 2 of the present decree are issued solely for the purpose of ensuring operational regulation of economic processes within the country, ensuring state and public security, protecting civil rights and freedoms, and also implementing the Federation Treaty.

4. Decisions of the Council of Ministers, the Government of the Russian Federation, and also decisions of the organs of power and administration of the republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, must be in keeping with the legislative enactments of the Russian Federation, bearing in mind amendments to the legal regulation envisaged by Paragraph 2 of the present decree.

5. The following possess the right to officially submit for consideration by the president of the Russian Federation, draft decrees of the president of the Russian Federation, and also draft laws of the Russian Federation proposed to the president of the Russian Federation for submission to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for consideration:

—the Council of Ministers, the Government of the Russian Federation;

—heads of organs of power and administration of the republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, the autonomous oblast, autonomous okrugs, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg;

—the chairman of the Russian Supreme Court;

—the chairman of the Russian Supreme Court of Arbitration;

—the procurator general of the Russian Federation;

—the chairman of the Russian Central Bank;

—the Commission for Legislative Proposals under the president of the Russian Federation.

6. Draft normative enactments submitted to the president of the Russian Federation in violation of Paragraph 5 of the present decree shall remain unconsidered.

7. It is to be established that all submitted draft decrees and directives of the president of the Russian Federation that have been cleared in advance with the heads of the relevant ministries, departments, enterprises, organizations, and institutions shall necessarily undergo expert legal examination in the appropriate sections of the Russian president's administration at least five days before submission for signing by the president of the Russian Federation, and at least one month before being submitted by the president of the Russian Federation for consideration by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in the case of draft laws of the Russian Federation.

8 Draft decrees of the president of the Russian Federation, as well as draft laws of the Russian Federation, proposed to the president of the Russian Federation for submission on his behalf for consideration by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, are to be submitted to the president of the Russian Federation only if accompanied by an expert legal opinion as to their conformity with the current legislative enactments of the Russian Federation, bearing in mind amendments to the legal regulation envisaged by Paragraph 2 of the present decree.

9. It is to be established that instructions on the preparation of draft laws for submission to the Russian Supreme Soviet that are to be carried out in the central organs of federal executive power shall be carried out within the stipulated time, and draft laws drawn up in accordance with them are to be submitted to the president of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure envisaged by the present decree.

10. It is to be established that decree No. 48 of the president of the Russian Federation, dated 14 January 1993, "On the Procedure for the Activities of the Central Organs of Federal Executive Power and the Russian President's Administration to Carry Out Work on Draft Laws," and directive No. 85-rts [as received; expansion unknown] of the president of the Russian Federation, dated 5 February 1993, on improving the preparation of enactments of the president of the Russian Federation and the Council of Ministers, the Government of the Russian Federation, are valid insofar as they do not contradict the present decree.

11. Personal responsibility for implementing Paragraph 4 of the present decree with regard to issuing enactments by the Council of Ministers, the Government of the Russian Federation, is to be laid on V.S. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Government of the Russian Federation.

12. The present decree is to be submitted for consideration by the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

13. The present decree comes into force from the moment it is signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation
[Dated] Kremlin, Moscow, 7 October 1993

Constitutional Court Suspended

LD0710182593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1735 GMT 7 Oct 93

["Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 'On the Constitutional Court'"; "Official Press Release"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Oct (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed the decree "On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation".

Below follows the full text of the decree.

"On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation"

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has found itself in deep crisis. Twice in 1993 the Constitutional Court placed the country on the brink of civil war by its hasty actions and decisions. When the threat of civil war became real, the Constitutional Court was inactive.

By actively carrying out political activities, the chairman of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court took part in political actions drawing the Constitutional Court ever deeper into them. In doing this the requirements of the law on the Russian Constitutional Court were crudely violated.

The Constitutional Court, by adopting a unilateral political decision on the Russian presidential decree "On Gradual Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation" of 21 September 1993, No. 1400, by not giving an immediate appraisal of the anticonstitutional violent actions of the extremist forces, and by not examining the issue of the constitutionality of the acts of the former Supreme Soviet and Congress of Peopl[illegible]puties after the cessation of their powers, played a [illegible]ive role, in essence the role of an accomplice, in th[illegible]gic development of events of 3-4 October 1993 in Moscow.

Some judges of the Constitutional Court have said they refuse to attend conferences and sittings of the Constitutional Court until the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation begins its work. Its decisions that are not adopted by all the members are null and void.

From a body of constitutional justice the Constitutional Court has turned into a weapon of political struggle, which is of exclusive danger to the state.

Taking into account the statement made by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on 5 October 1993 abandoning its function of checking the constitutionality of normative acts and international treaties of the Russian Federation, and in connection with the necessity to ensure the succession of constitutional justice in the Russian Federation by legal means, I declare:

1. To ascertain the impossibility of the Constitutional Court functioning in its incomplete composition and not to convene its sittings until the new constitution of the Russian Federation is adopted.

2. To propose that the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation examine as a priority, the question of organizational and legal forms of implementation of the constitutional justice in the Russian Federation.

3. To preserve the rights and guarantees granted to the Constitutional Court judges in accordance with the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and current legal acts.

4. The statement of Russian Constitutional Court Chairman V.D. Zorkin laying down his powers as chairman of the Constitutional Court is to be taken into consideration.

5. The acting chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation is to ensure the work of the judges and the apparatus of the Russian Constitutional Court in preparing proposals for the Russian Federal Assembly regarding the organizational-legal forms of the implementation of Constitutional Court business in the Russian Federation, including the possiblity of setting up a constitutional collegium within the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation; in preparing all the necessary materials for the cases being handled by the Constitutional Court for their subsequent examination; in publishing the decisions and other materials of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

6. The Russian Security Ministry and Ministry of Internal Affairs are to ensure the guarding of the buildings and other premises of the Russian Constitutional Court and the Constitutional Court judges.

7. A department to guard the judiciary's supreme bodies is to be formed. The Russian security minister (N.M.Golushko) [TASS parenthesis] is appointed head of the guard department.

8. The head of the department guarding the judiciary's supreme bodies is to present the structure of the department, the staff structure, and an estimate of expenditure within 10 days.

9. The decree comes into force from the moment of signing."

[No signature as received]

President To Appoint, Dismiss Local Leaders

LD0710202193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1850 GMT 7 Oct 93

Moscow, 7 Oct (ITAR-TASS)—The decree of the president of the Russian Federation on the procedure for appointing and dismissing heads of administration of the krays, oblasts, autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, and cities of federal importance [Moscow and St. Petersburg] has been published here.

The decree states: "With the aim of ensuring the stable functioning of executive power bodies for the period of gradual constitutional reform in the Russian Federation, in accordance with points one and two of the decree of the president of the Russian Federation of 27 September 1993 no. 1465 "On the Functioning of Bodies of Executive Power for the Period of Gradual Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," and being guided by Article 1211 and point seven of Article 125 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, I decree:

1. That it be established that the head of administration of a kray, oblast, autonomous oblast, autonomous okrug, or city of federal importance is appointed and dismissed by the president of the Russian Federation upon representation from the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Government of the Russian Federation.

2. This decree comes into force from the moment of signing.

[Signed]President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
[Dated]The Kremlin, Moscow, 7 October 1993

Moscow Soviets Abolished

LD0710211993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1955 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, 7 Oct (ITAR-TASS)—Today President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On the Cessation of the Powers of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, the Zelenograd Town Soviet of People's Deputies, and Rayon Soviets of People's Deputies and Settlement and Village Soviets of People's Deputies in Moscow."

The full text of the decree follows:

"In connection with the active resistance by the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, the Zelenograd Town Soviet of People's Deputies, and the rayon soviets of people's deputies and settlement and village soviets of people's deputies in the city of Moscow to the implementation of the decree by the president of the Russian Federation of 21 September 1993 no. 1400 "On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation" and cooperation with the armed mutiny in the city of Moscow on 3-4 October, for the purposes of reforming representative bodies of power and stabilizing the political situation in the capital of the Russian Federation I decree:

1. That the powers of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, the Zelenograd Town Soviet of People's Deputies, the Vostochniy, Nekrasovskiy, Rublevskiy, and Vnukovskoy settlement soviets of people's deputies, and the Tolstopaltsevskiy village soviet of people's deputies in the city of Moscow be brought to an end from 7 October 1993. At the same time the powers of the people's deputies of the soviets of people's deputies indicated in this article are terminated.

2. The Moscow government is to take under its control all bodies, organizations, and institutions subordinate to the soviets of people's deputies indicated in article 1 of this decree; ensure that the organizations and institutions subordinate to the Zelenograd Town Soviet of People's Deputies are taken under its control by appropriate bodies of executive power in Moscow; ensure employment (if so desired) for workers in the administrations and service personnel of the soviets of people's deputies indicated in article one of the present decree.

3. That elections to a representative body of state power of the city of Moscow be held simultaneously with elections to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

4. That the mayor of the City of Moscow present to the president of the Russian Federation by 20 October 1993 draft provisions for elections to a representative body of state power of the city of Moscow and provisions for a system of bodies for managing the city of Moscow for the transition period.

5. That leaders of enterprises, establishments, and organizations which previously employed people's deputies who were released for work in the councils on a permanent basis, should offer work at the post previously held or one analogous to it with the appropriate salary. That bodies of executive power of the city of Moscow afford assistance to deputies in finding work in those cases where the enterprises, establishments, or organizations in which they worked have gone into liquidation and have no legal successors.

6. This decree comes into force from the moment of signature. [no signature as received]

Compensation for Killed, Wounded Outlined

LD0810002093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1142 GMT 7 Oct 93

["Decree" by President Boris Yeltsin—"On Affording Material Assistance to the Families of Those Who Were Killed (or Died Later) and to Citizens Maimed During the Elimination of the Attempted Armed Coup d'Etat on 3-4 October 1993 in the City of Moscow"]

[Text] In order to afford material assistance to the families of those who were killed (or died later), as well as to citizens maimed during the elimination of the attempted armed coup d'etat 3-4 October 1993 in the city of Moscow,

I decree:

1. It is to be established that in instances where servicemen, rank-and-file members, or command personnel of internal affairs bodies, or other citizens, were killed (or died later) or were maimed (wounded, injured, shocked) through participation in the elimination of the attempted armed coup d'etat on 3-4 October 1993 in the city of Moscow, a lump sum of material assistance shall be paid:

To members of the families of servicemen, rank-and-file members, or command personnel of internal affairs bodies who were killed (or died later)—including to wives (husbands), to children under the age of 18 (students under the age of 23), or beyond this age if they became disabled before the age of 18, to fathers and mothers—an amount equal to 60 pay periods (to the families of servicemen performing military service on conscription—no less than an amount equal to 60 times the minimum monthly wage) in equal shares to each member of the family in addition to the benefits envisaged by law;

To servicemen, rank-and-file and commanding members of the internal affairs bodies who were maimed (wounded, injured, shocked) and prevented from performing further service—an amount equal to 30 pay periods (for servicemen performing military service on conscription—not less than an amount equal to 30 times the minimum monthly wage applying on the day of injury) in addition to the benefits provided by law;

To members of the families of those who were killed (or died later) while carrying out the labor commitments of other citizens—to wives (husbands) and children under 18 (students up to the age of 23) or older than that age if they became invalids before they were 18, to fathers and mothers—an amount equal to 120 times the minimum monthly wage applying on the day of death in equal shares to each member of the family;

To other persons who became group 1 or group 2 invalids after being maimed (wounded, injured, shocked) while carrying out labor commitments—an amount equal to 60 times the minimum monthly wage applying to the day on which the invalidity was assessed, or 30 times in the case of group 3 invalids.

The Russian Defense Ministry, the Russian Interior Ministry, the Russian Security Ministry, the Russian Ministry of Social Protection of the Population, and the Russian Finance Ministry are to ensure payment of the aforesaid material assistance from the funds of the republican budget of the Russian Federation.

2. The funerals of persons who were killed (or died later) in connection with their participation in the elimination of the attempted armed coup d'etat on 3-4 October 1993 in Moscow are to be charged to the funds of the republican budget of the Russian Federation.

The Moscow Government is to organize the holding of the funerals, in conjunction, where necessary, with the executive bodies of components of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Finance Ministry is to allocate, in the form of an advance from the Russian republican budget, to the Moscow Government 15 million rubles for the aforementioned purpose with subsequent modification through mutual clearing between budgets, proceeding from a norm not exceeding 10 times the minimum monthly wage per person buried.

3. It is to be established that the fact of the death or maiming during the elimination of the attempted armed coup d'etat on 3-4 October 1993 in Moscow (apart from servicemen and rank-and-file members or command personnel of internal affairs bodies) shall be confirmed by the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the city of Moscow. [no signature as received]

Statute on Duma Elections Amended

PM0810110193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 3

["Edict of the Russian Federation President on Ratifying the Edited Version of the Statute on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma in 1993 and Amending and Supplementing the Statute on the Federal Organs of Power in the Transitional Period," signed by President B. Yeltsin and dated Moscow, Kremlin, 1 October 1993, No. 1557]

[Text] On the basis of the results of the referendum of 25 April 1993, guided by Articles 1, 2, and 121/5 of the Russian Federation Constitution and Points 3 and 4 of the edict of the Russian Federation president of 21 September 1993 No. 1400 "On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation," and taking acount of the criticisms and proposals received from a number of federation components and the results of the discussion at the session of the Constitutional Conference's Public Chamber of the Statute on the Federal Organs of Power in the Transitional Period and the Statute on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma, I resolve:

1. That in the third section of Article 2 of the Statute on the Federal Organs of Power in the Transitional Period the number of deputies in the State Duma should read "450" instead of "400."

2. To ratify the Statute on the Federal Organs of Power in the Transitional Period with the amendments made to it.

3. To ratify the Statute on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma in 1993 in its revised version (attached).

4. To bring into force the Statute on the Election of Deputies to the State Duma from the moment of its publication.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin, [Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 1 October 1993, No. 1557

State of Emergency

Coup Leaders Formally Placed Under Arrest

LD0810092193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0847 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Sergey Oleynik]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Oct—Warrants for the arrest of the six leaders of the armed uprising have been officially issued, CRIME- PRESS was informed by the public relations center of Russia's Security Ministry.

After the capitulation of the White House Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, Barannikov, Dunayev, Achalov, and Makashov were held for three days at Lefortovo prison as administrative detainees. Yesterday their legal status was altered. They can now be described as being under arrest.

No charges have been preferred as yet against the former state functionaries. Sergey Vasilyev, deputy head of the public relations center, explained that, under the law as it stands, arrested persons may be held in custody without charge for 10 days.

Lawyers are still not being allowed access to the leaders of the insurrection.

Arrests Discussed

LD0810095093

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 0850 GMT on 8 October broadcasts a program in which Andrey Krasnov, of the Yukos information service, reviews press coverage of Rutskoy and Khasbulatov's arrest.

He states: "The IZVESTIYA daily has some details of the imprisonment of the former vice president and the former supreme soviet leader." He goes on to say that they were arrested by the Alpha anti-terrorist unit, were given food, and went to sleep. "Aleksandr Rutskoy smoked a lot throughout, while Ruslan Khasbulatov was in a state of prostration," he adds.

The possibility of Ruslan Khasbulatov being tried is in serious doubt, Krasnov says. "Some media have reported a serious worsening in his state of health. Abdul Akhamzayev, Ruslan Khasbulatov's lawyer, told the KOMMERSANT DAILY that the former leader of the Supreme Soviet is seriously ill."

Krasnov states that the trial will not be easy. Rutskoy and Khasbulatov will probably be tried according to Article 77—incitement to kill and incitement to mutiny—which provides for terms of imprisonment between three and 15 years and "even the death penalty," he adds.

Treatment in Prison Described

LD0710143193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1329 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By KRIM-PRESS correspondent Sergey Oleynik]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Oct—The rebel leaders—Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, Barannikov, Dunayev, Achalov, and Makashov—today had fresh cabbage soup, herring, and potatoes for their dinner. They will be given cooked wheat grain and tea for their supper.

The head of the Lefortovo Remand Center said at a news conference that the former state leaders who are now being held on remand are not receiving any favored treatment. The only difference in their position compared with the others who were detained on 4 October—and there are just over 50 of these left in Lefortovo today—is that they are being held in single rooms. In other respects the conditions for everyone are the same—they rise at 0600, lights out is at 2200, they have conversations with the investigators, and in their free time they can read newspapers and books from the prison library. They can hear the latest news on the radio, but there is no television in the cells.

In accordance with procedural norms, the organizers and participants in the rebellion are not yet taken out for strolls, and no meetings with lawyers or relatives are allowed. True, it is possible to receive parcels from outside containing clothing and foodstuffs. Despite the absence of fresh air, the persons under remand have no complaints about their state of health. The governor of the prison says none of those being kept at Lefortovo has wounds or other indications requiring hospitalization. Their psychological state is also satisfactory—they are all behaving correctly and politely, and there are no irregularities in their behavior. They are not displaying any hostility toward the warders and investigators.

To date, of the 160 taken to Lefortovo after the capitulation of the "White House," more than two-thirds have been set free for lack of corpus delicti. The rest are being investigated. The contingent here is of the most varied kind—from a 15-year-old adolescent who obviously got into hot water out of stupidity—to physically and politically fully mature members of the armed forces and militia. Under the law, on the passing of 72 hours from the moment of their arrest—that is, tonight—all of them must be charged or they will be released.

Lawyer Reports Khasbulatov 'Feeling Quite Well'

LD0810100993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Abdul Akhamzayev, the lawyer defending Khasbulatov, has reported to the INTERFAX agency that on Thursday [7 October] night he was given an opportunity to meet his defendant. According to the lawyer, Ruslan Khasbulatov is feeling quite well and presents himself with confidence. He shows no signs of depression, noted Akhamzayev. He also reported that during his meeting with the defendant it was decided that the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet will be defended by another lawyer.

Lawyer Withdraws From Case

LD0810112193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1050 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By KRIM-PRESS Correspondents Sergey Oleynik and Nikolay Semenenko]

[Text] Moscow, 8 Oct—The former parliament speaker and now prisoner Ruslan Khasbulatov has failed to find common language with lawyer Abdul Akhamzayev, who offered to defend him three days ago.

Today, in the course of the interval in the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] case proceedings, Akhamzayev, who is a member of the Moscow city collegium of lawyers, told a KRIM-PRESS correspondent that he had changed his decision to defend Khasbulatov. According to other data, it was Khasbulatov himself who refused the lawyer's services during their meeting in the Lefortovo prison yesterday.

At the SCSE trial Akhamzayev represents the interests of Gennadiy Yanayev, the former USSR vice president. Recently he also became the lawyer of Vyacheslav

Terekhov, who headed the USSR officers' union and who was arrested following the recent armed attack in Moscow on the headquarters of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

'Working Russia' Leader Anpilov Detained Near Tula

LD0710140493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1343 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] We have just received a telegram from ITAR-TASS. The leader of the Working Russia movement, Viktor Anpilov, was detained at about 1600 hours [1300 GMT] today at a dacha near Tula. Viktor Aksenov, head of the oblast directorate of the security ministry said that the operation was conducted jointly by the security service and internal affairs directorate. Anpilov offered no resistance when detained. No weapons were found on him but a bullet-proof vest was confiscated from him, as well as recordings giving views on the recent events. Anpilov and the owners of the dacha, who were all detained, were taken to Moscow.

Said Planning Attempt on Yeltsin

AU0710135693 Paris AFP in English 1348 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, Oct 7 (AFP)—Police on Thursday arrested Viktor Ampilov, the head of the ultranationalist Working Russia Party who was sought by authorities since the failed uprising in Moscow, the Interior Ministry announced.

Ampilov was arrested along with several other supporters in the region of Tula, about 300 kilometres (186 miles) south of Moscow.

The nationalist leader, according to initial findings by investigators, "was preparing an attempt against President Boris Yeltsin," said an Interior Ministry official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Ampilov along with Ilia Konstantinov, head of the National Salvation Front, another opposition party, is suspected of having helped orchestrate the violence in Moscow.

Konstantinov is also being sought by police.

Arrest Detailed

LD0810084293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0752 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Rudenko]

[Text] Tula October 8 TASS—ITAR-TASS has learned from trustworthy sources within Russian law enforcement bodies about some details linked with the October 7 arrest of Viktor Ampilov, leader of the "Working Russia" party.

Ampilov's hideout was disclosed by a person who preferred to remain anonymous. He told the editorial office of the newspaper "MOLODOY KOMMUNAR" that Ampilov had found refuge in a countryhouse, belonging to his friends, in the "Meliorator" Suburban Orchard Association. The man even drew a chart to help find the house. The editorial office informed the regional department of the Russian Security Ministry about this tip.

Secret surveillance was organised around the countryhouse and an ambush was set up jointly with the local militia. But Ampilov did not appear on the plot. About ten militiamen and security agents entered the house a few hours later. Its owners were inside together with a woman from Moscow who, as later established, had accompanied Ampilov to Tula. A bulletproof vest was found in the room and some sheets of paper with a written text on them. The first page was capped with the name "Viktor Ampilov." The agents were told that Ampilov had been in the house, but left it some time ago.

The owners of the house and the woman from Moscow were taken away and the agents pretended to leave the place, but continued to watch the house from the outside. A short while afterwards, they noticed somebody moving within the countryhouse and entered it again. Ampilov was very much surprised to see them. It turned out that he was hiding in the attic all the time. He did not put up any resistance during the arrest.

Yerin Comments on Arrests, Crime

LD0710185693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1800 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Yuriy Shcherban]

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—"Forty-nine bodies have been taken out of the parliament building by now," General of the Army Viktor Yerin, Russian minister of the interior, told a ministry briefing on Thursday [7 October]. He said rumours about hundreds of dead bodies lying in the building proved "slightly exaggerated".

The minister said that, according to some data reaching him, militants from among supporters of Aleksandr Rutskoy and Ruslan Khasbulatov are still holed up in the basement of the parliament building. Approaches to the premises are blocked by booby traps planted by parliament defenders.

According to Interior Ministry data, the number of those detained during the capitulation of the "White House", totalled 1,338. An overwhelming majority of them have been released for lack of corpus delicti. Slightly more than 200 people remain in detention under administrative law.

According to Yerin, the criminogenic [as received] situation in the capital of Russia and other regions of the federation was under the control of Interior Ministry agencies. Crime growth over the first nine months of this year was only 2.2 per cent as against up to 30 in the corresponding period of last year.

Yerin confirmed the fact that Viktor Anpilov, leader of the Labour Moscow Movement, was detained outside Moscow region on Thursday.

Anpilov is to be brought to Moscow shortly, he said. At the moment of being apprehended, Anpilov was preparing leaflets aimed at organising new provocations.

Yerin denied rumours about the involvement of a Dniester battalion or Riga OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] men in the defence of the "White House".

Tens of sniper and militant groups from among parliament defenders have been rendered harmless. However, provocations are possible, the interior minister told journalists. "It would be naive to expect that everything has subsided and calmed down. The situation in Moscow and around the city is under control," Yerin said.

Moscow Government Protests Release of Deputies

LD0810090293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1817 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Sugak]

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—The Moscow government issued a statement concerning the release of some deputies of the Moscow Council detained on the night from October 3-4, specifically Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Council Yuriy Sedykh-Bondarenko, leader of "the city headquarters for restoration of constitutional law." Sedykh-Bondarenko and his associates incited to unrest in Smolenskaya Square an armed gang, which then broke the riot police cordons around the White House, seized the mayor's office and staged a bloody pogrom there.

Such complacency sets one thinking about the protracted trial of the August 1991 coup plotters, the Moscow government said in the statement. It noted that the bloodshed in Moscow had been also prompted by softness showed by the public prosecutor's office towards extremist and criminal Viktor Anpilov. Being guided by such "soft" principles, organs of justice may also release leaders of the armed hardline rebellion Aleksandr Rutskoy, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Albert Makashov and others.

The Moscow government protests against the decision by law-enforcement bodies to free the Moscow Council deputies, in particular Yuriy Sedykh-Bondarenko, and calls upon Muscovites to press for a strict punishment for the criminals who raised arms against their people.

Situation in Moscow 'Starting To Stabilize'

PM0710090393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Vasiliy Fatigarov report: "The State of Emergency Persists. The Situation Is Starting To Stabilize"]

[Text] According to reports by the Moscow Internal Affairs Main Administration, there were no attacks on servicemen or military installations during the night of 5-6 October. Five murders were recorded in Moscow, one of which was cleared up, and there were seven violent robberies (three cleared up) and 12 thefts (seven cleared up). Bursts of assault rifle fire and shots were still heard in certain rayons of Moscow.

In the opinion of Moscow firefighters, the installations damaged in the recent events do not pose a great fire danger. But there is a different danger. Lone snipers continued operating Tuesday evening. Junior Sergeant Yevgeniy Kashayev, instructor on a fire truck standing at that time near the White House on Sadovoye Koltso, confirmed: "A sniper was ensconced in one of the surrounding buildings. I heard shots round about five o'clock in the evening."

The city is being patrolled around the clock by servicemen and militia detachments. The main tension is at the center. There is and has been no takeoff in the number of offenses in outlying districts.

"The curve of the growth in crimes in our district remains at the former level," Militia Colonel Vladimir Lipunov, commandant of the capital's Northern District, stated. "The events which have developed since 21 September have had no effect on the number of offenses. There have been shots, but this is the usual crime situation."

But all the guardians of order with whom I spoke last night said that the tough measures to implement the state of emergency were enforced and necessary, as a large number of uncontrolled weapons are distributed around Moscow. They must not be fired!

"Thank God, firearms have not yet been confiscated from vehicles, as was done in the region of the state of emergency in Ossetia," Lieutenant Vyacheslav Klabukov of the State Automobile Inspectorate said. "The population's attitude toward us is well disposed. Alas, there have been attacks, but in the main people understand the need for the steps taken by the government."

"I do not quite agree with the State Automobile Inspectorate spokesman," Militia Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Afanasyev, who is coordinating the actions of a Yaroslavl OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] group, said. "There are many functioning commercial stalls and people strolling about, and the traffic intensity does not die down until 0200 hours. In such a situation anything can happen...."

OMON detachments from many Russian cities are operating in Moscow. One mobile group alone, with which I have worked, detained approximately 70 people for violating the regime in the space of three hours. Many of them knew of the state of emergency regime, but supposedly did not realize there was a curfew.

"I knew about the state of emergency regime," Aleksandr Makhotin, production editor of Radio Radonezh, said. "But I did not know the procedure for implementing it."

The OMON acted tough, but "without excesses." None of the illegal goods confiscated from stall owners ended up in their pockets. I saw five OMON members sharing their last cigarette, but without opening confiscated packets of Marlboro and Camel.

The militia did not even detain many people making their way home. Nevertheless, according to Militia Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Rozanov, deputy commandant of the Central District, 424 people were brought in to Central District militia stations for various violations during the night of 5-6 October. At midnight a certain Yuriy Martynov was shot in his car while resisting militia staffers. Another citizen was seriously injured in an analogous situation. This is the cost of carelessness....

But you can already feel that Moscow is gradually awakening from the nightmare which has shrouded it. Lessons are not yet taking place in all schools, and not all parents are venturing to let their children out of their apartments, but the faces of our boys and girls look quite different to what they were a day or two ago. The kids have been the first to "forget" what happened, and their joie de vivre inspires hope. I would very much like to believe that all this will very soon sink into oblivion, and soldiers with assault rifles atilt will disappear from the capital's streets. The soldiers themselves are tired. Not even the most "impressionable" journalist could hardly have dreamed up what has fallen to their lot during these days.

'Relatively Quiet' Night Reported in Moscow

LD0810064093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0625 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow October 8 TASS—It was relatively quiet in Moscow overnight, according to the Interior Department of the Russian capital.

The fire department said no major blazes had occurred in the capital. However, four people were injured because of carelessness with fire.

The ambulance and the blood transfusion services said there are no shortages of medicines and donated blood.

White House Basement May Hold 'Armed Fighters'

LD0810113793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Examination of the basement premises of the House of Soviets is continuing. A part of the premises was mined by its defenders. INTERFAX has been told at the Interior Ministry that eight booby-trap mines have been made safe so far, and it is thought that there may still be armed fighters in the basement of the building.

Mayor's Office Says Death Toll Reaches 125

AU0710115393 Paris AFP in English 1145 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, Oct 7 (AFP)—At least 125 people have died in the two days of violence that rocked the Russian capital this week, the press office of the Moscow mayor said Thursday [7 October].

The latest figure, which the press office said was provided by municipal health officials, included parliamentary guards and people killed in riot violence on Sunday. It was presented as an overall, definitive toll.

The press service said the figure included dozens of people who were hospitalised and died afterwards of injuries sustained during the violence.

An earlier report from the ITAR-TASS news agency put the figure much higher at 187.

The task of compiling an accurate death toll has been complicated by the fact that various government institutions and agencies have announced widely differing "official" figures on victims of the violence.

Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on Tuesday said 127 people were killed in the two days of violence Sunday and Monday while other government officials have given separate tolls that would put the figure as high as 149.

According to an earlier report from medical officials, 108 people died in the violence that erupted Sunday at a television broadcast center while the corpses of at least 50 armed parliament fighters were pulled out of the White House.

Further on Casualty Figures

LD0710144193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1430 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Karlov]

[Text] Moscow, October 7 (TASS)—Seventy six civilians were killed in the armed rebellion in Moscow, a total of 656 civilians were wounded and 470 of them hospitalised, according to head of the Moscow ambulance service Levan Stazhadze, who added that the figures do not include the death toll among police and the military.

He told TASS on Thursday [7 October] that he does not exclude new casualties as quite a few armed militants remained in Moscow. "Local armed conflicts in the city are not excluded", he said.

"The information we possess gives no grounds for optimism", Stazhadze warned.

Funeral Held for Victims of 4 Oct Clashes

LD0710200193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1459 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—Civil funeral rites were performed in Moscow on Thursday [7 October] in connection with the death of seven members of Interior-Ministry personnel who died in line of duty near the parliament building, known as the White House, and near the Moscow mayor's office.

Their comrades, representatives of the Russian Government and the Moscow mayor's office, the leadership of the Russian Interior Ministry and the Moscow Main Department of Internal Affairs came to pay last respects to those killed. Hundreds of Muscovites and guests of the capital marched in mournful columns.

A mourning ceremony took place in the house of officers of the Dzerzhinsky Division of Russian Interior-Ministry troops. Those present bade last farewell to the five servicemen of the division who died when quelling the rebellion on October 4.

Within one day in Moscow the division lost the same number of servicemen as over the years of frequent tours of duty at flashpoints.

Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Kulikov, in an ITAR-TASS interview, expressed deep-felt sorrow at the deaths. "They died in battle as real soldiers and we shall do everything to worthily commend them. I nominated all the five of them to be awarded the title of hero of the Russian Federation".

The ceremony to honour the fallen servecemen of the division was attended by First Vice-Premier oleg Soskovets and Interior Minister Viktor Yerin.

A mourning ceremony also took place in Alabino township, Moscow region, where the Taman guards division is stationed. The servicemen today paid last respects to captain Aleksandr Milchakov, who was killed outside the ITAR-TASS news agency building on October 4 during a clash with armed bandits.

A farewell volley was fired in military honours to the officer who departed out of this workd leaving good memories of himself.

There were ten ceremonies to bury the civilian victims of the fighting in Moscow, Anatoliy Prokhorov, general director of the Moscow undertaker's firm ritual, told ITAR-TASS.

The Moscow Government has allocated 250,000 roubles for each of the families of the dead irrespective of which side they fought for.

All the unidentified victims of the fighting will most probably be cremated on Friday, a spokesman for the Khovansky Cemetery management told ITAR-TASS.

'Alpha' Group's Role in White House Assault Detailed

LD0810083493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1115 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] According to several persons involved in the operation to rout the rebels in the White House last Monday [4 October], the Alpha and Vympel groups of the Chief Security Department of the Russian Federation were given the task of making Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoy and the deputies surrender and to guarantee their evacuation from the parliament building. This is why the groups did not open fire inside the building and tried to contact the defenders of the parliament.

According to the Interfax reporter Andrey Pershin, who stayed in the besieged parliament building on Monday, two unarmed Alpha officers in helmets and bullet-proof vests appeared at the main entrance on the side of the embankment in the afternoon. On the main stairway they were met by the security minister appointed by the Congress of People's Deputies Viktor Barannikov.

Later, at their request, the officers were taken to the candle-lit House of Nationalities hall where the deputies, staff members and defenders of the building had been sitting for a long time. Deputies spoke from time to time. To keep up the morale they sang songs to the accompaniment of a guitar and recited poetry.

Both Alpha officers refused to disclose their names or ranks but urged their listeners to leave the building before it was stormed. They warned the deputies that the group would carry out the order to storm the White House even though the officers disapproved of the idea. They claimed that Alpha could fulfill the order in half an hour. They also threatened the deputies with a tank attack and paratroopers being dropped from helicopters.

The Alpha officers suggested that the deputies and other persons in the building end resistance, lay down their arms and take women, elderly people and children out of the building. In this case the security of the persons leaving the building would be guaranteed. They made a reservation that the future of the persons involved in armed actions would be decided by court and did not give any guarantees concerning them.

The officers promised that buses would be sent to the White House guarded by Alpha not the militia or black berets. Each bus would take its passengers to any metro-station they named.

The deputy speaker of parliament Valentin Agafonov as well as Victor Barannikov urged the people in the building to accept the proposal as the only reasonable one. Barannikov said he took an officers oath concerning the security of the persons leaving the building.

Later they had a private meeting with Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rutskoy.

Victor Barannikov took the officers to the entrance and ordered White House guards to let Alpha men back when they return for the evacuation from the building.

At 16:50 Alpha brought buses to the parliament building and began the evacuation. In the evening Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoy and Viktor Barannikov surrendered to officers of the group. According to unconfirmed reports, the terms of their surrender were agreed with Alpha during the conversation with the two officers some two hours before the beginning of the evacuation.

The speaker of the Tatar parliament Farid Muhametshin has told Interfax that the federal government and President Boris Yeltsin "took adequate steps with regard to armed militants" after the armed attack on the Ostankino TV center. After that, he stressed, the moves of the president as the guarantor of public security were justified by the Russian Constitution.

Rutskoy, Khasbulatov Arrests Described

PM0810101893 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Mikhail Barsukov, chief of the Main Protection Administration and commandant of the Kremlin, by Sergey Mostovshchikov; date, place not given: "The 'Alpha' Group Had Orders To Shoot To Kill If Rutskoy and Khasbulatov Offered Armed Resistance to Arrest"]

[Text] The revolutionary changes in Russia, the need for which was much discussed by the Bolsheviks, ended, after appropriate artillery preparation, with the arrest of the said Bolsheviks and their incarceration in Lefortovo prison. This victorious act of democracy was executed by the "Alpha" and "Vympel" special subunits, which are under the jurisdiction of Lieutenant General Mikhail Barsukov, chief of the Russian Federation Main Protection Administration and commandant of the Kremlin. He gave IZVESTIYA an interview about the details of the operation to neutralize and arrest Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Viktor Barannikov, and other former top state leaders.

[Mostovshchikov] Mikhail Ivanovich, when the storming operation was being planned in the Kremlin, was it known that there were a huge number of peaceful citizens in the White House—women, children, and staff?

[Barsukov] We demanded that all peaceful citizens leave the building, that none of them should be left in there at all, that the hostages should be released. But by 0800 hours on Monday, when the ultimatum expired, none of that had been done. After 15 minutes, firing commenced, because it was clear that negotiation was futile. All-out fighting began in response.

[Mostovshchikov] About that fighting. There are reports that the special subunits under your jurisdiction, specifically "Alpha," sat it out somewhere out of harm's way for the whole of that tragic festival of fire...

[Barsukov] My people were given a different task—to penetrate the White House and neutralize and arrest the main organizers of the disturbances in the city. Therefore, we waited until we could go into action and go and get them...

[Mostovshchikov] Who's "we"?

[Barsukov] Eighty officers of the "Alpha" group and about 100 personnel of the "Vympel" subunit.

[Mostovshchikov] What is "Vympel"? And how does it differ from "Alpha," if it does differ?

[Barsukov] This subunit was transferred to us, the Russian Main Protection Directorate, about a month ago from the Russian Security Ministry structure. Formerly it was the so-called spetsnaz [special-purpose force] of the First Main Directorate (PGU). Specialists in active combat operations and sabotage abroad. They have slightly different characteristics, of course, from "Alpha," a group which was originally set up as a special subunit for combating terrorism. Everyone in "Vympel" is an officer, and they know two or three foreign languages each.

[Mostovshchikov] Two or three languages? That's impressive. Although I suppose when the guns of a tank are trained directly on you, extra linguistic nuances are not much use...

[Barsukov] No doubt. But I must say that Rutskoy, Khasbulatov and the others were setting all kinds of conditions until the last moment, rather than surrender unconditionally. When the Belgian and French Embassies refused to grant them asylum and guarantees of personal safety, they declared that they would only leave the building together with all the other deputies. Otherwise, it was said, they would blow themselves up, with the people around them...

[Mostovshchikov] I realize that in the end they did not blow themselves up. Did you know beforehand exactly where the people you intended to arrest were, and how they would act?

[Barsukov] Only approximately. We thought they might be on the third, fifth, or 13th floor... At least we had guides who were very familiar with the interior of the building.

[Mostovshchikov] What about how they would behave? Was the possibility of armed resistance to arrest envisaged?

[Barsukov] All possibilities were envisaged. The men were given the order to shoot if someone would not lay down his arms.

[Mostovshchikov] How did the arrest go?

[Barsukov] When "Alpha" and some of "Vympel" entered the building under cover of the armored vehicles, they took control of the first three floors. While the firefight was going on, two of our officers went to negotiate with Khasbulatov and Rutskoy. At that point they had left the cellar where they had taken refuge during the severe shelling, and were in one of the rooms on the first floor. Our officers said that "Alpha" was already virtually inside the building and was ready to storm it from inside. Barannikov, who was standing there, said: "That's it, we'll have to surrender." After that, everyone was disarmed: Rutskoy's bodyguard, Khasbulatov. Incidentally, he had a Stechkin pistol, with a cartridge ready in the chamber. Barannikov's weapons—two assault rifles and a pistol—were in the safe. Incidentally, we did not open it immediately, in case of cocking the weapons or causing an explosion...

[Mostovshchikov] What can you say about Rutskoy's and Khasbulatov's behavior at the moment of arrest?

[Barsukov] Khasbulatov was pale and subdued, his hands were trembling. Rutskoy was outwardly calm.

[Mostovshchikov] Did you talk to them?

[Barsukov] No, I was not interested.

[Mostovshchikov] What were you interested in?

[Barsukov] I wanted to meet with Barannikov.

[Mostovshchikov] Why?

[Barsukov] At one time he and I had a very good relationship, you could even say friendly. I wanted to look him in the eyes.

[Mostovshchikov] And did you?

[Barsukov] Yes.

[Mostovshchikov] And what did you see?

[Barsukov] I did not see repentance...

Rutskoy's 5 Oct Appeal To Zorkin Detailed

PM0810094193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "A. Rutskoy to V. Zorkin: 'Valera, Call the Embassies...'"]

[Text] On the evening of 5 October the independent radio station "Ekho Moskvy" broadcast a recording of a mobile-phone conversation between Aleksandr Rutskoy and Valeriy Zorkin at the time the White House was being stormed at 1400 on Monday. The conversation—or, rather, Rutskoy's monologue (since Zorkin's replies were inaudible)—was recorded by the journalist Igor Malov, who was in the former vice president's office at the time.

"Well, Valera," Rutskoy shouted with his voice breaking, "I've just sent people out with a white flag—they were cut to pieces. Then they came up and finished them off (this referred to INTERFAX journalist Vyacheslav Terekhov, whom Rutskoy had sent to seek a truce. In actual fact, as is clear from Terekhov's story published in IZVESTIYA yesterday, he was detained and beaten up by White House defenders—Ed.). Yerin has ordered no witnesses to be taken. They know that we have sound and video recordings here starting from the second [of October]—who gave the orders, when they were given, where there was shooting, how people were killed. Surely you realize that we're live witnesses! They won't let us stay alive. Please, phone the embassies. Get someone to phone the embassies. Get somebody here from the CIS, get somebody here from the Council of the Federation members. Chernomyrdin's lying, Yerin's lying! I beg you, Valera; well, you understand. You believe in God (expletive deleted), on your own head be it! (pause)

"They're using heavy guns, Valera, heavy guns! If you could see what's going on... (pause)

"We're not shooting! Look, it's quiet. I'll hold the phone up so you can hear the silence! (pause)

"They are, they're regrouping. The tanks are moving into battle positions. They'll be firing volleys. Please, phone the foreign embassies. Chernomyrdin and Yerin are lying. Phone the foreign embassies, get foreign ambassadors over here. (pause)

"It's better if you contact foreign embassies! Get someone to get in touch. Will the world community really let witnesses get shot? After all, there would have to be an investigation later. They're murderers, do you understand or don't you? (pause; clearly the connection was lost)

"I've told him everything already."

This conversation was held when the blood of dozens of people had already been shed. When it was clear to Rutskoy that the communist-fascist uprising he had incited had been defeated. When he, one of the ringleaders, feared for his life. Feared retribution...

Officer Describes 3 Oct Attack on Ostankino

LD0710171293

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 1200 GMT on 7 October broadcasts a five minute report by Anatoliy Fedorov who interviews two of those who defended the Ostankino radio and television complex against the rebels.

Major Viktor Pinagenov was the officer in charge of protecting Ostankino's Apparatus and Studio Complex No. 3 (ASK-3), which houses Mayak and the Information Television Agency. He tells Fedorov: "At about 1900 on 3 October a crowd arrived headed by General Makashov. I went out to meet him. He introduced himself and I did the same. He said: Major, all the militia are on our side, please open the doors and let my people into ASK-3. I replied: I have no orders to let you in here. I withdrew my colleagues into the building and he warned: In five minutes I will begin storming the building and if we take the building we will shoot you. The storming of the building took place five minutes later. No doubt many people saw what happened on television.

"Well, after five minutes we had to defend the building. I withdrew the personnel from the outer perimeter because otherwise they would have been shot. Then they began to break the windows, brought up lorries and they were the first to open fire. There were very loud explosions and it was later discovered that they had begun to fire a grenade-launcher."

Pinagenov goes on to praise the defenders. The rebels had intended at first to attack ASK-1 but a former Ostankino employee had advised them that ASK-3 would be a better target, he notes.

Fedorov then interviews militia sergeant Denis Saramatnikov who was on duty in the Mayak broadcasting area that night.

Political Issues

Yeltsin, Shakhray Disagree Over Fate of Federation Council

MK0710105193 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

[Vladislav Dorofeyev report under the "Presidential Rule in Russia" rubric: "Boris Yeltsin Proposes His Plan for Simultaneous Elections"]

[Text] In yesterday's address to the nation, Boris Yeltsin proposed that the local soviets that had not supported him "summon up enough courage and dissolve themselves." Since 84 of 88 local soviets did not support the president, this means that soviet power in Russia, just as KOMMERSANT-DAILY predicted, is ceasing its existence. In addition, the president put forth his own scenario for simultaneous elections, proposing that elections to the Federal Assembly be held at the same time as regional elections to representative power bodies. Boris Yeltsin's latest proposals have not received overwhelming support even among his regular allies. In particular, Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray has announced his possible resignation owing to his disagreements with the president.

The main reason for Yeltsin's cancellation of the Federation Council session, originally set for 5 October, now becomes clear. Half the members of the Federation Council are chairmen of regional soviets who will lose their powers if the soviets are dissolved. Some local soviet leaders in conversations with KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondents stated that in the event of dissolution, they do not intend to put up resistance. The forecast made the day before yesterday by Khabarovsk Kray Soviet Chairperson Galina Lysenko, who said that "in the remaining time lawmakers will try to work out and adopt a plan for a kray parliament," has proven to be amazingly accurate. This idea fully agrees with the president's proposal yesterday to work out a structure for a legislative institution in the regions.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY earlier reported that the president canceled the 5 October Federation Council session and that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin held an unscheduled conference with representatives of the Federation components that same evening (see KOMMERSANT-DAILY of 6 October). According to participants in the meeting with Chernomyrdin, the conversation concerned economic subjects: the need to liberalize bread prices, change transportation flows, reduce customs tariffs, the condition of the fuel and energy sector, and the execution of the budget. Also, a new date for the Federation Council session was defined—the end of October. By that time a draft agreement on the Federation Council and procedures for its work should be ready. A working group from among representatives of the Federation components was set up.

After the president's appeal yesterday, the entire situation with the Federation Council is beginning to look like a farce since by the end of October only governors, that is to say, the president's people, may remain in the Federation Council. Even if Yeltsin agrees that the soviets should survive until the December elections, the leaders of these structures, seeing no future, will refuse to work.

It became known yesterday that Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray expressed his disagreement with the president's position at a closed government conference with representatives of Federation components on 5 October. Shakhray did not agree with the "improper" cancellation of the Federation Council session and stated that it is wrong to place the regional soviets in the position of local "white houses," since, in his opinion, the soviets will not want to dissolve themselves. Sergey Surov, press secretary in the vice premier's apparatus, who told this to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's correspondent, reported that Shakhray also mentioned his possible resignation.

According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts, the kray and oblast soviets will hardly offer any resistance. However, the reaction on the part of republican Supreme Soviets (practically none of the republic Supreme Soviets supported Boris Yeltsin) could be most unpredictable since the republics have already adopted their own constitutions limiting the effects of the Russian Constitution. In the latter instance, Shakhray's forecast may prove prophetic.

The Novosibirsk television company extinguished an interesting rumor yesterday about the possibility of a state of emergency being imposed in the city since neither power branches in Novosibirsk obeyed the president. The local Internal Affairs Ministry directorate denied this rumor while the Security Ministry directorate withheld comment. The report was probably a newspaper hoax since no state of emergency was imposed, but Ivan Indink, the newly appointed oblast administration head, quietly went ahead with his duties, having replaced his predecessor, Vitaliy Mukha, who was dismissed by the president for insubordination.

At this point the story about the organization of resistance to the president in Novosibirsk on the basis of the "Siberian Accord" interregional association (uniting 19 Siberian territories) could be considered a closed chapter. Especially given that on 6 October in his telephone conversation with "Siberian Accord" General Director Viktor Ivankov, Yeltsin said that he has no complaints to make about the association's activities. Having expressed his loyalty to the Siberian region, which is the largest one in Russia, the president apparently decided to tone down somewhat yesterday's statements about the regions and the Federation Council by Press Secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov and administration representative Nikolay Medvedev, who spoke of the Federation Council (representing regional interests) as a politically defunct institution. Apparently yesterday the president made a few more steps to consolidate his power. He forced the resignation of the Constitutional Court chairman, announced the abolition of the institution of soviet power, and proposed that simultaneous elections to the Federal Assembly and local parliaments be held in December. Everything would have been okay if not for the criticism of Boris Yeltsin by Sergey Shakhray, who has always been thought to be a man from the "president's team." Does this not mean that KOMMERSANT-DAILY's suppositions about possible disagreements between the president and the government should be supplemented with a forecast about possible disagreements between the president and members of his team, which in this situation is far more serious for the president?

Stankevich Comments on Future of Federation Council

MK0710115093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

[Untitled KOMMERSANT-DAILY feature surveying various individuals on their views of the Federation Council]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Sergey Stankevich, Russian president's adviser on political questions:

On the one hand, the Federation Council is more necessary today than ever because it is extremely important to find understanding and methods of interaction between the federal authorities and the regions under the specific circumstances that appeared in the wake of the armed rebellion in Moscow. Simultaneously, however, the following questions arise. If one is to construct a Federation Council in the shape that was agreed upon, that is, a body where both power branches are equally represented and whose representatives include members of regional soviets who have hardly learned anything and who have only piped down and are lying low for the time being. [sentence as published] This raises doubts as to how effective the Federation Council will be. Therefore, it would be sensible, before constituting the Federation Council, to see once again to what extent it, in its present version, measures up to the new political realities that arose after the quelling of the military rebellion in Moscow. Certain personnel changes among the deputies are now underway and corresponding decisions are being drafted regarding the soviets. Besides, since constitutional reform will now be expedited, the Federation Council should be built more organically into the general pattern of constitutional reform. Owing to these circumstances, the president opted for a week-long pause so that everything can be considered once again and so that no rash steps are taken that would have to be corrected later. [passage omitted]

Valeriy Neverov, chairman of the board of directors of the "Germes" diversified [mnogoprofilnyy] concern.

This is very bad. Some representative power should exist, even if under an emergency situation. I suppose that the postponement of the Federation Council's session will negatively impact the center's relationship with the regions, while regional authorities have to shoulder the bulk of the work to prepare for elections. Yet another fear arises: Could they perhaps indefinitely postpone the elections as they did the Federation Council? [passage omitted]

Need for Federation Council Asserted

PM0710150993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by Lyubov Tsukanova: "Respect for Authority. It Will Materialize When the Authorities are Actually Capable of Doing Something"]

[Text] A few days ago, when the future of federal authority (to be precise, of state authority in general) was in the balance in a rapidly changing situation, the idea of convening the Federation Council appeared to be the remedy. At any rate, given the real threat of anarchy, the Federation Council was the sole and ultimate "stabilizer." So it was said by the chairman of the Constitutional Court and a large number of centrist politicians. It was something urged by many regional leaders. They were not just urging, but acting consistently: Organizing conferences, adopting statements, putting forward demands. Moreover, signatures were being collected for an agreement on instituting a Council of Federation Components—an entity that would be at some remove from the organs of federal authority and, in the actual disposition of forces, "separate" above all from the president.

The president was in no hurry to convene the Federation Council. The reasoning was that proper preparations had to be made for the upcoming session, so that it did not take on the shape of a political rally, but was able to tackle specific tasks. It is clear now that the delay in convening the forum of regional leaders was due to the fear that, at a time of political uncertainty, the federal authority might be replaced by a suprastate body. Incidentally, this argument was once used by Ruslan Khasbulatov to explain the Supreme Soviet's reluctance to participate in the creation of the Federation Council. But the real motives were different then: The Supreme Soviet had a sense of power (we are not talking about real power, but a subjective feeling) and it evidently believed that it would soon be the complete master of the situation and it simply did not want to share power.

Now the presidential side might have similar motives. Now that the Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies have actually ceased to exist, the idea of a Federation Council, conceived of as a counterweight to them, is inevitably changing. Certain members of the presidential team, the most authoritative of whom is Sergey Shakhray, vice premier and chairman of the State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs, have already said that a fundamentally new political situation now prevails following 4 October. Whereas a few days ago the Federation components were able to dictate to the president, after the president's and government's political victory it is they who are now able to dictate. People have now started suggesting that the question may arise about whether the Federation Council as such is actually needed.

Incidentally, it is very possible that the question, if asked, would not cause great indignation in the regions. The events of recent days have again confirmed that a strong federal authority in Russia is by no means disagreeable, in fact, it corresponds to the regional leaders' private expectations. The autonomy they were harping on about before was a response not so much to presidential and government diktat (although this was cited as a justification), as to the disagreements among the Moscow authorities, their fighting among themselves, and, accordingly, the absence of a single partner in the center. The reaction of a number of local soviets to the recent Moscow events is typical: Deputies are reassessing, sometimes radically so, their position in the wake of 21 September and are expressing support for the president's actions. The resolute and consistent nature of these actions is seen as a sign of strength, and respect for real, rather than supposed, authority is still strong in the Russian mind, at any rate stronger than may have appeared only recently.

This is also evidenced by the reaction to recent events by certain public associations and political leaders who used to accuse the president of authoritarian ways, of wanting to establish a "regime of personal power." Not that these fears have disappeared, it is simply that the specific danger that affected everyone suggested that strong state authority is not just a subject of debate and that at certain points in social development it is something that is absolutely essential.

The danger is not yet past and the sense of strong state institutions will be relevant for a good while yet. But society must start making an effort right now to ensure that the euphoria of victory does not give rise to a new illusion: That one strong authority is better than two or three, counterbalancing one another. The state of emergency has a limit. The election campaign is starting. At this time the concentration of power in a single pair of hand could give rise to suspicion, to doubts about whether conditions can be created for really free elections. In order to prevent these suspicions from gaining hold in society and calling into question the legitimacy of the new legislative body which is to be elected in December, the strong state authority must be as open as possible and ready for dialogue. That is why I believe we also need both the Federation Council, as a consultative organ, the "public chamber," organ of the Constitutional Conference, and, perhaps, other public entities. The respect for authority, restored by the display of firmness, will grow in society, as well as in strength, if this authority demonstrates its consistent will for democratic transformations.

Yeltsin's Regional Policy Assessed

PM0810091793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Valeriy Vyzhutovich article: "Boris Yeltsin's Third Chance. President Missed Two Opportunities To Reform the System of Power—in August 1991 and in April of This Year. He Cannot Drag His Feet Any Longer"]

[Text] ...However, the agreed and unanimously approved documents to convene and establish the Federation Council have not yet been officially scrutinized: The session planned for 5 October was postponed. In the opinion of Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray, who heads the Federation Council working group, it may take place no earlier than the end of October.

Presumably there are good reasons for the delay in forming the Federation Council—the only body capable of exercising legislative powers in the transitional period. In very significantly describing the reasons as "political" but at the same time not being explicit about them, Sergey Shakhray may have disappointed some people. At least those who think that, having crushed the dyarchy first by edict No. 1400, then later by the firepower of heavy armor—an enforced and necessary step—Yeltsin has won a total and definitive victory. But in fact the way has merely been cleared for thorough transformations in the economy and system of power (assuming, of course, that only the Supreme Soviet and the Congress, and Khasbulatov and Rutskoy prevented the president and the government from succeeding in all their worthy projects).

It is nevertheless a fact that by decisively ending the dyarchy Yeltsin has untied his hands. His popularity has shot up. Now he can contemplate even simultaneous elections, if they are held in December. Again, as in August 1991 and after the April referendum, Yeltsin has seized the initiative and has the advantage necessary for quick and decisive actions. But uninvested political capital, as the Russian president has twice annoyingly confirmed, rapidly vanishes into the sand—the sand, for instance, of the Sochi beach where Yeltsin spent too long in thought after the victory over the putschists. If the breathing space—whatever the reasons for it—drags on too long this time too, the opportunity to keep the country from economic catastrophe and terrible social upheaval will be finally and irrevocably lost.

However, as Shakespeare's Romeo replied to his friend Benvolio, who did not understand why "are we stupidly dragging our feet": "We are not stupidly dragging our feet but are hurrying at the wrong time." The circumstances prevailing after the communist-fascist rebellion caution the president against being tempted to hurry "at the wrong time." First of all the need for the Federation Council as originally designed has gone. After all, it is clear that Yeltsin needed the Federation Council to pressure the Congress and parliament and, given a Federation Council loyal to the president, to actually perform legislative functions.

The Congress and parliament no longer exist. But the favorable attitude of the Federation Council toward Yeltsin, if it is formed, remains extremely problematic. The president's press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, unequivocally intimated this: "A short time-out has been taken in order to take stock of the situation and see how the Federation Council fits into it now." On the other hand, the change in the situation has even been registered by one of the regional leaders, Irkutsk Oblast Administration Head Yuriy Nozhikov, who only a few days ago was rebelling with his cohorts from "Siberian Accord" against the president's edicts of 21 September but has now been forced to admit: "Before the set-to that night, we would have been able to force the president to hold simultaneous elections, but now I don't know..." Come on, the Irkutsk governor understands perfectly well who will now have the whip hand—by relieving the Amur and Novosibirsk Oblast administration heads of their duties to make an example of them, the president left no room for doubt on that score.

The regional leaders' hasty demonstration of loyalty to the president after 4 October is very reminiscent of the former USSR republic leaders' behavior in August 1991. After the putsch failed, they also assured Gorbachev of their total loyalty and humility, which did not prevent them soon after from rashly abandoning the center and splitting up the Union. Although the October rebellion has made the provinces compliant for a while, there is no guarantee that the Russian Federation's integrity will not be seriously tested in the coming months. That is, one way or another, Yeltsin will have to come to an agreement with the Federation components.

Apart from this, the soviets' future fate will have to be determined very soon. As Head of the President's Administration Sergey Filatov stated, new elections for the representative branch of power are possible. Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov has reported that the Moscow City Soviet and the rayon soviets have been dissolved once and for all and will not be reconstituted in their previous form. In short, the reform of local representative power is also inevitable, which is forcing Yeltsin to seek support in the provinces and, most importantly, some means of paying for this support.

Having gambled on a policy of using force, Yeltsin will now on be forced to pay the Army, internal troops, and security organs for their loyalty (real or feigned). Mutual payments at the highest level of the leadership will become obligatory and even more open. Not to mention the payment that will have to be made for the people's support in the form of all sorts of additional social payments and price concessions which do little to stabilize finances.

The president has little time for a transitional period, until the new elections. The time-out will not last long. There are many more reasons to hurry than to hang about.

Disputes With Regions Seen Remaining

MK0710111493 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 62, 7 Oct 93 (signed to press 6 Oct 93) p 1

[Vladimir Todres, Dmitriy Volkov article under the "Regions" rubric: "Local Elites Shocked. Lack of Political Center Cannot Be Offset by Political Actions"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Federation Council is no longer needed for the purpose for which it had been initially designed—to defeat the Supreme Soviet and the congress. Neither of them exists now: the mental deficiency and criminal irresponsibility of the deputies and the precision of gun shelling proved more efficient than subtle political intrigues.

Does this mean, however, that the shelling in Moscow resolved the regional problem? Or that the Kremlin may no longer offer conditions to local chiefs, but just issue orders?

The first question concerns the technical feasibility of dissolving opposition soviets throughout Russia. A relatively easy task somewhere in Amur or Kurgan Oblasts, it will be fraught with a repetition of Moscow's bloodshed in St. Petersburg, where a mob of 3,000 is rampaging outside the local television center. This will be even more problematic in the republics—particularly in Karelia and Bashkortostan (where the Supreme Soviets suspended Yeltsin's edict No. 1400) or in Tatarstan (where the Moscow events were effectively ignored). Meanwhile, in both Ufa and Petrozavodsk the president will have to deal not only with parliaments, but also with Councils of Ministers that shared the stance taken by their representative branch.

The main thing, however, is that the current Kremlin team (even if it is from now on dominated by the top brass) will not be able to do without local elites, with which the interests of directors, administrations, and inner soviets have long been intertwined. In the past few days virtually all of them chose to wait and see instead of displaying their loyalty. But Yeltsin does not have other elites. This is what the Primorskiy Kray Soviet demonstrated the other day by calling for local elections for both branches of power on 11-12 December and nominating current Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko as the sole candidate for the governorship.

If the current elites stay on in the capital and the provinces, the country will automatically face the old problems in relations between central and local authorities. There are serious doubts as to whether Boris Yeltsin and the army have enough strength to suppress these problems by governing the entire country using state of emergency methods.

Presidential Press Secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov called the situation following the quelling of the armed rebellion in Moscow "new political realities." It is because of these realities that the federal center is now intent on reviewing its vocabulary when communicating with the regional authorities, as it has already done with regard to the mass media and political parties.

The thesis about "new realities," however, may be questioned. The confusion which, according to some sources, was evident in Kremlin offices and the struggle between ambitious leaders in the decisionmaking process—this is a deep-rooted reality, which cannot be overcome by army operations. The Kremlin's dependence on the military leaders' collective decisions following the removal of the party hierarchy has become a reality that will have to be reckoned with for some time to come. A lack of a political center in Russia, however, cannot be offset by the use of force. Thus, if the possibility of dismantling soviet structures and reining in regional elites appears to be a "new reality," this does not at all mean that under the regime of continuing presidential rule they will be replaced by an effective, liberal social system. Moreover, the "new realities" do not give grounds to claim with assurance that the proposed general elections, designed to restore the fundamentals of the rule of law in the country, will give equal opportunities to all significant political and social interest groups. Evidently, this does not mean that the president should refrain from decisive steps in changing the old social structure, but the removal of "old realities" does not mean that new ones will automatically emerge to replace them. Rather, a vacuum can be discerned.

Impact, Background of Possible Shakhray Departure Viewed

MK0810094493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 1

[Vitaliy Portnikov report in the "Cadres" column: "If Shakhray Leaves.... Who Will Deal With Federal Policy?" Last three paragraphs are follow-up report by Aleksandr Shanko]

[Text] Against the backdrop of the reshuffles in the last few days, the statement by Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray about his possible resignation appears more sensational that the dismissal of the general prosecutor or the Constitutional Court chairman. Stepankov and Zorkin have long chosen for themselves a place in "the other boat," and it was far more difficult for them, entrusted with official duties, to demonstrate their loyalty to the president than for our homegrown "centrists" who supported the parliament and Rutskoy until the first government tank appeared. The situation is quite different with Shakhray, who appeared to be the closest to Yeltsin among the government officials, hated by parliamentarians and Ruslan Khasbulatov personally, repeatedly nominated by Yeltsin for deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and just as repeatedly rejected by the deputies, also ousted by them from the government and returned to it by Yeltsin.... Shakhray's resignation is symptomatic not only as an indicator of a tough power struggle within the "winners camp," but also as a factor in the revision of regional policy which seemed to be a fairly serious accomplishment by the Russian president and which is now being subjected to a revision that is dangerous to the very existence of the state. The words about how Russia corresponds to the interests of the majority of the Russian people pronounced in Boris Yeltsin's second address to the nation demonstrated for all to see just how the president's counselors have been carried away by the struggle on the narrow patch of power in Moscow and how they long ago lost sight of the real changes occurring in the regions, in particular in the Russian Federation republics.

Sergey Shakhray was one of the most successful of the "cadre finds" of President Yeltsin, who for some reason knew a good economist when he saw one but did not know enough about politicians. At one time we reproached Mikhail Gorbachev, who selected the "bad" chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the "bad" premier, defense, security, and internal affairs ministers and vice president—in other words, the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Yeltsin, taught by the Gorbachev experience, was opposed by the chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, the vice president, and the security and internal affairs ministers whom he had groomed himself. The positions of the general prosecutor and the Constitutional Court chairman can be judged by their early removal. Of course, Yeltsin was saved by the fact that all these people showed themselves in the spring. But what if the president had begun then?

Are we safeguarded against such cadre "success stories" in the future? I shall venture to say that they await us in the future as well. Rutskoy, as is known, came about under pressure from the "Sverdlovsk period" people, the most loyal to the president. Now there is no vice president and these people, armed with long experience in selecting cadres, are continuing their activity in the presidential office and higher up. Therefore it is clear that the number 1 post [guards in front of the Lenin mausoleum] was removed with great pleasure, but apparently they will take their time over a law that could limit employment to proteges of the communist and post-communist elites who have finally compromised themselves.... Meanwhile, the time for such politicians as Shakhray will come only when they make room for them.

Shakhray's statement is also important in as much as he is the last person in the Russian leadership who really attended to the regions and understood what was going on there—and who knew how to talk with the regional leaders. Yuriy Skokov has long been out of business. Ramazan Abdulatipov, constituting along with Shakhray a fairly effective government-parliamentary tandem, will hardly be able to return to the top any time soon. With Shakhray's departure, only those people who know very well what kind of Russia the majority would like to see will remain with the president. They do not take into account that the minority, especially those living in the enclaves [kompaktno prozhivayushchiye], may play a much more serious role in Russian history than the people who entrenched themselves in the White House.

* * *

Sergey Shakhray understood that he would probably have to leave soon when on 22 September he was practically the first to start talking about simultaneous elections. His position was too far removed from the president's, and after the 3-4 October events the vice premier's resignation became all too probable.

Shakhray has lost out as an agent of inner apparatus intrigues. He has won as an independent politician. His departure from Yeltsin was also predetermined by his claims for the presidential seat in the next elections, which he has never denied. A candidate's election struggle ill fits his presence in his rival's team.

Shakhray's work (chairman of the State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs) will predetermine the main direction of his vote canvassing campaign. He will orient himself toward the interests of the regions, and in his relationship with the future electorate he will try to cash in on the provinces' dissatisfaction with Boris Yeltsin's present attitude to them.

Ryabov Outlines Duma Election Procedures

LD0710145193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1433 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow, October 7 (TASS)—"All the subjects of the federation, except the Chechen Republic, Yakutia and Bashkiria, have already accepted the idea of holding elections to the state Duma, scheduled for December 12, and have launched preparations for them," Chairman of the Central Election Committee Nikolay Ryabov told journalists here today.

He reiterated that the state Duma would be made up of 450 deputies. 225 of them will be elected according to the majority system from single-mandate constituencies, while the remaining half—on the basis of the proportional representation system from a federal election constituency. Hence, the territory of Russia will be carved up into 225 election constituencies.

"The commission," Ryabov said, "has already worked out a method for determining the number of constituencies within each subject of the federation. In doing this, we must avoid a mechanical approach: every subject of the federation, irrespective of the size of its population, must have at least one constituency."

"All the political parties and public associations," he said, "except the National Salvation Front, Viktor Ampilov's party, the 'officers Union' Club, the United Front of the Working People of Russia, the 'Scheet' (Shield) Union, the Russian Young Communist League, the 'Working Russia' Movement, and the Russian Party of National Unity, will take part in the race for the 225 mandates. The listed parties and movements, according to an order issued by the Justice Ministry, will not be registered as election unions."

Journalists have noticed that there was no "Zyuganov's Party" in the list. Asked about it, Ryabov noted that "the Justice Ministry has issued no order" concerning his party.

The chairman of the commission said that a necessary list of documents was drawn up so that all the parties and associations could begin the election campaign. They will have to collect for this purpose 10,000 signatures of electors from not less than seven subjects of the federation. Cables have been addressed to the regions, asking the subjects of the federation to submit within the next few days their views concerning the formation of election constituencies. The commission is to meet on October 10 to endorse the 225 election constituences.

Ryabov said that the Central Election Commission was receiving telephone calls from local councils, expressing their readiness to contribute to the election campaign. He ruled out the possibility of the elections being sabotaged on some territories by this or that branch of government. "The local councils are unable to prevent the elections," Ryabov stressed, adding that many of them were now revising their previous decisions.

According to Ryabov, a public council will most likely be set up under the Central Election Commission in order to guarantee equal opportunities to all parties and associations during the elections. It will also ensure them equal access to the mass media.

Asked how, in his opinion, the new Russian constitution should be adopted, Ryabov said: "A constituent assembly should obviously be convened for this purpose".

Civic Union Prepared To Participate in Elections

MK0710121393 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Unattributed report in the "In Brief" column under the "Moscow" rubric]

[Text] Addressing a press conference, Civic Union leader Vasiliy Lipitskiy confirmed his earlier assessment of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's 21 September edict. He stated that a "government that deprives itself of the opposition drives itself into a corner." V. Lipitskiy also said that Civic Union is ready to participate in elections, no matter when they take place, for the sake of preserving the remnants of democracy and also to present its election ticket. Civic Union also continues to support the idea of simultaneous elections.

Bonner Raises Questions About Elections

LD0810085593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0347 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow, October 7 (TASS) - Speaking at a press conference in the international press centre at Slavyanskaya Hotel here on Thursday [7 October], prominent human rights campaigner Yelena Bonner said she approves of the resolute actions of the president but is "not sure that the events of October 3-4 will open the way for advance".

Her reasoning is that the statute of elections "is not democratic enough". She said "elections should be held without fail and to both houses of the federal assembly." She considers it wrong to elect only the State Duma while turning the upper house into a kind of a "Boyar-dominated council."

Bonner also declared for simultaneous elections to the constitutional assembly. "A new constitution must be created only by independent people who in advance had agreed not to run for the federal assembly," she said.

Bonner announced that, despite numerous suggestions, she would not offer her candidacy for the new parliament.

Official Discusses Removal of Supreme Soviet Documents, Valuables

LD0710143293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 7 Oct 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] At today's news conference at the joint press center of the Russian president and government, Aleksandr Pochinok, Chairman of the commission for handing over the affairs of the Supreme Soviet and deputy minister of finance, told journalists about his commission's work. The removal of documents, money, and valuables—that fortunately were virtually undamaged—from the House of Soviets, began today. The commission's work is being made more difficult by all kinds of traps; in other words, camouflaged mines, of which several dozen have already been rendered harmless. As Pochinok went on, the White House will be restored, and this is mainly due to the military, who avoided destroying the support beams when they stormed the building. As far as the deputies, who came out into the open after it was stormed are concerned, the first thing they did was to try and get financial compensation. During the day of 5 October, payment of benefits was suspended. True, the more odious parliamentary figures—Baburin, Pavlov, and Isakov—did not sign any statements and they received no money. The future destiny of the local soviets was a little unclear, but Pochinok spoke only briefly about this.

[Begin Pochinok recording] You see, what we have always been saying is that Soviet power has ended. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry 'Commentary' Defends Yeltsin's Actions

LD0810101393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0735 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, 8 Oct—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has circulated a commentary.

The commentary says that the fundamental principle, enshrined in constitutions of all democratic states throughout the world, stipulates that the people are the supreme carriers of sovereignty. According to Article 2 of the present Constitution, "all power in the Russian Federation belongs to its multinational people" who have the inalienable right to express their will through direct democratic forms. In the history of Russian democracy there were two cases where expression of the people's will took place—these were the presidential elections in June 1991 and the referendum of 25 April 1993, in the course of which the majority of the population expressed confidence in the president and his policy. This is the primary source of the legal power of the president's actions.

Historically, the people's representative power in the Russian Federation implemented in the form of soviets. The present Constitution has inherited all the internal contradictions and illusions of this form of people's power. The soviets combine within themselves not only legislative, but executive, administrative, and control functions, which in practice lead to the soviets concentrating all power in their hands, thus undermining the fundamental democratic principle of division of powers.

In essence, this situation was enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 104 of which stipulated that the Congress of People's Deputies has the right to examine and decide any question concerning Russian Federation affairs.

In practice this has determined the course adopted by the congress and the Supreme Soviet, which began to pursue a policy of attempting to subordinate the executive power and trying to take charge of the Procuracy, the Central Bank, and the media. This course dominated the adoption of laws which were primarily aimed at infringing the rights of the executive power.

A situation developed where the steps taken by the executive power aimed at the creation of a law-governed state and the implementation of economic reforms came up against the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and the all-powerful congress. This became especially apparent during the adoption of the 1993 budget—a fundamental document of the economic reform. During this stage the president already had to go against the Constitution—even under the threat of impeachment—by refusing to sign the law on the budget adopted by the Supreme Soviet, the implementation of which would have led to Russia's economic collapse.

In taking unavoidable, extraordinary measures to dissolve the Supreme Soviet and congress, the president acted as he did, not because he wanted to usurp state power, but in order to end the legal impasse and to give Russian citizens a chance to express their views at elections.

The president's actions were contrary to Article 121 (b) of the Constitution (which stipulates that the president cannot use his powers to suspend the activities of any lawfully elected bodies of state power). It is important to note, however, that this article was itself added to the existing Constitution as a counterweight to the argument going on in Russia about whether the president should have the right to call early parliamentary elections. If the president had not acted as he did, fundamental constitutional principles (the principles of people's power and checks and balances) would have been trampled on. Economic reform would have been buried and the unity and integrity of the Russian Federation would have been jeopardized.

The democratic thrust of the action taken by the president and government is clearly evident from the fact that the 21 September decree "On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation" set an exact date for elections to the State Duma. It guaranteed that these elections would be free and fair. All the basic human rights and freedoms, including the right to take part in the running of the country, freedom of association, and political activity, were preserved. Both the president and government repeatedly stressed that the crisis would be resolved without resort to force and that the generally recognized principles of political struggle with the opposition would be properly respected.

Opportunities to settle the crisis by political methods were exhausted when on 3 October Khasbulatov and Rutskoy called for the armed seizure of the Kremlin, Moscow city hall, and the state television studios at Ostankino. Calls and actions aimed at seizing state power turned the opposition's political confrontation into an armed uprising. Relying on organized armed formations, the supporters of the Supreme Soviet unleashed bloodshed, street disorders, and thuggery in Moscow on 3 October, thereby creating a serious threat to the lives of citizens. Russia's security was placed in jeopardy.

On the evening of 3 October, the president, acting in his capacity as the guarantor of the security of the country and its citizens, and in full conformity with the law "On the State of Emergency" and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, imposed a state of emergency on the capital and took steps to enforce it. In view of the opposition's refusal to lay down its arms and the continuing actions of thugs who threatened the lives and health of the public, the president was obliged to put down the insurrection.

At all stages of the confrontation, the president's actions were commensurate with the acuteness of the situation, and so the principle of proportionality enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was observed. Even when the uprising was being suppressed by force of arms, everything was done to keep human losses to a minimum, and, at all stages of the operation to liberate the White House from the rebels, it was always possible for them to leave the parliament building unimpeded.

The legislations of all democratic countries provide for emergency measures to be used whenever there arises a real threat to the state structure and public order, the foundations of democracy, and the normal functioning of state institutions. In Germany, which has experienced totalitarianism, the adoption of emergency measures is possible even when the threat of a "peaceful" elimination of democracy is being created, as happened in 1933, when the nazis came to power and then consolidated that power by outwardly legal means. A state of emergency has been introduced on more than one occasion, for example, in the United States (in Los Angeles in 1992); an emergency regime operates almost continuously in Northern Ireland; and it has also been introduced in France (1968 disorders). When an armed uprising is headed by persons occupying high positions in the state and the armed forces, as the experience of France shows (Algerian uprising in 1958), the recourse is generally to emergency measures.

As for the temporary restrictions on some rights and freedoms in connection with the introduction of the state of emergency regime, they do not contradict the universally recognized norms of international law (Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) or the Russian law "On the State of Emergency" dated 17 May 1991 (suspension of the activities of public organizations impeding the normalization of the situation, limitation of freedom of the press and other media), the commentary says.

Yeltsin's 'Waiting Game' During Moscow Coup Questioned

LD0710221993

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1630 GMT on 7 October broadcasts a 15-minute documentary with video entitled "Indian Summer - 93," giving a chronology of the events on 3 and 4 October in Moscow.

Giving a roundup of events that followed Yeltsin's decree of 21 September, commentator Nikolay Svanidze says the reaction from parliament was immediate, excited, and joyful. Parliament replaced Yeltsin, appointed Rutskoy president, and convened the Congress. Svanidze says:

"Rutskoy called the power ministers in for a disciplining. It is absolutely clear now that it was a critical moment. Had the power ministers bowed to Rutskoy, all the subsequent events would have taken a different shape and different people would be telling you about them now, but the ministers, one has to assume, had already made their choice by then. One also has to assume that President Yeltsin already knew about their choice. Therefore, he took his chances. However, the events which followed demonstrate that the president did not have firm confidence in the Army's stance."

The film voices criticism over the poor protection of the media headquarters against extremist attacks.

Svanidze says that on Sunday evening, Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar made a television address calling on Russian citizens to gather near the Moscow City Council to protect democracy. He adds: "Why did Gaydar, a clever person, who had never been one for public addresses, asked unarmed people for support and sent them to the Moscow City Council to fight against armed murderers? The first thought, and it seems the right one is—in any case, so far nobody has denied it—that the Government did not have firm hopes in the troops.

"The next alarming thought comes as confirmation of the first one: Why did Yeltsin not appear on television, but restrict himself to written appeals? It became known that he was in his office but refused to sit in front of the television camera. That night numerous people appeared live on Russian television—politicians, TV stars, actors. There were different people and they were saying different things. The people of Russia could hear different people but until morning they did not hear or see the only person who was needed more than anyone else then—our president.

"One may have different opinions of Boris Nikolayevich, but nobody has ever accused him of being shy. Why, then, did our president not speak to us at the most critical moment, when the mayor's office fell, when [illegible] were storming the Ostankino television center, and when the militia radio net was intercepting Rutskoy's irate swearing? I hope we will hear a specific answer to this question which is worrying many of those who did not sleep that night. At present I have only one explanation—Yeltsin was not sure of how the elite military units would act.

"Realizing all the burden of responsibility lay on him, he was playing a waiting game. He was afraid of doing something wrong—to ask the population to be quiet and sensible when it should be asked for active support or vice versa. Such a mistake could have been fatal for the president. He is not allowed what even the first vice premier can be forgiven for. It looks as if there was, albeit for a short time, a moment when the Government, Chernomyrdin, and Grachev, were not embarrassed—not, to be accurate, lost touch with firm armed support under their feet. It was then that the president fell silent and Gaydar called on the inhabitants of Moscow to come to the square to do the job which was more appropriate for special purpose units.

"Over the last years the Army, essentially, far from being a democratic institution, has saved democracy in Russia twice; first, when it refused to obey orders to open fire, and second, when it carried out such orders."

Issues Raised by Moscow Events Viewed

PM0810085593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Article by Vladimir Kuzmishchev: "Red Is the Color of Trouble"]

[Text] Why do you always need a disaster to make you stronger? Those are more or less the words of the song played during the breaks in the transmission of the taking of the White House on television. Incidentally, it is not a new song. It was probably written as a warning two years ago after the August putsch. It was at approximately that time that in the fall, in a subway passage, I did something unexpected—I picked up and bought the newspaper DEN. No, I was not interested in psychopathology. It was simply that the newspaper vendor's face caught my attention. Why, I wondered, was such an ugly person earning his living selling a brown newspaper? But he obviously had his own interpretation of my interest—he pulled my sleeve and said with a kind of plaintive trustingness: "Comrade, you are a Russian. Brother, you must join the army of Russia's defenders. I have the address here." It was then, just two months after the victorious morning rain in August, that it all began. Outwardly I would say it all had a piquant look. First there appeared in the press the doggerel of the eminence grise Lukyanov, then the boy Nevzorov made the division into yours and ours, and there was the brown and the gray-red press playing at objectivity placed martyrs' crowns on the heads of the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Anpilov, the international art historian disguised as a straightforward guy, and Savenko, also known as Limonov, emerged.

All this was still only unconventional behavior. They were testing the authorities. It turned out they could get away with it. No one was punished either at the first assault on Ostankino or after the May Day carnage. Then there appeared shots of combat training sessions for boys with swastikas. The courageous Lubyanka, tempered in the fierce struggle against puny and uncoordinated dissidents, for some reason could not make up its mind to wage a resolute struggle against well organized national-socialists. It is true that General Sterligov once stated that he was under surveillance but he immediately added he had nothing to fear, people could fear him now.

Indeed somewhere in the middle of the summer the authorities' tolerance became something like carelessness. The trial of the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency long ago turned into a farce, the newspaper DEN simply spat, from the great height of national-socialism, on the naive attempts of some rayon courts to bring them to book for openly calling for a coup, and the boy Shurik using the airtime kindly provided for him announced the formation of combat militia teams to an audience of many millions. They were being trained in the southern republics, blatantly negating the state's official policy, but the appointment of militia had been announced in advance—a coup d'etat in Moscow...

Stop, enough... You have already realized that I am ready to associate myself to the ad hoc sentences in the press, which directly or indirectly blame the executive power for the fact that blood was shed? In that case, as one literary hero once said, you are insulting my intelligence.

Did the executive power see what was happening? Undoubtedly. Could it have done anything? Hardly. Who should have immobilized the fascists? Surely not General Barannikov, who until very recently ruled the Lubyanka? And whom then would he have led to storm "Ostankino?" Who should have initiated criminal proceedings in response to the calls to overthrow the government? Surely not the full-lipped boy devotedly hanging on to the words of the trade institute teacher who put him on his feet? This boy himself struggled against the executive power in the breaks between acquiring his royalties and other undertakings designed to provide for him in his old age. Our legal power is a copy of the Constitutional Court, which in our country has swum in the deep waters of politics and the shallow waters of legality.

[Text] What did the authorities have? Only the army. You must agree it was ridiculous to bring tanks into Moscow to break up a fascist meeting or close down DEN. Indeed... I am not entirely convinced that even the army was entirely reliable. If it were, why was there the Officers Union? But these are my own vague and strictly personal suspicions, indirectly backed up by Gaydar's emotional speech on the square in front of the Moscow Soviet. For some reason those who are now strenuously describing the minor details of the erection of the barricades have failed to mention Gaydar's words which at the time were at odds with all the government's previous assurances that they had sufficient forces to suppress a rebellion. Of course, I did not have a tape recorder with me but Gaydar said that reliance solely on power structures was not proving itself. Something like that. So the power in the Kremlin was not completely sure of victory? Uncertainty broke through desperately in Gaydar's speech. The government thus acted in the only way possible in those conditions.

Why then bring unarmed people out against gunmen? I repeat a question that has already been heard in the mass media. I do not want to offend those who came out on Tverskaya Street, especially as they included most of my acquaintances, but let us ask a question which sooner or later will be heard. Was the risk that great? One asks why officers, who in general are not stupid, should storm the Moscow Soviet, if the majority in it is in solidarity with the parliament? I would not touch on it even now. It could be left as a monument to hypertrophied muddleheadedness. Schoolchildren could be taken there on excursions and made to listen to speeches and then told for their edification: "You see, children, what Soviet power was like."

Of course, involvement in a just cause, a sense of one's own importance and the feeling that you are among your own people are valuable in themselves and this will hardly pass without a trace, nor will the memory of what the reds were. Very recently it was still axiomatic that the aims of the opposition and the government were the same. It was a case of the ways of achieving them. Unfortunately, under our conditions the logic of the struggle invariably leads the opposition into the camp of the reds—there is no other fulcrum. As I write these lines Mr. Vladislavlev is talking on television about how an opposition is necessary—it is the basis of democracy. Theoretically he is right but we should not forget that in September the members of his allegedly centrist union were in the same presidium as the leaders of the National Salvation Front. Incidentally, the first notes of the heroic symphony in honor of the White House thugs were heard in this program. The thugs who, in impotent malice, fired on the crowd. Is that just the start?

Ban on Organizations Viewed

PM0710145193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Otto Latsis article under the "Events and Commentary" general heading: "Seduction Through Violence—The Trademarks of Totalitarian Thinking: The View After the Revolt"]

[Text] Even before the dead bodies have been cleared away, the political debate has erupted. Of course, society must understand what happened, it must come to terms with itself in a new, pitiless light. But alongside the incoherent words of genuinely shaken people, habitually persuasive political speculation can be heard over whether the country has crossed the fatal line, whether it has left behind the era when it was believed that civil war was not for us.

To clarify, here are two examples from the 5 October "Tema" television program. Well-known television commentator and former Russian People's Deputy Aleksandr Tikhominov says that he is opposed to the 21 September edict because he does not accept any violation of the Constitution. Due credit may be accorded to the civic fortitude of an individual who announces this publicly the very day after the shameful routing of those who, it would seem, acted under that very banner. But there is something more important: He also rejected a return to totalitarianism under the red flags and renounced violence as a means of resolving political differences. For this reason Tikhomirov, who had come to the White House for the "Congress" after 21 September, left it before the defenders of the former parliament set out on the warpath. It is not difficult to recall the arguments refuting his political ideas: A law adopted by universal ballot (referendum) is higher than any law adopted by parliament. However, A. Tikhomirov has his own arguments. Personally, I am prepared to restrict myself to the acknowledgment that, if our opinions diverge, then one of us is wrong—and I hope it is not me. But an opposing viewpoint has the right to exist and to protection even after the defeat of its armed supporters. Such a viewpoint, naturally, should also be represented in the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

Aleksandr Tsipko, a famous publicist and philosopher, maintained another belief. His theory is brief: The president is to blame for the tragedies which occurred, and the cause is his 21 September edict. Clearly the implication is that the initiators of the violence are not guilty, because they had no other option. But you know, this is not true. The thrust of the edict is not the eradication of parliament (which, incidentally, was not even a real parliament). The thrust is the creation of a parliament. For all dissenters, a direct and swift path was opened: elections. If they are so convinced they are right and that they have the people's support, then that is all they need. They can dazzle the electorate with their truth, win in the elections, carry through a new Constitution in the State Duma, even abolish the presidency entirely.

However, all of this constitutes arguments from the sphere of politics and law. It would have been enough for A. Tsipko's statement to be accompanied by such arguments prior to 3 October, when the matter centered on the correctness or otherwise of those debating over microphones and on the pages of the newspapers. After 3 October, the matter is one of the correctness or otherwise of those who shot and killed people. It is the matter of a moral evaluation of violence. A. Tsipko's 5 October statement means that, in his view, there are political forces for whose sake human fatalities are justified. It is extremely important not to overlook this as an assertion of a particularly dangerous political morality. It is of added interest insofar as the man making the statement is a publicist and philosopher who gained popularity in the perestroyka years through a spirited criticism of Marx and Lenin's philosophy of violence. We will leave aside the question of how far this criticism was vindicated.

Right now there is a more interesting question: Why is it that the author who so bravely condemned the politicians and scholars of yesteryear has not today attempted a condemnation of the contemporary violence? We can hazard a guess. A publicist's capital is his popularity, and this is easily earned through originality of judgment. But how difficult it is to work up to a truly original judgment in our century when everything has already been said! However, there is always the easily accessible "audacity of thought": saying everything back to front. Admittedly, on verification this is neither audacity nor thought, but merely anti-thought, thought turned back to front. So what—the state's laws do not forbid this. Only the moral checks which every civilized individual consciously places on himself are as absolute as the political freedom that society is obliged to guarantee us.

It seems to me that the criterion for reacting to violence should be the determining factor not only in political debate, but also in political decisions in the times ahead. The absence or vagueness of this criterion in some political documents cannot but cause alarm. As, for instance, with the 5 October statement by the Public Committee of Democratic Organizations of Russia [OKDOR]. OKDOR's political sympathies and antipathies, and the majority of its specific proposals, are close to my own—which makes it all the more undesirable to bypass the dubious specifications of this document.

Here are some extracts from the first two items of the OKDOR proposals. "To dissolve all parties, movements, and other organizations of procommunist, profascist, and nationalist orientation, and to rule out henceforth the possibility for such organizations to be active." "To halt the output of publications serving as a platform for procommunist, profascist, and nationalist organizations expounding a misanthropic ideology and responsible for the ideological groundwork for the armed revolt."

I, too, am convinced that the activity of some organizations and newspapers should be stopped, although I suggest that after the state of emergency is repealed the suspension of newspaper publications should be effected by decision of a court, and not by edict. I also suspect that I am thinking of pretty much the same organizations and newspapers as OKDOR. The brown-shirted Barkashovites and the red-shirted Anpilovites, the combined red and brown shirts of the National Salvation Front, and the poisonous DEN not only deserve to be banned now—there was every legal justification to stop their activity long before 3 October. It is the indisputable mistake and fault of the authorities that this was not done earlier.

But the formula underlying the ban should be what is provided for by law in any democratic country: for inciting violence, for organizing, and effecting violence. To use words like "orientation" (any), "serving as a platform" (for anybody), and particularly "ideology" as bases for a banning order is unwise. Both in the case of an unsubstantiated effort to justify the actions of the rebels (from A. Tsipko), as well as in the case of their wholly deserved condemnation, there must be only one criterion—reaction to the illegal use of force. Any assumption regarding the acceptability of a prohibition on thought (and such an assumption is inevitably connected with the words "orientation," "ideology") is extremely dangerous during days when many are dizzy with "victory."

It is not difficult to cite specific examples showing the importance of such a criterion. I, for instance, object to the national socialist ideology, or orientation, of Liberal Democratic Party Leader V. Zhirinovskiy. Moreover, I am convinced that the ends proclaimed by him are unattainable without armed force. But V. Zhirinovskiy consistently speaks out against violence. This is what is important, and not the fact that he supported the edict of 21 September. Of course, he deceived the electorate insofar as the ends he promised cannot be achieved by the methods they chose. But this is a problem for the electorate: whom to believe. But there are no grounds for a banning order here, despite the "orientation."

It is also possible to turn attention toward another flank of the political spectrum—the Workers' Socialist Party. The procommunist ideology, orientation, and even direct succession to a specific (reformist) wing of the former CPSU is only too evident here. But (as far as I know, at least) there have been no calls for violence, for its organization or implementation, from that party. What is more, its leaders include people who opposed the 19 August 1991 putsch organized by the CPSU. So why ban them?

Let us not forget that the routing of the rebels did not remove a single one of the problems burdening our life, which may even have been complicated a little further as a result of their action. Solving these problems demands a rational, stably operating, social organism, and this is unthinkable without opposition. It is extremely important that any opposition ideology that excludes calls to violence should be represented legally, and not forced underground either before or after elections.

In the wake of the bloody rebellion it is vital to return as quickly as possible to a normal pattern of work, to the painstaking solution of those socioeconomic and political problems on which the rebels speculated, and not without success. But society cannot deal with these tasks unless it rids itself of habits which have became the norm over decades of totalitarianism. Above all, from the terrifyingly hardy illusion that the end justifies the means.

Background to Kazannik's Appointment Eyed

PM0710135393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Valeriy Rudnev report: "Presidential Supporter Appointed General Prosecutor"]

[Text] The wording used in Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's latest edicts—Nos. 1583 and 1584 of 5 October—was very concise. The first edict read "On V.G. Stepankov. Valentin Georgiyevich Stepankov is relieved of his duties as Russian Federation general prosecutor. Moscow, the Kremlin." The second read "On the General Prosecutor. Aleksey Ivanovich Kazannik is appointed Russian Federation general prosecutor. Moscow, the Kremlin."

What prompted these personnel changes in one of the key posts in the current authorities' system of law-enforcement organs and power structures? I put that question to officials from the President's Administration, the government, and their press centers. But I got no frank comments.

Incidentally, it is no secret that over the past year V. Stepankov had left the presidential team and openly sided with the former Supreme Soviet. Whether this was a voluntary choice on his part or whether he was forced into it (until recently the general prosecutor was appointed by the Supreme Soviet and ratified by the Congress of People's Deputies) is hard to say. The former general prosecutor's behavior of late has been so contradictory and inconsistent that it is impossible to be definite about his position.

Nor can we disregard V. Stepankov's professional mistakes as general prosecutor. At any rate, V. Stepankov's direct participation was a factor in the State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE] case falling apart during the preliminary investigation and now, it seems, finally collapsing in court. Of course, the president and his team do not want anything of this kind to happen to the new case regarding a plot against the authorities—the parliamentary putsch. The president recently stated bluntly that there should be "no repetition of the sham trial of the SCSE." Since the investigation of the new case will require a general prosecutor, the question of V. Stepankov's dismissal was decided 4 October at the time the mutinous White House was falling.

There was yet another technical reason for removing V. Stepankov from control over the investigation into the parliamentary putsch case. After all, in the past the general prosecutor was closely linked by his job to the current Lefortovo prisoners—Viktor Barannikov, the former state security boss, and Andrey Dunayev, one of the leaders of the Russian militia. Moreover, they also had an "agent"—the notorious Yakubovskiy.

In short, the president had sufficiently important grounds for removing V. Stepankov from the post of general prosecutor. Did V. Stepankov himself realize this? I think he did. After all, following the suspension of the Supreme Soviet, when the president suddenly reaffirmed V. Stepankov as general prosecutor by edict, people at the Prosecutor's Office itself started openly saying that Stepankov's days were numbered and that he only had a few days left. But Stepankov himself was in no hurry to tender his resignation and clung on to his leadership post until the last minute. Even on the day the presidential edict dismissing the general prosecutor was signed (this had already been openly discussed in presidential circles, and the general prosecutor knew this, of course), V. Stepankov displayed his official zeal in examining the remains of the White House with investigators.

Now to turn to the new general prosecutor—Aleksey Kazannik. His is 51 and a Ukrainian. He is married with two boys aged 15 and 17. His wife is a therapist. A. Kazannik is a university graduate—he graduated from Irkutsk State University in 1963. A year later he defended his dissertation and became a candidate of legal sciences. He was a head of faculty at Omsk University. He was elected a USSR people's deputy for the Omsk National-Territorial Electoral District. He became a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources. Following the winding up of the USSR Supreme Soviet he filled a modest position at the Omsk Oblast Administration—as chairman of the Committee for Religious Affairs and Nationalities.

Incidentally, Doctor of Juridical Sciences Aleksey Kazannik is well known for another reason. During the election of members of the USSR Supreme Soviet he gave up his seat to Boris Yeltsin, which gave the future Russian president greater political scope.

It is well known that in the past few years A. Kazannik has repeatedly been offered various jobs and even ministerial portfolios, Moscow apartments, and other inducements, but he has invariably turned them down.

Sergey Suslikov, IZVESTIYA's Omsk correspondent, has learned a few details about the new appointment.

...Boris Yeltsin phoned Kazannik at home at 0730 on 4 October and asked him to take the first flight to Moscow in connection with his appointment as Russian general prosecutor.

"You're not bothered that I've never worked at the Prosecutor's Office?" A. Kazannik asked.

"No, I'm not," the president replied.

A. Kazannik's journey to Moscow was not without incident. The plane in which he was flying had to make a forced landing at Nizhniy Novgorod. An anonymous phone call had been received warning the city authorities that there was a bomb on board. None was found. But the caller was successfully traced. He has been arrested and is under investigation.

Aleksey Kazannik was introduced to the General Prosecutor's Office leadership 5 October, following which the new general prosecutor had one-on-one talks with V. Stepankov. A. Kazannik was introduced to the General Prosecutor's Office staff and began work 6 October.

Committee Urges Banning of Communists, Fascists

PM0710140593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Statement by the Public Committee of Democratic Organizations of Russia under the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI headline "The Extraordinary Terminology of the Public Committee of Democratic Organizations of Russia: 'Disband, Ban, Terminate.' Clearly It Is Due to the State of Emergency"]

[Text] The people of Russia have once more confirmed their democratic choice. But it cannot be expected that history will go on indefinitely giving us the opportunity to revive Russia. The two years since August 1991 were given to us so that the political situation could finally develop, and everyone could determine his attitude toward it. The experience of those years must be taken into account. There is no time to lose now nor any right to make mistakes. The bloody events in Moscow confirmed that for all to see.

The Public Committee of Democratic Organizations of Russia [OKDOR], mindful of the full responsibility for the country's future, considers it necessary to put forward the following initiatives:

1. To disband all parties, movements, and other organizations of a pro-communist, pro-fascist, and nationalist orientation and henceforth preclude the possibility of the activity of such organizations. Call to account the leaders of organizations guilty of preparing and carrying out the armed uprising.

2. To terminate the issue of publications serving as the platform of pro-communist, pro-fascist, and nationalist organizations which preach a misanthropic ideology and are responsible for the ideological preparation of the armed uprising.

3. To adopt an edict banning the employment of leading officials in all state and social structures who were involved in the preparation and execution of the attempted coup d'etat in August 1991 and the armed uprising in October 1993.

4. To ban the use of communist and fascist insignia and symbols. To close down the V.I. Lenin Museum in Moscow and its branches in other Russian cities. To abolish immediately the no. 1 state post outside the Mausoleum.

5. To disband all organs created by the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, including the Constitutional Court.

6. To disband the central organizational structure of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and give sectoral trade unions in Russia the opportunity to resolve for themselves the questions of the formation and activity of trade union associations.

7. To note the unsatisfactory work of the leadership of the Security Ministry and the Interior Ministry which effectively aided and abetted the activation of procommunist, profascist, and nationalist forces after August 1991.

8. To issue immediately edicts ensuring the resolute progress of the economic reforms, in particular the edicts on land, private property, and so forth.

[dated] 5 October 1993.

Moscow.

Movements Comment on 'Bloody Sunday'

MK0710102493 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Nikolay Zhigulev report under the "Reverberation" rubric: "Public Forces Unanimously Denounce Massacre, Call for Restraint and Reason"]

[Text] Various Russian parties, movements, and trade unions continue to discuss the bloody drama on the streets of Moscow and the upcoming elections to the State Duma.

The executive committee of the International Democratic Reform Movement [IDRM] issued a special statement denouncing "the armed action that was carried out at the initiative of a group of White House leaders" and saying that its members "mourn for all those who were killed, wounded, or injured as a result of the tragic events." The IDRM executive committee suggested that the Russian president set up a commission involving international organizations to objectively investigate the events in Moscow.

According to Yevgeniy Pimonov, cochairman of the Moscow Committee for the Protection of Constitutional Order, "when people are trampled underfoot by an iron-soled boot, they try to defend their rights using the means they are being oppressed with." It was noted that the elections proposed by President Yeltsin should be put off at least until next March because many parties and movements are likely to abstain from earlier elections.

The Russian Committee of the Independent Trade Union of Coal Industry Workers issued a statement saying, among other things, that the Supreme Soviet's supporters overstepped a fatal line by shedding the blood of peaceful, innocent people. The Russian Committee pointed to the sometimes inadequate reaction by the government to the actions of the rebels and demanded that order be urgently brought not only to the capital, but to the country in general. "The government is obliged," the statement says, "to draw lessons from the bloody Sunday, to catch both the instigators of the devil's uprising [shabash] and the murderers and perpetrators of the pogrom themselves, and to deal with them in strict accordance with Russian laws."

"The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [RUIE] mourns for the victims of the events of 3 and 4 October in Moscow. In these sorrowful hours we express our deepest condolences to the relatives and friends of the fallen and our sympathy with all who suffered from the brutal armed conflict unleashed by irresponsible people," says the statement of the RUIE board. It also emphasizes that RUIE supports the initiative of the Moscow Confederation of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs to set up a fund to provide assistance to the victims. "The duty of the living is to bury the deceased with dignity, as human beings, and to assist their families." The statement ends with the words: "Russia's fate and the path of reform call for peace among people, restraint, and reason."

Activities of Chernomyrdin, Vice Premiers Reported

PM0710112593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Unattributed "Executive Branch: Monitoring" report: "Meetings, Conferences, Sessions"]

[Text] Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian Government, took part in a session of the Security Council chaired by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The session was held behind closed doors although it is known that the discussion centered mainly on the events of 3-4 October and the lessons which should be learned from them.

In the morning, First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar took part in a session of the Security Council and then chaired a conference of the Applied Research Foundation. In the afternoon the first vice premier took part in a discussion of the current situation at the commission on operational questions.

First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets met with representatives of NASA and then held a conference on the development of the subway. In the evening, like his colleagues, he took part in the work of the commission on operational questions.

First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko, in connection with his new appointment, took part in a session of the Ministry of Information and the Press Collegium and then met with the collective of Russian Television. In the afternoon the first vice premier had a conference on cooperation with Cuba. Then Vladimir Shumeyko took part in the work of the commission on operational questions.

Vice Premier Boris Fedorov took part in a session of the Security Council. Then he met with Transport Minister Vitaliy Yefimov. There was a discussion of the problems of financing transport shipments.

Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray also took part in the session of the Security Council. In the afternoon the vice premier took part in further preparations for the Federation Council session.

In the morning Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin held a number of conferences. The topics were: on the new ruble zone; on debts and assets; and on the Russian Bureau for the use of the consultation-technical assistance of the EC. In the afternoon Aleksandr Shokhin took part in the work of two commissions: first, on military-technical cooperation and, in the evening, on operational questions.

Vice premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha chaired a session of the food commission.

In the morning Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov had a meeting with Ho Huan Nghiem, SRV ambassador to Russia. In the afternoon, Yuriy Yarov chaired a session of the commission on questions of the transfer of the former Supreme Soviet's organizations and institutions to the ownership of the Council of Ministers. In the evening, like his colleagues, Yuriy Yarov discussed the operational situation at the commission responsible for those questions.

Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays held a number of working meetings that day.

Today, as expected, a routine session of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers Presidium is being held at Staraya Ploshchad. According to the preliminary agenda it will examine the draft Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the draft targeted program of fishing and the fish industry, and some traffic questions.

Appeal to 'Quash' 1991 Putsch Case Rejected

LD0710174793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1405 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Nikolay Semenenko]

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—During hearings of the 1991 putsch case, which continued here today, the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court has turned down the appeal of the defendants and their lawyers to quash the case.

The Collegium's ruling says that the adduced reasons for the appeal—unproved corpus delicti, lack of corpus delicti, new political situation, as a result of which the actions of the defendants no longer contain any threat to public security, violation of the legislation in the course of the investigation, and also the alleged violation of the procedure for obtaining the consent of the former USSR Supreme soviet to bring former people's deputies of the USSR to trial—could be established only in the course of the trial. Hence, the case cannot be quashed at the given stage.

The Military Collegium has disagreed with statements by some participants of the trial, claiming that the court was now subjected to pressure by several Russian public and state leaders, including some officials of the highest rank. Court Chairman Anatoliy Ukolov said that there were no obstacles to the normal work of the court. He stressed that in their work the judges were guided only by the law and by their inner convictions.

In view of the long intervals that have occurred in-between court sessions, mostly caused by the illnesses of some of the defendants and their lawyers, the court has changes the procedure of its sessions. They will now be held from 10 to 15 hours with a short interval.

At the end of today's session, the participants of the trial and the public present in the courtroom have honoured by a minute of silence the memory of those killed during the recent bloody events in Moscow.

Trade Union Leader Resigns

LD0710175093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1703 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—Igor Klochkov, the conservative chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade unions, announced his resignation on Thursday [7 October].

He headed the organisation since its birth in 1990.

Spokesman for the Federation Aleksandr Segal told TASS that Klochkov had resigned because of "growing accusations against the Federation" and against him personally.

He quoted Klochkov as saying that he resigned "to preserve the unity of the Federation".

Military Issues

Yeltsin Awards Ministers, Militia, Servicemen

LD0810093993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0751 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, October 8 [TASS]—President Boris Yeltsin on Thursday [7 October] awarded Interior Minister Viktor Yerin the title of hero of the Russian Federation for bravery and heroism in quashing an armed rebellion on October 3-4 in Moscow.

The Ministers of Security and Defence Nikolay Golushko and Pavel Grachev as well as Deputy Defence Minister Konstantin Kobets were awarded the orders "for personal bravery".

The president also issued a decree awarding the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously) to militia commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well as privates for their role in helping crush the rebellion. Ten people in all.

Yeltsin issued a similar decree awarding the title of Hero of the Russian Federation to servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces who participated in quashing the rebellion.

The titles were awarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Belyayev, Major-General Valeriy Yevnevich, Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Ignatov, Private Roman Korovushkin (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant Konstantin Krasnikov (posthumously), Sergeant Alexey Kuroyedov, Private Vladislav Panov (posthumously) and Captain Sergey Smirnov (posthumously).

The president also issued a decree awarding orders and medals to law enforcement officers and army servicemen for bravery in fulfilling special tasks during the rebellion.

The order "for personal bravery" was conferred on 14 people, including generals, commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

The medal "for valour" was awarded to four militia sergeants.

Yeltsin Press Secretary Praises Army

LD0710125493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1228 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—President Yeltsin's press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov made the following statement today:

"Some mass media organs are circulating dubious conjectures about the stand assumed by the Army, by the Defence Ministry. These reports and pseudo-analytical commentaries have nothing to do with the real stance of the Army and of Defence Minister Pavel Grachev.

"In his address to the nation President Yeltsin specially mentioned the role played by the Army in suppressing the armed rebellion, giving its due to the stand, assumed by the Russian Armed Forces.

"On behalf of the Russian president, I am authorized to state that the Army, the Defence Ministry and personally Defence Minister P. Grachev fulfilled their task in total volume. They fully complied with their civic and soldiers' duty and obeyed without hesitation the order of the commander-in-chief.

"All inventions on that subject are the result of an irresponsible attitude, incompetence and lack of information, and they may serve the purpose of a provocation.

"The president urges mass media once again to display restraint and a sense of responsibility in conditions of a state of emergency and political tension, and not to let people, willingly or unwillingly acting as provocateurs, publish their materials or speak on radio or tv."

Grachev Conveys Yeltsin's 'Deep Gratitude' To Troops

PM0810112593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 1

[Own Information report: "Defense Minister Thanks Troops"]

[Text] On 7 October Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev visited the temporary deployment station of the units and subunits of the Kantemir, Taman, and Tula divisions which took part in the suppression of the armed uprising. He familiarized himself with the conditions of the troops' deployment and talked with officers and men.

On behalf of the president-supreme commander in chief and the government of Russia, Army Gen Grachev expressed deep gratitude to the servicemen who saved the country from a tragedy which could have led to civil war. We bow our heads to the courage and selflessness of those officers and men who died fighting the armed mutineers, the defense minister noted, The Russian Defense Ministry, he said, is now receiving telegrams from civilians and servicemen alike expressing their gratitude to our servicemen.

The defense minister presented [full] colonel's shoulder boards to Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Kadatskiy, commander of the First Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Taman Division. The officer was given the rank ahead of schedule. Other servicemen who took part in the suppression of the armed uprising will also be given citations.

Grachev Denies Reports of 'Panic' in Kremlin

LD0810113893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1053 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow October 8 TASS—Russian defence minister denied press reports claiming that the Kremlin was in panic when armed opposition militants seized the mayor's office and the "Ostankino" TV centre on October 3.

"There were no confused people in the Kremlin. The president quite resolutely took over the command. The prime minister immediately organised headquarters in the Kremlin and I headed another headquarters in the Defence Ministry", Grachev told the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS daily on Friday [8 October].

The defence minister added that it had taken him one hour to plan which troops to call up and how to suppress the rebellion.

At 17.00 hours on October 3 he began to send orders to military units. No tanks were initially called to Moscow as that was Sunday afternoon and most Muscovites were returning to the capital from their country homes. "Had a tank convoy moved (along roads), traffic jams and car accidents would have happened", Grachev explained.

The troops began to arrive in Moscow by 21.00 hours. They included 1,000 men on armour from the Taman Division, 400 men on wheeled vehicles from the Kantemirovskaya Division, 450 paratroopers, 200 motorised infantry troops and a special task battalion.

Grachev said that it was initially proposed to assault the parliament building at 02.00 hours at night. "But there was no necessity to hurry up", according to the minister, who explained that crowds of people still remained at the White House at the hour and the attacking forces could have mistaken each other for opponents at night and opened fire.

Troops began to advance to the White House at 07.00 hours on October 4 and opened fire only when four armoured personnel carriers of the oposition had attacked them.

Grachev is sure that the requests of former Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy and former Parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov to begin talks were aimed only at delaying the assault. "We decided that they were dragging out time... in order to escape at night", he said.

Tanks opened fire on the White House after it became clear that its defenders are not going to surrender. Under the cover of heavy tank and APC fire paratroopers blocked all exits from the parliament building. By 17.00 hours the White House surrendered.

Grachev is sure that the army could have concluded the operation by midday, however there were too many idlers watching the battle. "The Russian people are so light-minded that there are not afraid of bullets. A big crowd of people gathered there, mostly from among supporters of the president. They proposed to render assistance and attack the White house themselves. I ordered to hold fire if civilians were in the way", Grachev said.

The defence minister admitted that there were cases when army officers recruited soldiers to defend the White House. 20-25 people defected to support the parliament building, including 4-5 from the military political academy. The commander of an air defence regiment near Podolsk, some thirty kilometres away from Moscow, Colonel Borodin recruited 18 of his soldiers to the defence of the White House. They were all arrested on the way to Moscow. Political Commissar Ostapenko also recruited 18 soldiers in the city of Noginsk, near Moscow. The group was detained and Ostapenko shot himself. Another colonel tried to talk his subordinates in an airborne division into defending the White House. But nobody agreed and colonel Uvarov fled. "I think we shall quickly find him", Grachev said.

Grachev Says Troops Acted 'Resolutely, Bravely'

PM0710190293 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Pelts on news conference by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev at the Defense Ministry on 6 October: "The Army Was Forced To Act Resolutely"]

[Text] There is nothing surprising about the fact that the events of 3-4 October are still at the center of attention. New details of the tragedy are emerging, points are being clarified—in short, a natural process of interpretation and analysis is going on. And in the process opinions are emerging which are truly staggering in their incompetence or even their open desire to shift the blame for the numerous casualties and damage onto someone else. There have even been attempts to accuse the Army.

Russian Federation Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev has already spoken about the actions of servicemen in this crisis period, at a press conference held the day after the events, on 5 October (see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 6 October 1993). But in view of the continuing attacks on the Army and the unsubstantiated rumors and speculation, he deemed it necessary to meet with journalists again. The briefing was held at the Defense Ministry building on 6 October.

The main thing, the defense minister stressed, is to give readers accurate and objective information and exclude all malicious talk and especially reproaches against the Army. He said that all the troops involved in the operation acted in an orderly fashion and strictly according to orders. There were no delays, still less refusals.

He spoke in detail about the Defense Ministry's actions in the period 3 through 5 October. As soon as the minister received the president's edict on the state of emergency in Moscow (which was at 1600 on 3 October), a decision was taken to use certain forces and resources for joint operations with the organs of the Security Ministry and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

At precisely 1700 on 3 October the units began to receive the relevant orders and directives. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported precisely which subunits were enlisted to carry out the operation. Let us just remind you of the total number—1,300 men, and of the fact that the forces were selected with a view to countering specific armed groupings. There would have been no point in bringing in entire divisions, as was the case in August 1991, the minister stressed.

Taking into account their distance from the capital and the equipment available, the troops were due to enter Moscow between 2000 and 2100 on 3 October. The schedule was adhered to, and in accordance with the plan, subunits of the Taman and Kantemirovskaya Divisions, the 119th Parachute Regiment, a spetsnaz [special-purpose] company of the Airborne Assault Forces, and a separate motorized infantry brigade arrived precisely at the appointed time at their assembly points—around the General Staff, the Airborne Assault Forces staff, and the Ground Forces Main Staff.

The defense minister devoted particular attention to the situation that developed on the evening of 3 October at the Ostankino television center. It is on this point that opinions are being expressed to the effect that the Army "abandoned it to its fate, and permitted clashes that entailed loss of life."

Pavel Grachev stressed that he was informed promptly by the internal affairs minister of the events developing at the TV center. According to MVD information, there were about 100 armed thugs there and 4,000 unarmed people. At the time of the attack the forces of the militia and the internal troops amounted to a total of 500 men plus six armored carriers (15 more armored carriers arrived later). The organs of law and order gave assurances that they could deal with the situation themselves, but that they would not be the first to open fire. Nonetheless Pavel Grachev decided to change the route being followed by the separate brigade (200 servicemen) which was on its way, and to direct it to the area of the TV center. However, after assurances from the internal affairs minister on their readiness to deal with it themselves, the brigade continued with the task previously assigned to it.

Could the storming of the White House have begun that same night of 3-4 October? Yes, the defense minister stressed, the troops were ready. After a collegium session (from 2300 on 3 October to 0000 on 4 October) at which the president and members of the government were present, the Army subunits were in a position to seal off the House of the Soviets building completely by 0200. But at that time there was a crowd of many thousands there, as well as scattered militia detachments who were not in control of the situation. The nighttime conditions, confusion, and nerves strained to breaking point could have resulted in unjustified casualties. It was therefore decided to carry out a reconnaissance operation that night with the commanding officers of the subunits that had arrived, and not to begin the operation to encircle and seal off the building until the morning, at 0700.

This task was carried out without delay, even though the troops had already come under sniper fire while advancing. Attack positions were occupied rapidly and the armored vehicles gave the men protection against bullets. No order was given to open fire. This order came, the defense minister stressed, only when the armored group of the House of Soviets' defenders (four armored carriers) attacked subunits of the Taman Division.

Despite the issuing of an ultimatum to lay down their arms and come out of the building, the resistance continued. It became clear that those entrenched in the building were simply playing for time and trying to last until nightfall. In these conditions, Pavel Grachev stressed, it was decided to reinforce the troops with a tank company (1000). Before opening fire from the tanks, we once again warned the resistance forces and demanded that they lay down their arms. But this produced no results, Pavel Grachev recalled.

And then firing was stepped up. After which, first the civilians started coming out of the building, and then, by 1700 on 4 October, the organized resistance was virtually broken.

Pavel Grachev stressed once again that at this crucial, critical moment for the country, the troops acted resolutely and bravely. There was no reason to bring new subunits into Moscow, although, had the need arisen, another division and a spetsnaz brigade of the Airborne Assault Forces were in readiness. But by the evening of 5 October, the defense minister stressed, I gave these forces the "all clear."

By the morning of 5 October the subunits that took part in the operation were replaced by subunits of the Tula Airborne Assault Division, who had accomplished a march of more than 200 km in five hours and arrived at their assembly point on time.

During the briefing Pavel Grachev answered journalists' questions on instances of servicemen going over to the side of the defenders of the House of Soviets. He confirmed that there were isolated cases. Today it became known that among them were four students from the Humanitarian Academy (in one case the circumstances are still being clarified), and one officer each from the Frunze Academy and the Dzerzhinskiy Academy. In addition, there were two attempts at group defection by servicemen. The commanding officer of an Air Defense training unit, Colonel Borodin, tried to penetrate the House of Soviets with volunteers (18 men), but the group was stopped on approach and arrested. Another officer, Lieutenant Captain Ostapenko (from Noginsk), having talked round 17 of his subordinates, tried to reach Moscow in a truck (with weapons, but no ammunition). The truck was stopped at Kilometer 31 on the Shchelkovskoye Highway by the militia. When they tried to arrest him the officer shot himself, and the soldiers returned to their unit. And the last case: Lieutenant Colonel Uvarov (from Tula) tried to organize a group of his subordinates to defend the White House, but, having failed to receive support, he fled. All the other reports are either pure invention or malicious fabrication intended to destabilize the Army.

The defense minister also spoke in detail about the motivation for the actions of the troops who took part in the operation at the White House. He did not deny that until the last moment the troops were hoping that the conflict would be settled peacefully. However, when they themselves came under attack and when they saw their comrades' blood, the psychological barrier was surmounted. The troops realized that the people entrenched in the building were dangerous and would stop at nothing.

During the briefing the defense minister also answered questions on social protection for servicemen and on the problems of the further building of the Russian Armed Forces. In particular, he spoke about work on military doctrine and mentioned some new basic tenets which are to be discussed at the next Security Council session. That is scheduled, Pavel Grachev stressed, for 15 October.

Army's Actions in Crisis Defended

PM0810103193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Leonidov under the "Pertinent Comments" rubric: "It Turns Out Russia Was Saved by Akhedzhakova!"]

[Text] The tragic events in Moscow will be the subject of analysis and commentaries in the press for a long time to come. The most important thing will probably come to the fore—how the country is going to live after what happened and how stability, civil peace, and real progress on the road of reforms can be ensured. The euphoria will pass and a multitude of very difficult and agonizing questions of this sort will inevitably arise. But for the moment... For the moment emotions are clearly prevailing.

I would like to think that the emotions evoked by the stormy days are the only explanation for the rather concerted chorus of accusations that have suddenly been hurled at the military in a whole host of publications and radio and television programs to the effect that the Army, quote, "was late" in coming to the aid of Muscovites on the alarming night of 3-4 October and that the men in uniform almost deliberately delayed and bided their time while the wave of violence was growing in the capital.

Those alleging this evidently think that divisions and regiments can be moved around by waving a magic wand. Civilians can possibly be forgiven for not knowing what a complex and laborious job it is to organize the movement of heavy equipment many kilometers and especially to bring it into such a large and densely populated city as Moscow. But you need no specialized military knowledge in order to at least avoid juggling with the facts and confusing cause with effect, all you need is elementary honesty.

Are the military to blame for the fact that this situation developed over the White House and that it developed in this particular way? Did this happen suddenly? Did it not come to a head, like a boil, over many days? Were huge militia and Internal Troops forces tasked with enforcing law and order not sent to the House of Soviets? How come at the most dangerous moment, when the threat of an escalation of violence occurred, they proved incapable of independently ensuring the security of citizens? Were the forces insufficient? In that case what prevented militia reinforcements being promptly summoned from other cities? Because this was in fact done when the situation had already become unmanageable and criminal elements rather than politicians had started running the show. Finally, it is also natural to ask: Generally why was the situation taken to such an extreme that troops had to be brought in, because there were many opportunities to defuse it in good time?

These are the questions which should be asked before discussing how timely the Armed Forces' actions were.

It seems that some people want to go down a well trodden path—to marginalize the military. As after Tbilisi, Vilnius, Baku... Some people again want to portray the Army as a kind of conservative, dark force from which anything can be expected. For example, what is to be made of the fact that certain apparently democratic publications are writing virtually in irritation that Defense Minister Army General P. Grachev tried to stay faithful to the principle of "keeping the Army out of politics" until the last possible moment...

In the respected IZVESTIYA newspaper V. Kononenko gives what is generally an extremely original interpretation of events. It turns out that B. Yeltsin too was insufficiently active. And that it was only after a certain television item in which a group of intelligentsia appeared, including the well known movie actress L. Akhedzhakova, that the alleged "turning point" came. Whereupon Yeltsin finally showed decisiveness and Grachev was finally "talked round"...

Bravo, Liya Akhedzhakova! The airborne troops who sacrificed their lives to stabilize the situation in the city are nothing compared to her. The defense minister is nothing compared to her, even though he went to talk with the rebels, risking a sniper's bullet.

It would be funny if it were not sad and bitter. A tragedy occurred, a bitter and bloody tragedy which should shake any decent person to the core, whatever his convictions. But instead there are these recriminations, this commotion, this slicing up of the "cake of glory": Who gets the biggest bit... The gem about Akhedzhakova is not the only one. There are also a considerable number of other "contenders for the turning point" in the press and on the air. All right, if somebody wants such glory many military personnel will surely give it up without regrets.

It is also extremely sad that some people who evidently consider themselves democrats are so quickly renouncing fundamental democratic values. "Keep the Army out of politics"—Grachev was not the one who thought that up. It is the law by which the armed forces of all civilized states live. Incidentally, in his address to soldiers 22 September even the Russian president urged them above all to be calm and not to allow themselves to be drawn into political wrangling or used for narrow group ends. "Keep the Army out of politics" is a formula which has, if you like, won a place in the hearts of the military and has been sincerely accepted by them. The military, taught by the bitter experience of August 1991, believed, let us say bluntly, that they would never again have to bring their tanks and armored personnel carriers onto Moscow's streets. But if the highly dramatic spiral of events nonetheless did lead to that, extremely responsible and precise explanations regarding this are needed. Those who are now, either because of the fear they experienced or because of other reasons and intentions, publicly announcing that the Defense Ministry leadership and unit commanders, quote, "wavered for a long time" about whether to go to Yeltsin's aid are doing the Russian president a very bad turn. I think the conjectures that troops were summoned to the capital only to ensure his "political survival" are offensive to the president himself. The dramatic decisions to bring them in, as is known, were based on something completely different—the fact that it was necessary to ensure citizens' safety and stabilize life in the capital. The fact that it was actually a question not of political confrontation but of a threat of bloody chaos, a terrible orgy of crime, looting, and civil war in the country is ultimately the only legitimate grounds for bringing troops into Moscow.

As regards how quickly decisions were made by the military... It is easy to shoot your mouth off and make malicious assessments when sitting in a cozy office. But when you yourself are going to face the bullets, leading your subordinates, the price of foolhardiness and haste is paid in blood. A military man starts to resolve any task by clearly understanding its essence, meticulously assessing the situation, and making a thoughtful decision. This was especially necessary when it was a question of making such grave decisions as were made in those alarming hours...

On that tragic Monday the Army was forced to do somebody else's job. It was forced to do this because those who were obliged to cope could not cope with it. Because it was necessary to save people, save the city, and finally, save the state itself from the bloody chaos that had suddenly become very real. Incidentally, this is the spirit in which the Army's role is assessed by the Russian Federation Government, whose appeal to soldiers was published in yesterday's KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

So there is no need to muddy the waters, there is no need for hasty emotional conclusions. The tragedy which occurred requires serious reflection: How are we going to live now? How, despite everything, can we proceed, forcing our way through obstructions and barriers of conflicts toward what is called a civilized society. Toward a society in which, among other things, the postulate "keep the Army out of politics" would indeed be immutable and would not surprise or irritate anybody.

No Militiamen, Soldiers Sided With Putschists

LD0710121993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1101 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, October 7 (TASS)—The Russian Interior Ministry's public relations centre today denied reports by several mass media sources that 200 men from various interior bodies and interior troops had joined the putschists during the coup de force in Moscow.

"In the course of the parliament building's blockade and the operations that followed it up," ITAR-TASS was told by Arkadiy Semenyaka, an official of the centre, "all servicemen of Russian law enforcement bodies have displayed loyalty to their oath and to their service duty. No units have refused to obey the orders of the Interior Minister. [no end quotes as received]

According to Semenyaka, the people arrested on October 4 included 15 militiamen from different law enforcement bodies of Russia, including some from the former parliament guard department. Their cases are now being investigated. Two men from the interior department of Kurgan region were released on October 5 since they were arrested by accident.

Semenyaka said that 78 servicemen of the interior troops, who stood on guard around the Moscow municipal council building without weapons, were captured by the puschists and taken to the parliament building. This case is also being investigated at present.

Officer Charges Militia Leadership With Indecision

PM0710150193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition p 2

[Marina Lebedeva report: "'From Friday We Received Incomprehensible Orders From the Leadership,' Says Deputy Chief of Moscow Militia Station"]

[Text] It is hard now to find anyone who, after analyzing recent tragic events, would not ask themselves just what happened during those days to the militia, which left its positions on Krasnaya Presnya virtually without putting up any resistance? Why were the militia's shields so easily wrenched away by the mutineers? How did a mob of hooligans prevail over organized and (supposedly!) disciplined law-enforcement organ officers and get through to City Hall without any particular effort?

The leader of a Moscow militia station located near the White House, who asked to remain anonymous, clarifies the picture.

"From Friday we received incomprehensible orders from the leadership. On Sunday this became particularly alarming. We would be told to arm ourselves, then told to disarm just half an hour later. Our duty officers heard Rutskoy swearing over the radio (I had never heard such language) and ordering us not to obey Pankratov, the city militia chief. On the other hand, I was called by the leadership, who demanded that I send men first to one place then to another. I asked how many to send, and what equipment they would need. There would be no comprehensible answer, just a painful, sometimes hour-long silence. I was ashamed to look the guys in the face...

"The militia outside the White House had to stand for hours in front of a frenzied mob, and we only had pistols. What use is a pistol when the other side has assault rifles and mortars?...

"On Sunday we were on duty on the 'Mir' Hotel beat—the White House. When that drunken, 'frenzied' mob was advancing on City Hall, we suddenly got the order not to shoot and to retreat.

"When I realized that our superiors were simply waiting to see who would win, I countermanded the instructions to disarm and ordered my guys not to surrender their weapons—they are still carrying them. It simply became clear to me that nobody was thinking about us and that I myself would have to decide whose side my men were on.

"Look at the conditions we are working under—it's laughable how few working phones we have. Here's the number, go to the editorial office and phone our duty officer. You won't get through—half the phones aren't working because the cable's broken. Do you know when we asked the main administration to fix it? July...

"Do you think that ordinary militiamen don't see what's going on, or that all this was really useful for somebody? We have not forgotten the '91 putsch. People were killed—but was anyone punished? It is more than two years now... Tizyakov and Pavlov are alive and well, and we are being shown scenes from the show in the Supreme Soviet auditorium.

"Now there has been another putsch. Did you notice how the arrested White Housers came out? The deputies even had their hands raised to give themselves up, but Rutskoy, Khasbulatov, and Makashov showed no sign of defeat. They know the system, and will go unpunished like the State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE]...

"You have probably heard that animals get antsy before an earthquake. We in the militia start worrying when we get a pay raise. It's a sure sign of trouble ahead. That was what happened in 1991, and that is what happened this time too. We got extra money two days before the events. To make it easier to cope with the bullets.

"After everything that has happened I have only one wish—to make my report and get out. One of my colleagues has done just that—he's called it a day and left for the provinces, where there aren't any revolutions..."

When I reached the end of my description of this militiaman's confessions, I heard a radio report that Mayor Luzhkov of Moscow had stated that it would be an unforgivable mistake to let those to blame for this tragedy escape or to "let things drag on"—as was the case with the SCSE.

How nice that at least now the leader of the city and the militia captain are of the same mind.

Interior Troops Deny Being Inadequately Fed

LD0710134593

[Editorial Report] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 0930 GMT on 7 October broadcasts a 5-minute report that follows a claim in this morning's Mayak Panorama that Interior Ministry troops guarding the Ostankino Television Center were being poorly fed. Correspondent Anatoliy Fedorov asks servicemen of the Dzerzhinskiy division what they think of the food they are receiving.

One soldier says the troops are receiving regular meals, and they have no complaints. But they will not refuse anything offered by members of the public. The commander of an armored personnel carrier says that additional food and hot tea or coffee would not come amiss. A spetsnaz major says that officers are getting exactly the same food as soldiers. It all comes out of the same pot. He feels that feeding arrangements are quite satisfactory, but it would be embarrassing to turn down food that had been sincerely offered by civilians.

In the studio, Major General Vladimir Kovalenko, deputy head of the Logistics Department of the Interior Ministry forces, says: As a result of a decision made by the internal affairs minister, every serviceman has been receiving an additional allowance of 1,000 rubles ever since the start of the state of emergency. This is to pay for additional hot food. This applies to all units that are now protecting public order and guarding various installations, and our staff are making sure that the decision is implemented. Together with the management of state TV and radio, we are now seeking to improve the way in which food is served and to make sure that the men have proper breaks. I think we will manage to resolve all the problems.

Kovalenko adds that Muscovites should not worry about the well-being of Interior Ministry troops. They will be properly fed and adequately clothed. The Mayak presenter apologizes to anyone who might have been offended by this morning's report, but says that consideration for others' welfare never does any harm.

Security Council Discusses Draft Military Doctrine

PM0710141393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

["Russian Federation Presidential Press Service Report" dated 6 October 1993]

[Text] A session of the Russian Federation Security Council was held in the Kremlin today under the chairmanship of Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin. The draft of the basic provisions of the Russian Federation military doctrine, which represents a component of the overall concept of the country's security, was examined.

The draft includes the basic principles of Russian military doctrine: the prevention of war, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, and the inviolability of state borders.

The basic provisions of the Russian Federation military doctrine will regulate military aspects of the Russian state's policy in ensuring national security and will determine the parameters of its Armed Forces, the prospects for their development, and methods and resources for maintaining defense at the necessary and sufficient level.

The Security Council made a high assessment of the role of the Armed Forces as the guarantor of reliable protection of Russia's vital interests and the bulwark of its statehood. The fundamental importance of state concern for servicemen was especially stressed, and this will also be reflected in the military doctrine.

As a result of the discussion, the Russian Federation president instructed that the draft of the basic provisions of the Russian Federation military doctrine be definitively finalized. The document which has been discussed will be ratified at the next Security Council session on 15 October of this year.

Moscow, the Kremlin, 6 October 1993

Kokoshin Discusses Doctrine

LD0810112893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0441 GMT 8 Oct 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" broadcast]

[Text] As you know, Russia's Security Council has been examining the country's new draft military doctrine. Its main provisions are to be closely harnessed to the armaments program. Here is how Andrey Kokoshin, the Russian Federation's first deputy minister of defense, describes the essence of this program:

[Begin Kokoshin recording] We have been working on this ever since Russia's own Defense Ministry was established. It covers all types of armaments that take far longer than usual to develop, including some that will not be ready until the year 2010 or 2015.

The program sets out clear-cut priorities. These include deterrence of nuclear or large-scale conventional war, employing both nuclear and nonnuclear resources. Another priority is to ensure that Russia can wage war, so to speak, in both maritime and continental theaters and secure an advantageous outcome for itself. All types of equipment that we need to achieve this are envisaged under the program.

In it we strove to keep in mind prospects for the development of our treaty on collective security and cooperation with other CIS countries. We do not intend to sever any of these ties. Industrial cooperation will also be maintained. This cooperation will depend to a great extent on military and political relationships, however.

I consider that the recent summit meeting in Moscow of the CIS leaders will also influence the way our armaments program is implemented. Of course we would benefit if Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and other CIS states that have enterprises manufacturing defense products on their territory were to be involved in the implementation of the program. [end recording]

Kokoshin Holds Conference on Defense Order

PM0610144393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Oct 93 p 2

[Report by Valentin Rudenko: "Defense Order: The Ball Is in the Finance Ministry's Court"]

[Text] The fulfillment of the state defense order for 1993 and 1994 and the implementation of the long-term arms program are a sore point not only for industry but also for the Defense Ministry. A special conference with deputy commanders for armaments and chiefs of a number of Russian Federation Defense Ministry main directorates held Saturday [2 October] by Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin was devoted to this problem.

Work on the long-term arms program proceeded virtually from the first day the Russian Federation Defense Ministry was formed. The program was submitted for examination to the government in early September of this year. It is designed to cover the period through 2000-2005, but it includes a number of arms systems with a much longer lifetime—through 2010-2015. Moreover, it deals not only with research and development work and the launch of series production of particular systems of arms and equipment, but also with tracking them through the process of operation, including recycling. Particular emphasis is placed on the priorities—facilities for communications, reconnaissance, control, and electronic warfare, battlefield equipment for the serviceman, and others. It is assumed that Commonwealth countries, primarily Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, will take part in implementing the program. The recent meeting of CIS leaders in Moscow was one argument in favor of interstate cooperation in the sphere of defense production.

On the basis of the armaments program, the Defense Ministry has elaborated and submitted to the government the draft defense order for 1994. One of the two versions of it envisages a slight increase in appropriations over this year, while the other keeps them at the former level. The military department has done its part of the work. The ball in now in the court of the government and the Finance Ministry. Only after this will it be possible to give enterprises a real guideline regarding the defense order and to begin the contract campaign.

The generals who spoke at the conference were unanimous in the opinion that the root of all the problems lies in the extremely complex budget and financial situation and in the inadequate, untimely, and spasmodic financing of defense needs. Although financing has improved slightly in the last six-eight weeks, the Defense Ministry is still owed an astronomical sum. In terms of some parameters the debt has not only not decreased, but has actually increased. To the credit of defense firms, they are behaving worthily in these difficult conditions and are making every effort to fulfill the defense order.

"No matter how complex the financial and economic situation in the country, the state must settle up with enterprises and make an advance payment for next year's defense order," Andrey Kokoshin believes.

It is a matter not of an increase in the defense budget, as sometimes made out, but of bringing the allocated funds into line with the real growth in prices.

There is another important detail I would like to note. Today the defense budget is by no means only military spending but also a very important factor in the economic and social life of the 30, 35, or, according to some calculations, 40 million people connected with the defense sector of the economy. It is common knowledge that around two-thirds of the funds allocated for the purchase of weapons and combat equipment are spent on the social sphere and only one-third on the production of defense output proper. The funds transferred by the Defense Ministry often go entirely on paying debts and paying wages. In addition to everything else, these funds preserve jobs and keep unemployment in check.

Among the key problems whose solution cannot be deferred, the conference participants mentioned the mandatory advance funding of the 1994 defense order, the switch to direct relations not only with head enterprises, but also with subcontractors, full settlement with enterprises for manufactured components, the drawing up of a minimum critical list of technologies and unique production facilities without which the timely and good-quality fulfillment of the defense order is impossible, and a substantial increase in the average wage, which is currently around 1.6-1.8 times lower in the defense sector than in industry as a whole. We cannot allow all our unique specialists to leave. And there is a risk of that.

At the same time the conference participants noted that on the whole the attitude toward the defense order has begun to change for the better. Many enterprise leaders have seen from their own experience that, notwithstanding all the problems, the Defense Ministry is today the most stable and reliable customer. There are hundreds of illustrations of this. Here is just one. The building of the cruiser Petr Velikiy at the "Baltiyskiy Zavod" shipyard in St. Petersburg is proceeding with difficulty, but nevertheless work on it is not ceasing for even a single day. Whereas no work has been carried out on the nuclear icebreaker next door for almost 18 months because of the lack of funding.

The meetings between the Defense Ministry leadership and general designers, and also the scientific and production collectives of design bureaus, research institutes, and series-production plants help in establishing direct contacts and studying the true situation. The latest such meeting was held last Friday [1 October] at the A.N. Tupolev Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex. Current and long-term problems of the development of long-range aircraft were discussed.

"Our design bureau has a wealth of experience in strategic and heavy long-range aviation, and it must be preserved at all costs," Valentin Klimov, general director of the Tupolev Complex, said in conversation with your correspondent.

It is extremely difficult to realize this wish. Long-range aviation has probably suffered more than other combat arms during the reorganization of the Armed Forces. The size of the defense order has declined sharply in recent years, and many promising programs have been axed. Series production of the Tu-160 supersonic strategic missile carrier and bomber with variable wing geometry has practically been suspended.

But for its part the Defense Ministry, Andrey Kokoshin assured the meeting participants, will try to do everything to preserve the design bureau and to preserve series-production facilities, above all the Kazan Aviation Plant.

To the credit of the Tupolev workers, they too are not sitting idly by and are showing concern not only to survive but also to do groundwork for the future. Work on civilian themes is being actively carried out. There are interesting proposals for the modernization of military aircraft and for equipping them with new avionics, control systems, and arms. All this inspires confidence in the future.

Comments on Long-Range Aircraft

PM0610154993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 3 Oct 93

[Report by I. Krondo and V. Kuzmin, including recorded interview with First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin; date and place not given; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Krondo] The Tupolev Design Bureau is 70 years old. In October 1923 the world's first monoplane took to the air. It was the ANT-1, designed by Andrey Nikolayevich Tupolev. More than 150 modifications of various aircraft have been designed at this bureau over the past years. Combat aircraft were also designed here. Russia's First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin and representatives of the Air Force Command visited the design bureau on the eve of the anniversary. The prospects of the development of long-range bomber aircraft were discussed during a meeting with managers of aircraft enterprises. [video shows veteran aircraft, aircraft building facilities, model aircraft]

[Kokoshin] Discussing the issues of long-range aircraft and the arms with which they are to be fitted is part of the work that we are carrying out to finalize the long-term arms program that has essentially already been submitted to the government. We would like to have what is being done at the plant, what is being finished here. We need it, the plant needs it, and the Armed Forces could do with it too.

Need for Long-Range Reconnaissance Argued

PM0710140593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Aleksandr Manushkin "Military Observer's Notes": "Can Orions See Everything from Above?... What U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft Are Doing Near Russia's Borders"]

[Text] At the beginning of this year I visited a Russian long-distance aerial reconnaissance regiment stationed on Belarusian territory. A lot of water seems to have flowed under the bridge since then, but I still remember that trip. Because the unit's command and officers spoke with particular pain...no, not only and not so much about their own social problems, although these were discussed, but about the fate of the regiment as a combat unit.

It is known that under the treaty with Belarus the unit will be stationed there for two years. But what then? The regiment has obsolete Tu-22R reconnaissance aircraft in its arsenal. By that time the majority of the aircraft will have come to the end of their working life, and they will most likely have to be written off and removed from the effective strength. So Russia's long-range aviation could soon find itself without these reconnaissance aircraft.

Should we have any regrets for obsolete hardware that has come to the end of its life? Despite everything, the Tu-22's, which were once the pride and glory of the Soviet Union (they were used not only as reconnaissance aircraft but primarily as carriers of missiles and nuclear weapons), now belong to the past. In addition, because of the shortage of aviation fuel and the restrictions on flights (it is, after all, a different state), the Tu-22R's are more rarely fulfilling their immediate tasks. In short, withdrawal suggests itself, as it were.

Another regiment of reconnaissance aircraft is stationed on the territory of Ukraine, which has "privatized" it along with all long-range aircraft.

It is worth mentioning another regiment of long-range reconnaissance aircraft stationed, fortunately, at home in Russia. Until recently it was armed with quite obsolete Tu-16R's. They have now been laid up. This is the picture that is painted....

Is there, in fact, any need to be concerned? This entire armada of aircraft was created back in the "Cold War" years, and we, just like the United States, incidentally, were quite unable to dispense with strategic reconnaissance. Times are different now. Now almost all in the world are our friends. This would be fine in itself. But we employ a lulling word even for those states which conduct active reconnaissance (previously we said simply "espionage") against Russia and the former republics of the USSR—"partners." How do things stand for these partners in this sphere?

To conduct strategic reconnaissance from the air, the world's leading countries maintain a solid pool of aircraft equipped with the most modern optical and radio-electronic systems for detecting objects and processing data. The United States, of course, has the largest pool. It maintains an entire aerial army of U-2 and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft within the Strategic Air Command (some sources have now started calling it the Combat Air Command). There are approximately 65 strategic reconnaissance aircraft.

The U-2 strategic reconnaissance aircraft was developed by the Lockheed firm. It is designed for high-altitude reconnaisance. It has equipment to intercept and record radio and radar emissions, as well as infrared and photographic equipment. It has a speed of 750 km per hour. Its maximum flying altitude is 24 km, and it has a range of up to 10,000 km. The aircraft is equipped with a system for refueling in the air. In the space of one hour it can photograph a section of terrain with an area of 15,000 square kilometers. It is capable of identifying objects as small as 25 cm.

The RC-135 strategic reconnaissance aircraft was created by the firm of Boeing on the basis of the C-135 military transport aircraft. It is equipped with modern navigational, aerial photographic, and radio, radiotechnical, infrared, and optical reconnaissance apparatus. It has a crew of up to six. A speed of 1,000 km per hour. Its practical ceiling is 15 km. It has a flight range of 14,500 km. The apparatus enables it to reconnoiter the borders of the territory of a state of interest to a depth of up to 800 km. With the help of the cartographic system installed on board it is possible during eight hours' flying time to carry out an accurate survey of a territory with an area of approximately 100,000 square km.

The United States now has a total of 44 U-2 aircraft and 21 RC-135 aircraft in its arsenal. In addition, the U.S. Navy has 303 patrol aircraft (to track submarines) and 37 Orion-type reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft. They provide the unified air reconnaissance system, which is being created in the United States, with data. Incidentally, the unified air reconnaissance system will include, in addition, space facilities (manmade reconnaissance satellites), multifunction reconnaissance and military command and control systems (Hawkeye long-range radar detection aircraft), and also information gathering and processing centers on the ground.

The majority of strategic reconnaissance aircraft (38 units) are stationed at so-called forward airbases. I believe that many readers will be interested to learn where they are. Here are recent data.

Location of U.S. Strategic Reconnaissance Aircraft at Forward Airbases

Airfield	Type of Aircraft	Number
Mildenhall (Britain)	RC-135	4
Alconbury (Britain)	U-2	12
Akrotiri (Cyprus)	U-2	3
Soudha (Island of Crete, Greece)	RC-135	1
Ericson (Greece)	RC-135	4
Al-Ta'if (Saudi Arabia)	U-2	4
Osan (South Korea)	U-2	6
Kadena (Japan)	RC-135	3
Yokota (Japan)	RC-135	1

It can be seen from the table that the majority of the airbases are not far from the borders of Russia and the CIS countries. At the same time aircraft of other NATO countries are also involved in reconnaissance. I will cite a summary obtained at the Air Force Staff for just one day chosen at random. On 27 September 1993, for example, air reconnaissance along the borders of the Russian Federation and the CIS was being conducted simultaneously by five reconnaissance aircraft of the air forces and navies of the United States, Norway, Sweden, and Japan in the following regions: Turkey—one U-2; the Baltic—one Caravelle; the Barents Sea—one Orion; the Sea of Japan—two Orions.

There is no day when reconnaissance aircraft do not take off from overseas airfields and head for Russia's borders. Their routes lie at a distance of 10-300 km from our state border. Even the routes of reconnaissance aircraft stationed in Britain (a long way off, you might think) tend mainly toward the Baltic and the Barents Sea. As for the United States, last year, for example, strategic reconnaissance aircraft (not counting Orions) carried out approximately 300 flights to regions bordering on the territory of the former USSR. To be fair, it should be said that the intensity of such flights has diminished in recent years (the thaw in international relations has evidently had an effect), but it is still high.

What tasks does U.S. strategic reconnaissance tackle near our borders? There are many. Here are just a few:

—keeping track of the everyday activities of the Russian Armed Forces, revealing changes in the state of their combat readiness, numerical strength, and location;

—determining the state and composition of the forces and means of Russia's air defense systems, their actual combat potential, and the characteristics of new systems for detecting aerial targets;

—observing the activities of naval groupings in the regions of naval bases, on voyages, and in regions of combat service;

—tracking combat-training and test launches of Russian carrier rockets and tests of new aerospace systems.

In short, our partners are not dozing or wasting time. But what of us? I am far from thinking that Russia has now started vying with America in the number of strategic reconnaissance facilities. This is senseless and, most likely, unnecessary. May God grant, as the saying goes, that we will maintain in the necessary state of readiness that which is left after dividing up the army of the former USSR. The state treasury is empty, and there are insufficient funds for the most essential things.

Russia has proclaimed itself a democratic state. The image of the enemy no longer exists, arms and troop numbers are being reduced.... But the United States is continuing with reconnaissance near our borders—which accords with its vital interests. This is the reality. But clearly we must not forget that, despite the economic and political troubles, Russia remains the world's second nuclear power. By virtue of the country's geographic position, our political and economic interests extend both to the east (Asia) and to the west (Europe). Whichever competent persons I spoke with at the Air Force Staff, they told me: In long-range aviation we must have at least two reconnaissance regiments—one in the east, the other in the west. Not without a sense of professional pride they showed me photographs of the U.S. aircraft carriers Nimitz, Kitty Hawk, and Lincoln intercepted in the ocean expanses this year alone. It is hard to disagree with this.

Incidentally, in the long-range aviation staff's reconnaissance department I was also shown photographs of other aircraft carriers. They emphasized that they had first photographed the Lincoln, for example.

Long-range reconnaissance aircraft also fly on other missions. True, such flights have become extremely rare. This is understandable, when the Air Force Command has to rack its brains over where to find the funds to pay the personnel's wages, to prepare the housing stock for winter, and for other urgent needs. For one such long-range flight is equal in terms of fuel alone to the pay of 100 officers. So make your choice....

Alas, the collapse of economic ties within the former Soviet Union and the imperfect nature of the present market relations have hit hard at the country and the Army, including the Air Force. If cardinal measures are not taken at the state level, in two or three years' time we could be left entirely without reconnaissance aircraft. The last long-range reconnaissance aircraft will simply be written off because they will have come right to the end of their life.

What, then, are the prospects? If it were not for the country's economic problems, they would appear promising. For example, specialists rate highly the Tu-22MR supersonic long-range reconnaissance aircraft. They say it is a remarkable machine in terms of both speed and flight range. But the chief thing is that the aircraft has on board excellent navigational and other equipment, which makes it possible to conduct reconnaissance by day and by night, under any weather conditions. But there is a shortage of funds to create the optimum number of these machines. There is also an acute shortage of funds for research and development.

We have a defensive doctrine. Under these conditions the role of reconnaissance can hardly be overestimated. The state must, if necessary, expose in good time the real intentions both of possible enemies and of "friends" and prevent an undesirable development of events at an early stage. As we see, there are plenty of problems. If only the statesmen and those on whom the funding of military programs depends had sufficient courage, wisdom, and means to ensure that long-range aerial reconnaissance does not develop according to the residual principle.

Students Subject to Military Service Call-Up

LD0710084493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0748 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Moscow, 7 Oct (ITAR-TASS)—The press service of the Russian Federation president has reported that a decree by Boris Yeltsin was today promulgated for publication. In accordance with the decree, citizens who have reached the age of conscription and who are undergoing full-time education courses at basic and secondary vocational training educational establishments will be called up in October-December 1993 to do military service in the armed forces of the Russian Federation and other types of troops.

Up until now, this category of persons, along with students of higher educational establishments, have had their conscription deferred.

Economic Issues

Gaydar Views Tasks Facing Government

LD0810111493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2120 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Report by Sergey Omelchenko; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Today problems of economics and politics have become interwoven in a tight, tangled, and contradictory knot, which the executive authority failed to untie without using strong-arm methods. Now, having got rid of the obvious obstacles put up by enemies and opponents, the main task for the government is creative and constructive work aimed at restoring order in the country, Yegor Gaydar emphasized at a meeting with journalists on Staraya Ploshchad. Naturally, the first question concerned the tragedy that took place in Moscow.

[Begin Gaydar recording] This situation brought to light weaknesses in the organization of many state authority structures, power structures, and a lack of information, government information first and foremost, on what could threaten civilian peace and state stability. [end recording]

[Omelchenko] Gaydar considers that in order to stabilize the situation in Russia it is necessary first of all to bring down the budget deficit to sensible dimensions, and at the same time to restrain the increase in prices and inflation; to lower the limit for budgetary credit by several times; to remove barriers to the export of our goods; and to continue the privatization process. Gaydar cites as a positive factor the recently adopted decision to place a fairly impressive social insurance fund under government control. But what will the government not do in the absence of a tough opposition?

[Begin recording] [Gaydar] The most frightening thing in our economy today is the huge volume of unfulfilled and unrealizable promises. That at least is what we must now avoid.

[Omelchenko] A critical situation calls for clarity of actions and confidence. How optimistic is your stance?

[Gaydar] If there is a parliamentary majority that does not want to destroy its own economy but really wants to create a base for stable development, then by 1994 we could sharply bring down the pace of inflation and at least lay the foundation for establishing economic growth. [end recording] [video shows Gaydar meeting journalists]

Cabinet To Accelerate Land, Housing Reform

MK0710131893 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 62, 7 Oct 93 (signed to press 6 Oct) p 2

[Boris Aleksandrov report under the "Prospects" rubric: "Provisional Government Thinks About the Future. Plans of Viktor Chernomyrdin's Cabinet"]

[Text] From the point of view of the upcoming elections for the State Duma, the present Council of Ministers is provisional. Yet the political situation is conducive to radically reforming the economy. This was said during a news briefing by Sergey Vasilyev, head of the Working Center of Economic Reforms under the Russian Government. According to him, the cabinet's current and long-range plans propose the final liberalization of foreign trade, the grain market, and the energy market. Parallel to this will be financial stabilization, where the key problem for 1994 will be to regulate the center's budget and taxation relationship with the regions.

The third direction of the government's activities is the protection of property rights. A package of draft edicts has been prepared that includes edicts on the protection of citizens' private property, on the registration of enterprises and real estate transactions, on financial-industrial groups, on the transfer of the right of ownership of securities, and on the protection of stockholders' rights. A package of draft laws on agrarian reform includes in particular the introduction of mortgage and futures operations [zalogovyye i srochnyye operatsii] involving agricultural products. This will make it possible to switch to the civilized crediting of farms and their protection against inflation without resorting to the ugly system of budget subsidies and preferential terms.

The fifth package consists of documents on housing reform and real estate control, that is, the use of land. The package was under preparation for a long time in the State Committee for Construction with the participation of foreign specialists. It is remarkable for its high degree of analysis. Plans call for putting the current spontaneous privatization of housing onto a normal footing. A very important thing here is to discontinue the practice of distributing housing free of charge and to start granting citizens credits to build housing. This is expected to result in an expanding market of special stocks, the so-called housing bills of exchange that enable one to invest money step by step toward future housing.

Finance Ministry Proposes 'Real Privatization'

LD0810100393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2004 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Russia's Finance Ministry has drafted a presidential decree introducing compulsory formalization of enterprises' arrears by bills of exchange under which the debts would have to be paid within 45 to 120 days depending on the economic sector, Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov said on Thursday.

"If such an enterprise failed to pay its arrears on time, the bills of exchange could be freely sold in the market," Fedorov told an international conference in Moscow whose theme was "the Central Bank in a transitory economy." This bankruptcy procedure would mean "the beginning of real privatization," as enterprises would be appropriated by "efficient owners."

The minister said he was against mutual cancellation of debts by enterprises, something that was done last year. He said that, according to his ministry's data, 70 percent of credits provided for replenishing enterprises' working capital were used for other purposes, including current consumption.

Fedorov said that in the third quarter of 1993 the limits for centralized credits approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been raised by 20 percent, according to preliminary estimates.

He said his ministry would try to reduce the budget deficit in the fourth quarter to 4.6 Tn rubles.

"In this way we hope to reduce the annual budget deficit to 12 Tn [trillion] rubles or 10 percent of the GNP [gross national product]," he said. Last year's deficit amounted to 20 percent of the GNP, according to the IMF.

Fedorov said that a tough monetary policy could bring the rate of inflation down to 15-20 percent in December and to 10 percent in February 1994.

Readies Stabilization Package

MK0710134893 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

[Nikolay Podlipskiy report: "Operational Management Commission Holds Meeting. A Package of Financial Stabilization Documents Drawn Up"]

[Text] Virtually all the deliberations of the government commission for the operational management of the national economy have been held behind closed doors. Late Tuesday night, however, this tradition was broken—First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, the commission's head, held a news conference after a commission meeting. This decision came as no surprise, because the meeting considered matters related to the earliest possible reconstruction of the Ostankino television center—the vital mass media company under government control.

According to Oleg Soskovets, estimating the costs of Ostankino's reconstruction is fairly difficult at this stage. Vyacheslav Bragin, chief of the Ostankino Television Company, was tasked with preparing a request for a proposal for reconstructing the building, taking into account that the would-be transmitting studios should be protected against future attacks. Contractors for the reconstruction of all the damaged buildings have in effect already been chosen—this will be done by the companies that built them.

Nonetheless, it was not the reconstruction of state television (or raising the efficiency of broadcasting, for that matter) that held any particular interest. The thing is that the agenda in its initial version included an item that was removed from it just before the meeting—on financial stabilization measures, the elimination of nonpayments, and a drastic improvement in payment discipline. According to representatives of the government, these matters were left outside the collective discussion because they have already been resolved "in a working manner."

According to unofficial reports, the Finance Ministry has drawn up a financial stabilization package, which initially consisted of 11 documents. They essentially boil down to tightening financial policy as much as possible, introducing a number of new taxes (for instance, a 7 percent charge to the fund for the stabilization of priority industries), and banning any creation of credits for the repayment of enterprises' mutual debts. However, a number of government staffers, supported by industrialists, expressed apprehensions that these documents, if fully implemented, may lead to virtually the complete bankruptcy of the national economy.

In this event the following scenario is likely. The documents from "Fedorov's package" will be signed because achieving financial stabilization is still considered a priority area for the Council of Ministers. The introduction of these measures, however, will be followed by an agreement between the resuscitated "monetary" and "industrial" blocs on selecting enterprises for priority treatment, which will be given financial assistance. It is the length of the enterprise list that will be discussed in the government, where proponents of budget deficit cuts still call the shots. This is attributable to the fact that after the parliament was abolished, representatives of Russian industry lost the most effective body through which they more or less successfully lobbied their interests. Moreover, at a time when Gaydar and Fedorov have increased their influence on the cabinet's policy, the industrialists have seen their possibilities diminish here as well—the Council for Industrial Policy is yet unable to exert any serious pressure, and Oleg Soskovets's authority alone is no longer enough.

End of Economy Ministry Planning Welcomed

MK0710140193 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Nikolay Oleynikov report under the "Details" rubric: "A Farewell to Gosplan"]

[Text] The freshest economic news is the complete and final abolition of the former Gosplan [State Planning Committee], currently the Economy Ministry. The huge building of the former bulwark of the command economy has until recently housed in its offices top specialists in limits and subsidies.

Fresh winds from the Kremlin and Old Square have left it virtually untouched. This is why the masters of distribution were on the sly composing new plans to revive this planning monster, plans that were nearly articulated by former minister Oleg Lobov.

So much for it! Hundreds of sectoral specialists and wizards of summary analysis are packing their belongings; they say that the number of personnel will be cut threefold or even fivefold... In its new capacity, the former Economy Ministry will evidently deal with analysis and forecasting of the country's social and economic development, work out regional policy guidelines, review and assess large-scale investment projects. With no command or distribution functions. It has not been decided, however, what the revamped institution will be called.

The virtual abolition of the former Gosplan has demonstrated the government's actual departure from the sectoral principle of management and a switch to economic methods of regulating the economy. Apparently, it is the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank that will send the main signals to the former single national economic complex. So, eventually we will come to a situation where, as Yegor Gaydar envisioned nearly two years ago, the economy will take orders from interest rates. As in America...

Government, Central Bank Friction Continues

MK0710133793 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

[Radmir Kilmatov report: "Reforms Working Center Criticizes Central Bank of Russia. Frictions Between Government and Central Bank Still There"]

[Text] The monthly rate of inflation in the third quarter dropped from 25-30 percent to 20 percent. This was stated at a news briefing by chiefs of the Working Center of Economic Reforms under the Russian Government that ended late on Tuesday. On the strength of 1993 performance, prices will increase 11-fold (they grew 26 times in 1992). Specialists of the center, however, think that a tough financial policy is being prevented as before by heads of the Central Bank.

It was stressed at the news briefing that the government on the whole managed to score local successes in putting a cap on the growth of money supply. The money supply is growing more slowly than prices: whereas prices rose 7.78 times from the start of the year, the supply of money grew 4.45. This tendency may in the long run lead to the normalization of monetary circulation.

However, in the opinion of reform center specialists, like before, the government's course toward financial stabilization is running into serious obstacles. The main destabilizing factor that really prevents its implementation is, according to Sergey Vasilyev, the head of the center, the actions of the Central Bank leadership and of its chairman, Viktor Gerashchenko. As was stated at the news briefing, the bank does not at the present time limit the size of credits it issues. In particular, the rate of an interbank short-term credit is still in fact below 200 percent despite a recent government decree. As the dollar fluctuated during trading at the Moscow Interregional Currency Exchange, this credit rate never topped 190 percent. As a result, the center's chiefs doubted that financial stabilization could be achieved under the present Central Bank leadership.

Such statements by the heads of the reform center, which is in fact an apparatus for economic expert analysis under the Russian prime minister, are rather remarkable. On the one hand, they contradict the emerging trend toward bringing the entire financial policy of Russia under government control (this trend is natural in light of the cabinet's attempts to use its control over the economy to present budget and finance figures to advantage) and the easing of tensions between Finance Minister Boris Fedorov and Viktor Gerashchenko. On the other hand, it is quite probable that the harmony between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Economy, and the Central Bank was not all that firm from the start. Chiefs of the center, perhaps, expressed a continued guarded attitude toward the Central Bank on the part of Yegor Gaydar and Boris Fedorov, who maintain close relations with the center and, for tactical reasons, cannot themselves voice their fears.

Volskiy Questions Course of Economic Reform

MK0610112193 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 41, 10 Oct 93 (signed to press 5 Oct) p A5

[Article by Arkadiy Volskiy under the "Opinion" rubric]

[Text] The assessment of what has happened is perfectly unequivocal—it was a heinous provocation. A serious nationwide tragedy that like a deep wound will continue to hurt Russia's body painfully and for a long time.

Today, however, I would like to speak not so much about the tragedy itself as about what preceded it. About the moral responsibility of the authorities and about the immoral attitude of politicians who opened the way to this sorrow. Those who stormed Ostankino and those who died in the White House are the victims of a philosophy whose name is "intolerance." This is Russia's hereditary disease, bringing it only blood throughout its history.

Could the 3 October events have been prevented? I am sure that they could have been and should have been. If the conflict between the two branches of power had not grown into a political squabble. If we had finally learned to listen to each other and not to execute each other.

I have never been an advocate of the Congress of People's Deputies. I have always thought that the deputy corps, elected on the wave of 1990 public rallies, do not represent the constructive forces of Russian society. We, representatives of the industrialists, could especially clearly see its fruitlessness in terms of economic lawmaking activity. Six draft laws prepared by us had been gathering dust for more than a year. At the same time, however, we felt that the Russian parliament reflects the mood of particular social groups. That it was a litmus test for the mentality of millions of Russians whose consciousness does not accept the course toward a "capitalist revolution." Not to violate it but to bring about positive changes—this is the purpose of the transitional government and rule that now exist in Russia. From this position, in my opinion, the chosen method of forceful development [silovoye razvitiye] by parliament was not the best possible option.

The abolition of parliament has far from put an end to the dispute about the essence of Russian reforms. And this is precisely what is being constantly discussed. It is naive and incorrect to reduce everything to the power struggle, to the personal ambitions of particular politicians. Underlying everything is the question: In what direction and how is our country to develop? Here it is necessary to treat the special position of the regions, manifested after 21 September, in a very balanced and sensible way. This position has marked a deep watershed between the viewpoint of Moscow and the provinces, especially the republics. If the government ignores this watershed, it will get a new old parliament in the shape of the Federation Council.

I am also deeply concerned by the position taken during these days by some representatives of the intelligentsia, public figures, and journalists. All these appeals about the need to do away with the elected soviets at the local level, to disband and ban opposition parties. Any totalitarianism, even in a democratic package, will eventually stifle the sprouts of freedom, human rights, and political diversity which have just emerged in our society.

Being a person closely related to industry, I am extremely alarmed by the economic situation looming in November. Against this backdrop, some members of the government are increasingly falling to politicking and the resultant unprofessionalism. There is no dialogue with the trade unions, the industrialists, and the entrepreneurs.

I suppose that it is the Federation Council that should, pending general elections, become the main guarantor of calming Russia. It has every opportunity to make sure that its rational and balanced voice be heard and received with due respect and that the upcoming election be held in a truly democratic atmosphere.

Provisions of Bread Subsidy Edict Summarized

PM0710143193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Oct 93 "Delo" Supplement p 1

[Yelena Sokolova report under the "Social Policy" rubric: "Bread Is Getting More Expensive, but Not for Everyone"]

[Text] As we well know, because of the upcoming introduction of free prices for bread and bakery products, President Boris Yeltsin has signed an edict "On Bread Benefits for Citizens on Low-Income." For the first time, a social protection measure has an anticipatory character, that is to say people will receive the payments before they spend the money on bread.

Under the plan, bread prices are being freed gradually starting on 16 August, when we paid an average of 99 rubles [R] per kilogram. We will pay R137 in the third quarter and approximately R250 by the end of the year. The size of the benefit has been calculated on the basis of average statistical data about Russians' bread consumption. This is 12-13 kg per month per person. The benefit will be identical for all categories of needy people, standing at R235 in August, R470 in September, and R1,400 per month in the fourth quarter.

These payments are envisaged for two groups of citizens: Those on low-level incomes and those with a certain social position regardless of their income.

The first group includes working people whose average earnings do not exceed the minimum old-age pension. This criterion has been chosen because the minimum pension, which currently stands at R14,620, is closer to the subsistence level than the minimum wage which in turn is half as much as the pension.

The same group includes nonworking pensioners receiving the minimum old-age pension, unemployed people or those who have been sent by the employment service to undergo professional training or retraining, and those receiving unemployment benefits or a grant not exceeding R14,620.

The second group of citizens entitled to compensation includes nonworking able-bodied people looking after category-one disabled persons, extremely old people over 80 years who need constant attention, or a disabled child up to 16 years old.

The category also includes nonworking wives of servicemen living with their husbands in places where they do not have the opportunity to find work.

Compensatory payments for bread will also be received by mothers and other relatives who stay at home with children up to three years old, schoolchildren up to the age of 16, high school students up to the age of 18, undergraduates, postgraduates, and students on combined work-study programs. This right has also been accorded to refugees and forced migrants.

The bread benefit is being established and paid on the basis of applications submitted by citizens from their places of work, study, and residence to organs of social security and the pension service, in other words the sources of their basic income. At the same time it is necessary to furnish documentary confirmation of the right to receive this payment.

According to preliminary calculations, the budget cost of this measure of social protection for needy citizens will be R14 billion in August, R28 billion in September, and R251 billion in the fourth quarter.

Poll Finds More Support for Capitalism

MK0810083793 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 2

[Oleg Savelyev report under the "Social Barometer" rubric: "Russians for Socialism? Is That So?"]

[Text] In mid-September 1993, the All-Russian Institute for the Study of Public Opinion polled some 1,600 inhabitants of Russia who proportionately represent the main sociodemographic groups of the adult population.

The answers to one of the questions in this survey—Which economic system seems to you more correct?—are in percentages.

The one based on state planning and distribution	33
The one based on private property and market relations	39
Do not know, hard to say	28

Advocates of state planning are more frequent among pensioners, middle-ranking managers, and manual laborers, and all persons older than 55 with less than a high school education and monthly incomes of 10-20,000 rubles per family member.

Market relations are mostly advocated by heads of enterprises, entrepreneurs, high and higher school students, skilled specialists, as well as all men, persons with higher and incomplete higher education under 40, with a per capita monthly income of 30-100,000 rubles, and living in urban centers.

The above figures somewhat contradict the assertions, widely publicized and lavishly commented on in the media, that the majority of people in Russia thirst for the socialist road of development, resulting from surveys conducted by the "Public Opinion" fund. Part of the population apparently continues to interpret "socialism" as that very attractive version of an economic system known in this country as "Swedish socialism."

September Inflation at Around 20 Percent

PM0810095393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Svetlana Ulanova of Russian Government Center for Economic Conditions: "Inflation in September Was Around 20 Percent"]

[Text] According to operational data, the overall inflation index for the four weeks of September was 121 percent. In the last week of the month prices rose 4.1 percent, and they have risen 480 percent since the beginning of the year.

Overall, paid services to the population increased in price by 45 percent (rail fares went up 150 percent from 15 September, while hotel services went up 33 percent over the month and municipal bus fares went up almost 30 percent), nonfood goods by 25 percent, and food products by an average of 15 percent. Since approximately mid-July this year the cost of nonfood goods has risen faster than that of foodstuffs.

There was a 7 percent difference in inflation levels in September between economic regions, with inflation hitting 24 percent for the month in the East Siberian Region, while in the Central and Far East Regions it was 16.5 percent.

As in August, in September the biggest price increases affected products forming the basis of the Russian population's diet: Flour went up 38 percent over the month, bread and baked goods went up 25 percent, vodka went up 24 percent, and pasta went up 23 percent. Tobacco products and matches went up 16 percent.

In September Russia's population purchased 3.3 percent more foodstuffs than in August. At the same time, more foodstuffs were bought in unorganized trade outlets than in stores in any form of ownership—obviously because prices at the markets rose only half as much as those in stores. This is connected primarily with the seasonal decline in the price of fruit and vegetables.

Throughout this year Moscow's markets have steadily held the lead in terms of price levels for food products. Over the last six months, for instance, the price of meat and dairy products in the capital's markets has been 2.2-4 times the average Russian price level at markets in other cities. Moscow is Russia's outright leader in terms of the price of a number of products. At the end of September, for instance, a kilogram of butter cost 7,450 rubles [R] at Moscow's markets, which is 3.9 times more than the average price for Russia. By way of a comparison, the second highest price for butter was in Novosibirsk, where it cost R3,500—2.1 times less. The average cost of a kilogram of curd cheese in Moscow was R3,335 (the figure was R2,500 in Nakhodka, the next most expensive city).

As of 28 September, a basket of the 19 most important food products in Russia cost an average of R20,400 calculated over the month. This is 11.4 percent more than at the end of August, and 4.7 times more than at the end of December last year. The cost of this basket was 30 percent higher at prices at unorganized trade outlets than at prices at organized trade outlets.

At the end of September the Far East Region was still the most expensive of Russia's economic regions in terms of the cost of this basket. The basket of 19 products in Magadan calculated over the month cost R55,000, while this figure stood at R40,100 in South Sakhalinsk, and R37,200 in Vladivostok. The cheapest cities are still Ulyanovsk (R10,200), Chistopol (R14,400), and on this occasion Ishimbay (R15,400). The cost of this basket of products increased 17 percent over the month in the Central Chernozem and Ural Regions. There are cities where the cost of this basket increased by over one-third for the month—namely, Novyy Urengoy, Shuya, and Saransk.

In terms of the cost of this basket, Moscow and St. Petersburg occupy 32d and 39th place respectively on the list of Russia's most expensive cities.

Media Issues

Situation Surrounding Banned Newspapers Clarified

LD0810063793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0530 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] As is known, following the tragic events in Moscow some newspapers have been closed down, including PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, GLASNOST, and NARODNAYA GAZETA. (Sergey Luknitskiy), head of the directorate for protecting freedom of the press of the Russian Ministry for Press and Information, has told correspondents of the (Evening Club) that the publication of the above newspapers has been suspended for so long as the presidential decree on state of emergency remains in force. Sergey Pavlovich asked to tell the readers that the official announcement of the ban contains a mistake: It is not the consistently democratic NARODNAYA GAZETA, which is published in Moscow, but the St. Petersburg right-wing NARODNAYA PRAVDA that has been suspended. (Ivan Filimonov), member of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA editorial board, denied all rumors about arrests of heads of the publication. A news conference was held in the PRAVDA office where newspaper staff protested against the suspension and told their colleagues that the newspaper's philosophy would not change. We will continue to defend the constitutional system and human rights as before. Well, you understand that this is possible only if the publication of PRAVDA is resumed.

As regards the newspapers belonging to those public organizations that behaved indecently during the October events—for instance, Anpilov's MOLNIYA—their publication was banned along with the organizations themselves. Incidentally, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA started coming out on Tuesday [5 October]. It was patronized by the Supreme Soviet but now it is the Russian Council of Ministers that has become its patron.

Ministry Considers New Rules

MK0810084793 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 4

[Aleksandr Khinshteyn report: "The 'DAY' [DEN] of the Jackals"]

[Text] Despite the Press and Information Ministry decree temporarily banning red and brown newspapers, including DEN, these papers, having managed to come out earlier, have been freely sold throughout the country. And their vociferous call for "taking up axes" has not come to anyone's attention.

We turned to First Deputy Press Minister David Tsabriya, who signed this decree, for explanations. He bitterly complained about his limited rights. It turned out that the ministry was not even entitled to request that the issue be halted; only the Moscow commandant, General Kulikov, can do this. But he, for some reason, is in no hurry to do so.

David Davidovich said also that according to current law, any newspapers that have been closed can, unfortunately, be registered again under a different title, even if they are published by the same people and headed by the closed publication's chief editor. This is what DEN had already done when it took a new title, GAZETA DUKHOVNOY OPPOZITSII [SPIRITUAL OPPOSITION NEWSPAPER], simply turning its masthead upside down.

"As we were drawing up the Law on the Mass Media, we set our sights on a normal, developed society, but now I see that we made haste by making too great a leap forward. The mechanism of the law works very slowly and inefficiently."

According to the deputy minister, presently a heated debate is under way behind the scenes about a new, updated law. It is expected that this law will make it possible to sue newspapers within 10 days, and a people's judge will be entitled to pass rulings on his own to impose fines or temporarily suspend their circulation. Reasons for banning are expected to remain unchanged. Both the "newcomer" Shumeyko and all the ministry's chiefs are eager to prepare a new draft, but so far the Russian Government has not made a proposal for this.

Apparently they keep pondering what kind of society we actually are.

SEGODNYA Protests Banning

MK0710103693 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 62, 7 Oct 93 (signed to press 6 Oct 93) p 2

[Unattributed commentary: "Appeal by SEGODNYA Journalists"]

[Text] After the armed resistance of the national communist opposition was quelled, banning opposition newspapers cannot be deemed an adequate measure from a legal, political, or moral point of view. If some kind of alleged seditious activity is at issue, this is why provisional censorship exists and was introduced in accordance with the law on states of emergency, along with the possibility of legal proceedings in accordance with the law on the press. Otherwise, the absurd and harmful order to close the opposition press (PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, DEN, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, GLASNOST, etc.) deprives us of the moral right to support the current political authority.

In the present conditions, only guaranteed freedom of speech can save the regime from degeneration and arbitrary rule. The opposition newspapers should urgently be allowed to come out.

Newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Reappears 8 Oct

PM0810092193

[Editorial report] The Russian Trade Union Federation and Employers' Union paper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, one of those banned under the Information Ministry's 4 October directive, reappeared on 8 October in four pages, in its previous format, with identical masthead, founders, editorial collective, registration number, and partial copyright notice. A boxed editorial announcement at the bottom of the front page is carried next to a barely legible copy of what appears to be an official, stamped "Order No. 187" signed by First Deputy Press and Information Minister D.D. Tsabriya. The announcement reads:

"The RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA editorial office has received this document from the Russian Ministry for Information and the Press. It has to be understood as giving permission to publish the paper. We are grateful, of course, but we would also like to state the following in this connection:

"We have lived several days of tragedy. Russia stood on the brink of civil war. We were all dumbfounded and horrified to realize how far people can be pushed by extremism, irresponsibility, intolerance, and the abuse of power. The country looked down a gunsight and saw the Russian state hurtling into the abyss.

"There can be no forgiving the people who caused this bloodshed. And our grieving over the graves of the dead is sincere and inconsolable.

"RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is publishing again after a three-day break. We are putting this issue together on the day of mourning for those who died in a fratricidal slaughter unleashed by irresponsible politicians who put their own political ambitions and pretensions above other people's lives. And our hearts are filled with sadness.

"The enforced three-day break also leaves us with a sense of bitterness. We have been personally humiliated and professionally insulted: Why did the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA collective suffer the indignity of being included (mistakenly and unjustly, it now turns out) among even the indirect accomplices of the rebels, when everybody knows that our paper has always stood for national and civil accord, for good sense, and for legality? Why was any blame attached to us when our journalists are guiltless? These are not idle questions, and we would deem it a partial compensation for the damage done to us to have a public apology to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA from the authors of Press and Information Ministry Order No. 183, published in millions of copies and broadcast via all the mass media.

"In these tragic and crucial days for the Fatherland we would not wish to seek particular attention for ourselves. But freedom of speech, individual rights, and pluralism of opinions are things that we need more than ever right now to build a truly democratic society for everyone. Particularly since Russia is coming up to an election in which each of us has a casting vote. This time we must now allow resentment or personal preferences to prevent us from making the right choice. That choice entails values too great for it to be made in a climate of fear and coercion.

"We express our gratitude to all those who refused to accept the ban, albeit temporary, on RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and spoke up in its defense—to the work collectives, the journalists, the trade unions and employers, to the enterprise chiefs and all our readers. We will go on working together: Building a new society and new relationships within it, while defending each person's interests, is a gigantic task. If we work together, as a team, we will cope. If we assail one another, we will destroy the country and we will lose ourselves. History has given us a chance to revive a great Russia. It would be unpardonable to squander it on a 'fight to a victorious finish.'

"We who live on have to think about the future. To those who died for it, we owe eternal memory."

Ostankino TV, Radio Chairman Holds News Conference

LD0710225393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1725 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] A news conference of the heads of Ostankino TV and Radio Company began today with a minute of silence commemorating the victims of the recent events. Thanks to the courage of the Vityaz [knight], special purpose subunits, the militia, and Ostankino staff, the organizers of the revolt failed to force the free and independent broadcasting back into a cage, said Ostankino Chairman Vyacheslav Bragin.

[Begin Bragin recording] The past few days saw a failure, a fiasco of a second State Committee for the State of Emergency [Bragin uses the abbreviation GKChP throughout], which had entrenched itself in the White House. In August 1991, these same people attempted to suppress democracy and they were given a name then—the State Committee for the State of Emergency No.1. In the last few days the very same people, the same leaders, made a second attempt. The State Committee for the State of Emergency No.2 is as reactionary and pro-communist as the first one, only this putsch was even more violent and bloody, even more closely connected with fascism, and with bandit and mafia structures. [end recording]

The chairman of Ostankino TV and Radio Company said that when the threat of the TV center being seized became real, the rebels were prevented from coming on the air by means of a timely switching over of Channels 1 and 4 to the channels of Russia's Television, which broadcast news bulletins prepared jointly with Ostankino journalists. In the meantime, fighting went on near Ostankino, on which Kirill Ignatyev, first deputy chairman of the broadcasting company, gave the journalists some details:

[Begin Ignatyev recording] You know that mob general Makashov brought his militants here, inter alia, in buses seized in the streets; the militants would stop a bus, take the passengers hostage, shout through megaphones that they should be let through to Ostankino because they held hostages in those buses. And so they arrived here in three city buses and several trucks seized near the mayor's office. So at about 1630, the first militants started to appear here—that is, an hour and one-half after Rutskoy made his statement at the White House. [end recording]

Having pointed out that all departments of Ostankino acted as a single body during last Sunday's dramatic events, Ostankino Chairman Vyacheslav Bragin agreed with the criticism that there had been no efficient mechanism for ensuring the safety and evacuation of people from the TV center surrounded by the militants.

[Begin Bragin recording] What efforts have I taken now to ensure that the most vital interests of the team of employees—I emphasize employees, because I include in this category journalists and TEC [Television Engineering Center] and other service personnel—are safeguarded in the future? I have already put this question now before the government, before Soskovets and Shumeyko, and I have received their support. We are now shaping an official document on this to be addressed to the president so that—I emphasize this—the lives of journalists in various political situations similar to the one we have just been through are not threatened with danger. I am raising the question that an extra area of territory be allocated to the television center, so that the perimeters of the television center are far enough away from the building in which we are now sitting. I told Soskovets that we need that territory which comprises the house of deputies, the other side of the pond, the Ostankino cultural complex, the estate beyond the tower, and on the other side from where there is housing—you can't do anything else there—so that this territory is kept for Ostankino, so that the main municipal transport routes are changed, so that Ostankino is not split in half by municipal transport, so that in the normal peak-time situation vehicles are unable to drive up to the gates of the television center or the ASK-3 [Apparatus and Studio Complex No.3] as part of a single complex, so that these perimeters at a considerable distance from the TV center are protected by reliable engineering buildings, so that there is a proper reinforced concrete wall, as is the case in other countries, so that all systems ensuring the running of the complex for a long period of time are guaranteed, so that the system for the evacuation of the personnel is ensured, so that subunits for the defense and protection of the tele-complex are in permanent attendance here and in considerably greater numbers than is the case at present, so that considerably greater supplies of weapons are inside the Ostankino tele-complex than is the case at present, including heavy weapons—in any case grenade throwers should be there, because in this case we came up against armored personnel carriers which caused damage. [end recording]

Meanwhile, life goes on, and equally challenging work is awaiting Ostankino employees who lived through this nightmare.

[Begin Ignatyev recording] The man with the gun, the man with the sub-machine gun, was until recently the main protagonist of those events. The time when people themselves will become the main protagonists is not far away. As you know, the elections have been scheduled for December. I would like to say—and I think that my colleagues who are here now and who have lived through those moments will support me—I would like to say that it would be nice if our electors, those people who will be deciding the fate of Russia, made their choice not in favor of those who distributed weapons, stopped buses on the streets of the city and took them hostage, fired shots at civilians from the top floors of the buildings, stormed Ostankino and tried to gag free television, egoistically distanced themselves from the events which took place, and were guided not by the interests of Russia or the normal interests of defending the lives of their colleagues, but by selfish interest, the interests of self-preservation and personal popularity. [end recording]

As for claims saying that during the pre-election campaign Ostankino intends to represent only one side, as they say, Vyacheslav Bragin said the following:

[Begin Bragin recording] I think that the only possible line for the Ostankino Television Company is to remain somewhere in the middle. That is the way of tried and tested civic spirit, the tried and tested way aimed at democracy and the way of pluralism. Naturally these categories should now be widely employed in connection with the pre-election campaign being unleashed. Some political groupings and some political leaders are worried whether or not they will be given a chance to speak and to express their political aims on Ostankino. I can tell you unambiguously that we will adhere to, as they say, equal and well-balanced political representation on the screen. We are now very much involved in working out a concept for our channel for the final stage of 1993 and for the first six months of 1994.

We are building into this concept—everyone sees it from a different angle—and the stance of the company's heads on the concept of our channel is that we should be able to contribute through our channel, through Ostankino TV, to uniting Russia and making it a single entity; that we should be able to contribute to the implementation of the policy pursued by the president and democratic forces in Russia, aimed at carrying out reforms and effecting a political, economic, and social transformation in Russia as soon as possible. We want our channel to contribute toward strengthening Russia and developing national, patriotically Russian attitudes [Rossiyskoye nachalo], that there should be some powerfully expressed spiritual themes on our channel, that there should be more programs on the history of culture, on music, literature, and the arts. In a word, all those programs which shape a human personality, which make a person look inward and focus on his own soul, his family and children, health and nature, culture, and the greatness of his motherland. This is a rough outline of the main aspects of our work with regard to forming a broadcasting concept of our channel. [end recording]

It became clear to the journalists who attended the news conference that this course would be pursued by Ostankino staff in far from ideal conditions as they looked around the building of the Olimpiyskiy TV and radio complex, the damage to which from the assault is estimated at more than 10 billion rubles. Here are some bank account numbers for those who would like to help restore the TV centre. [Video shows account number on screen over a still of damaged building: Account No.345283/5083, sorting code 201791, Avtobank, hard currency account No.07350109]

Nevzorov Gives Up '600 Seconds' To Start New Program

MK0810093993 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 2

[Unattributed report in the "In Brief" column]

[Text] St. Petersburg—Nevzorov is most likely to stay with Petersburg television. An order signed by Bella Kurkova, head of the "Petersburg - Channel 5" company, will come out shortly. According to unconfirmed reports the order says: "To dismiss the correspondent Georgiy Urushadze for an unauthorized trip to Moscow (he is known to have left the White House together with the last deputies). To announce a rebuke to Aleksandr Nevzorov." It has also become known that A. Nevzorov has given up his daily "600 Seconds" live program but has agreed to produce a weekly prerecorded program of a criminal nature. [as published]

Newsmen Protest Lack of Protection 4-5 Oct

PM0710144593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 2

[Report by Tatyana Akkuratova and Nikita Vaynonen, incorporating interviews with VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA Chief Editor Aleksandr Lisin and ITAR-TASS Collegium Member Igor Ignatyev; place and date of interviews not given: "Who Left the Press Defenseless"]

[Text] The news agencies and newspapers have reported that it was apparently because of its special popularity that MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS specifically came under fire. In fact, the gunmen trained their weapons on everyone who was in the MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA publishing house and print shop at 1700 hours on Monday [4 October] evening. Fortunately, no one was hurt. But not one of the newspapers printed there was able to appear the next morning. In addition to MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS that includes MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA itself, KURANTY, and others.

The only one that did manage to publish, on Monday evening after the shooting furthermore, was VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA. Its Chief Editor Aleksandr Lisin now talks to your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent:

"They fired at my office from the inner courtyard. Where I am sitting now, the wind is blowing on me from the holes in the glass. The office of the advertising agency director next door was also completely shot up. I do not know how they chose their targets, perhaps it was at random. The gunmen took cover among the cars. Incidentally, many cars were also shot up, mine among them. This was clearly done by people retreating from the White House: Afterward some of them went on elsewhere while others kept on firing quite a long time.

There were probably about 20 of them. Because there was a danger that they would break into the building we tried to hide. Our editorial office had an armor-plated door installed after the August [1991] putsch. Vladimir Andreyevich Gribkov, director of the publishing house, telephoned me (and others too, apparently), he and his staff were downstairs in the bomb shelter, and he suggested that we try to get through and join them. But that was very risky. You could only get down there by elevator because on this side of the building the staircase is all glass and the glass had been shot out. We consulted among ourselves and decided to stay put.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] In your view, what might the attackers' aim have been?

[Lisin] It is hard to say. As I heard it said then, they had been ordered to go out into the city and fire at the windows to terrorize everyone. What would they have achieved by seizing the publishing house? This was simply an act of madness. But those people, of course, were criminals.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] Did they manage to break in?

[Lisin] It seems that they reached the first floor, but I do not know how many made it that far.

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI] Who forced them out?

[Lisin] That is the problem, no one did! It seems that they fled of their own accord when they realized their actions were pointless. This is a very serious question. There was no one protecting "Ostankino." Or us. But none of the journalists ran for it, everyone stayed here. Many spent the night here in the editorial office. We worked on the next edition. [Lisin ends]

Here are the details of some other events:

Gunmen who broke out of the White House fired on the ITAR-TASS building during the night of 4-5 October, leaving many of its windows shattered.

As Igor Ignatyev, a member of the agency's collegium who was on duty that night, told your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent, four bullets smashed through the window of the ITAR-TASS World Service English-language office where there were translators working, most of them women. One of them was saved by a safe which stopped a bullet, the other bullets passed over the journalists' heads. In the neighboring German-language office, which was fortunately empty at that moment, bullets smashed three windows. Judging by the nature of the shots and the holes, this was the work of snipers firing from the tops of buildings opposite the ITAR-TASS building on the corner of Nikitskikh Vorot Square and Tverskoy Boulevard.

The situation remained tense and was aggravated by the cross-fire which broke out at midnight outside the building during which one servicemen was killed and another seriously wounded but there were no casualties among the OMON [special purpose militia detachment] men guarding the agency's building or among journalists.

Ignatyev stressed that the agency did not stop work for a second, transmitting and receiving information on all channels.

The night before the agency had to interrupt work for around 20 minutes. At approximately 1800 hours ITAR-TASS General Director Vitaliy Ignatenko was presented with an ultimatum—switch to Rutskoy's side and begin transmitting "truthful information." The visitors—there were two of them—were told that such a decision could only be made by the collegium, although this was a stalling tactic. At 2020 hours, the Rutskoy supporters accompanied by armed men reappeared. While the meaningless talks were going on and a "statement" was being written, (it had not even been composed), some spetsnaz men appeared outside the ITAR-TASS building, there were some shots, and the uninvited guests left the agency. In the intervening 20 minutes of talks TASS also transmitted a report on the temporary suspension of the broadcast of information. As Ignatyev explained, "we have blocked the communications channels to prevent reports from the White House people being transmitted." He specially noted the skillful actions of the anti-organized crime snatch squad, which enabled them to place the ITAR-TASS building under their guard without a shot being fired.

These two incidents are evidence of more than just the danger of journalists' work. They also indicate that, in conditions of a state of emergency, the mass media were left simply defenseless against the putschists. TASS is now being guarded by staffers of the Russian Federation Interior Ministry OMON. They have detained eight people who fired at the agency building in the night of 4-5 October and from whom they confiscated automatic firearms, petrol bombs, and metal bars.

Regional Affairs

Yeltsin Proposes Local Soviets Dissolve Themselves

Local Soviets Oppose Plan

MK0810091893 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 3

[Vladislav Dorofeyev report: "Opposition In Federation Council. Soviets Reluctant To Dissolve Themselves"]

[Text] The regions' reaction to the presidential proposal for local soviets to dissolve themselves has been mixed. In the republics, which have gotten used to their new status and their own constitutions, Supreme Soviet heads oppose simultaneous elections and self-dissolution. In krays and oblasts, the presidential idea has elicited a skeptical, wait-and-see reaction, with local chiefs citing a lack of a legislative framework. In the regions, sessions of soviets began yesterday.

Yesterday, meetings of Supreme Soviet Presidiums in Petrozavodsk, Izhevsk, and Kazan did not even consider the question of self-dissolution. Zilya Valeyeva, first deputy chairman of the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet, told your KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent that if "the president's proposal for the dissolution of the soviets is understood as a proposal, each soviet must make its own decision."

The opinion of Ivan Aleksandrov, deputy chairman of the Karelian Supreme Soviet, may be considered key in assessing the republics' reaction to the president's proposal. Aleksandrov believes that the president "should not take on all of Russia and dissolve local soviets" because this may disorganize the entire life structure in the regions.

Even Yevgeniy Krestyaninov, chairman of the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Soviet and a resolute Yeltsin loyalist, said that he did not "see any need for self-dissolution, at least because there will be no one to make preparations for the elections to the State Duma." Aman Tuleyev, chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet, acknowledged the need to transform soviet power, but nevertheless he proposed that the questions of self-dissolution and the date of elections to the local, professional parliament be discussed at the oblast soviet session on 14 October. An official from Tuleyev's staff voiced the opinion that should the president issue an edict dissolving the soviets, the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet would react sharply negatively. Following up on the subject, Anatoliy Grebenkin, chairman of the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet, said that if Boris Yeltsin managed to dissolve the Supreme Soviet, he will also be able to dissolve local soviets, which, obviously, "will have to bow to this unreasonable decision."

The president's idea of the self-dissolution of the soviets and holding simultaneous elections to the State Duma and local soviets has met with a number of objections. First, regional soviets have traditionally dealt with matters of the territories' economic strategy; second, even autonomous entities lack a legislative framework for this; third, soviets will have to organize preparations for the federal elections.

Most representatives of regional authorities surveyed believe that the president eventually will not force local soviets to dissolve themselves. Elections to local parliaments, in their view, may be held in the first quarter of 1994.

Local Administrations for Plan

LD0810093193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0827 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Grigoriy Shalakin in Kemorovo, Oleg Artyushin in Bryansk, and Valeriy Biryukov in Kaliningrad]

[Text] Kemerovo October 8 TASS—Deputies of local soviets must pluck up courage to resign and participate in the new elections with dignity, said Mikhail Kislyuk, governor of the Kuzbass region, in a televised interview.

The Kuzbass administration does not demand that local soviets be dissolved, he emphasized. But they "have signed their verdict themselves; they have no future", he added.

According to Kislyuk, the Kuzbass administration will help the deputies of the regional soviet to find a new employment. As far as those who will advance their candidacy at the new elections are concerned, they will do so on a par with the rest of the nominees.

Bryansk October 8 TASS—The regional soviet must dissolve on its own initiative so that "to enable holding elections to a new compact body of representative branch power which will work on a professional basis," said Vladimir Karpov, acting head of the Bryansk regional administration in a televised interview.

As is known, the Bryansk regional soviet had come out against the presidential decree on stage-by-stage constitutional reform and declared it invalid on the territory of the Bryansk region.

Kaliningrad October 8 TASS—The deputies of the Kaliningrad regional soviet do not realize their responsibility for blocking the implementation of President Yeltsin's decree "On Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform in the Russian Federation" on the territory of the region, participants in a session of the Kaliningrad regional administration noted on Friday.

The decision was made at first at a session of the Maliy council and confirmed at an extraordinary session of the regional soviet on September 27.

The extraordinary session ignored when Yuriy Matochkin, head of the regional administration, protested that the Maliy council had exceeded its official powers.

The regional administration has demanded that an extraordinary session of the regional soviet be convoked immediately to consider Matochkin's protest and self-dissolvement of the regional soviet.

More Regions Support Yeltsin Plan

PM0710134593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Roundup comprising Aleksandr Bulygin report from Krasnodar, Vladimir Yefimov report from Tyumen, and ITAR-TASS reports from Ulyanovsk and Arkhangelsk: "Regions"]

[Text] Krasnodar—An appeal by the "Russia's Choice" movement to the president said that events have shown once and for all that "soviets and democracy are totally incompatible. The blood shed in Moscow is also on the hands of those people's deputies who approved the stance of the leaders of the former Supreme Soviet, including deputies of the Krasnodar Kray Soviet.

"The December elections cannot be really free and democratic unless soviets at all levels, which turned out to be the main saboteurs of radical reforms and democratization, are dissolved. We urge you to dissolve soviets at all levels immediately. The party of soviets is just as much to blame for the bloodshed as the National Salvation Front and the organizations of communists disbanded by the president."

Tyumen—The participants in a Tyumen rally of democratic forces, in an appeal to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, demanded the removal of Oblast Soviet Chairman Vladimir Ulyanov and the holding of early local soviet elections. The Coordinating Council of the "Democratic Russia" movement said that Ulyanov does not have the authority to represent the region's position on the Federation Council, since the Oblast Soviet session's decision that the president's edict No. 1400 was not valid on the territory of the oblast was made in profound breach of the standing orders and in the absence of a quorum.

Ulyanovsk—"We resolutely support Russian President Boris Yeltsin's actions to impose order and legality both in Moscow and in the country" was the statement issued by Yuriy Goryachev, head of the Oblast Administration, Georgiy Stupnikov, the president's representative, and Sergey Yermakov, mayor of Ulyanovsk. They gave assurances that they "will make every effort to ensure a stable situation, law and order, and the safety of the oblast's citizens."

The Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has appealed to the citizens of Ulyanovsk and the oblast. The document emphasizes that the Oblast Soviet "resolutely condemns the bloody turn of events in Moscow and supports the efforts of organs of power and administration at all levels" and "counts on the wisdom of Russia's leaders and of the Federation components."

Arkhangelsk—In a television appeal Valeriy Krimnus, the Russian Federation president's representative for Arkhangelsk Oblast, has called on Oblast Soviet deputies to express no-confidence in Oblast Soviet Chairman Yuriy Guskov as an active accomplice of the Moscow mutiny. Throughout the crisis Yuriy Guskov, a former Russian deputy, actively participated in the work of the Congress disbanded by the president, shuttling between Moscow and Arkhangelsk. The former first secretary of the CPSU Oblast Committee has always spoken of his loyalty to communist ideals and the principles of Soviet power. At a meeting with Oblast Soviet deputies 22 September he said that he would "defend Soviet power by every available means" and would "maintain this stance to the end."

Udmurtia Sets Elections

LD0810033693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0200 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] An extraordinary session of Udmurtia's Supreme Soviet took place on Thursday. It discussed the issue of reforming the bodies of state power and management in the republic. ITAR-TASS reports that the session decided to hold early elections of the region's parliament, local soviets, and heads of administration simultaneously with the election of the Russian president. Also, it was stated that elections to the Russian representative bodies of authority in Udmurtia would be held fully in accordance with Boris Yeltsin's decree.

Komi Supreme Soviet Opposes Plan

LD0810082593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1734 GMT 7 Oct 93

[ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[Text] Syktyvkar, 7 Oct—Yuriy Spiridonov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Komi Republic, has spoken against the body dissolving itself at a meeting with representatives of the bodies of authority, of public opinion in the republic, and journalists. In his view, in the final analysis, the Supreme Soviet should determine its position and adopt a decision on this issue, and he himself would like to consult people on this, on whether or not the people's deputies of the republic of Komi should depart. There is an instrument for doing this, a referendum.

The press service of the Supreme Soviet of the Komi Republic has circulated a statement that officially refutes INTERFAX information that the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Komi Republic allegedly discussed the issue of dissolving itself as a body. The press service stated that this information does not correspond to what actually took place and that no such issue was discussed at the session.

Prefectures To Take Moscow Soviet's Buildings

PM0710140193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 1

[Vladimir Tereshchenko report: "Rayon Soviet Condemned To Death"]

[Text] City Hall Press Center—Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov has given instructions to the capital's prefectures to take over rayon soviet buildings for use by organs of the executive branch. The same fate awaits a number of buildings that used to belong to the Russian parliament, and also the official apartments of former people's deputies at all levels. These decisions have been coordinated with president B. Yeltsin.

The rayon soviets are being disbanded and will not reappear in their former guise. A new city Duma, if it is established, would obtain a permit to use the V.I. Lenin

Museum building where it was housed at the start of the century. The museum's exhibits will move to the Museum of the Russian Revolution.

Regional Reaction to Yeltsin TV Address

LD0710173493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1401 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—"The president has said what he should have said at this difficult period of the country's history. He has expressed our common pain, caused by the latest events, and has at the same time described measures to stabilise the situation in our society," ITAR-TASS was told by Vice-Chairman of the Kirov Regional Council Andrey Yurkus. He said that the situation in the region, which was kept firmly under control all the time, remains calm. The local industrial enterprises and farm husbandries are working normally. The regional public movements and parties have refrained these days from any steps or actions that could whip up passions and trigger political confrontation.

Summing up the results of the Regional Council's latest session, Yurkus stressed that it supported on the whole the president's efforts to establish civil peace and concord in the country. Most constructive in this respect, he believes, is the part of Yeltsin's address devoted to the forthcoming elections, including elections to local representative bodies. "The election campaign in Vyatka, already joined by the local branches of many political parties and public associations, promises to be very active and this forebodes positive changes," vice-chairman of the Regional Council said. He himself had recently assumed leadership over the regional branch of the "Russia's Option" movement.

Reports continue to be received from all over the country, condemning the actions of the putschists. The newspaper "SIMBIRSKIY KURIER", which comes out in Ulyanovsk, has published an article entitled "Sorry results of the Soviet venture", describing Khasbulatov and Rutskoy as gamblers, who had provoked a tragedy in Moscow. "This act of violence was prepared long ago. Plans were hatched to overthrow Yeltsin and his government by armed forces," the article says. The Ulyanovsk parties and movements have launched preparations for elections to the State Duma. The organisational committee, which they have set up for this purpose, has today announced that a constituent conference would be held this sunday. It will draw up their election platform and nominate their candidates to the State Duma.

But the people of Russia are concerned not only about the elections today. In light of the prevailing situation, the managers of Murmansk enterprises believe it is their primary duty to boost output. They are ready to go on supporting the president, the Russian Government and the regional administration in their effort to stabilise the country's life. They are interested in having businessmen and not politicians elected to the new Russian parliament.

Some local councils are still busy thinking up ways to remain at the helm. Fearing lest the soviets that have boycotted the latest presidential decree might be dissolved, the Supreme Soviet of Karelia plans to put off until June 1994 the elections to local self-government bodies, thereby confirming their powers within the republic. This proposal, tabled by the Presidium of the Karelian Supreme Soviet, will be discussed during its extraordinary session scheduled for Friday. The agenda includes an item devoted to the elections to the State Duma of Russia. The Karelian MPs are also expected to express their attitude to Boris Yeltsin's address.

Kaliningrad Press Reaction to Moscow Events

WS0710142493

[Editorial Report] Kaliningrad Oblast newspapers SVOBODNAYA ZONA, STRAZH BALTIKI, YANTARNYY KRAY, and KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on 5 October all publish reports and comments connected with the 3-4 October events in Moscow. All reportage and commentaries are either neutral in tone, or clearly pro-Yeltsin.

STRAZH BALTIKI and YANTARNYY KRAY publish a front-page chronicle of the armed conflict. All four newspapers carry President Yeltsin's 4 October address to the citizens of Russia.

YANTARNYY KRAY and KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on page 1 carry a joint address from Head of Oblast Administration Y. Matochkin and Oblast Soviet Chairman Y. Semenov. The address, in its entirety, reads as follows: "Unfortunately, people have suffered in the Moscow events, and the blood of Russian citizens was spilled.

"We do not make any political assessment of the events; time and history will put things in order and name those who are guilty for what has happened.

"We are sorry that the opposing sides did not listen to the pleas from the Russian province urging that violence is inadmissible and that compromise is to be reached.

"The Oblast Soviet and the Oblast Administration did everything to prevent conflicts, grant normal working conditions, peace, and security for the citizens. The Administration and the Oblast Soviet are turning to all the local residents with a persistent appeal for calm, and to refrain from following various political agents provocateurs and extremists. We are calling for tolerance toward people with different political views. Please, remember, that we all are Russians, and Patriarch Aleksiy II reminded us of this.

"The Oblast Soviet and the Administration address Army and Fleet servicemen, and Ministry of Interior and Security Ministry functionaries with a request to perform their duties, protect calm and security, and not get involved in illegal activities.

"The Administration and the Oblast Soviet will regularly inform you on all the changes of the situation in the region."

KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on page 1 carries a 80-word declaration by City Soviet Chairman N. Lazareva. It contains appeals for protecting "peace and stability" and "refraining from meetings, rallies, pickets, and strikes," and voices its "belief" that "everything the citizens want to say, they will say in a civilized way during the election campaign." The declaration concludes with the opinion that "only accord will help resolve the heavy political crisis embracing Russia."

YANTARNYY KRAY and KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on page 1 carry a 150-word appeal by presidential representative E. Poluektova. The appeal is a strong demonstration of support for President Yeltsin's actions and indignation toward the "agonizing bunch of former Supreme Soviet deputies" who "pushed armed bandits into shedding the blood of young soldiers." In her opinion, "the president made all efforts to avoid involving the Army in resolving the political conflict; however, he had no choice." Poluektova underlines that by adopting resolutions invalidating President Yeltsin's edict on constitutional reform, Small Soviet and Oblast Soviet sessions "created an illusion that the former people's deputies enjoyed support from the entire nation; however sociological polls testify to the opposite." She expresses hope that the recent "bloody" Moscow events "helped thousands of my compatriots who believed in Khasbulatov and Rutskoy, regain their eyesight and understand that all their promises were a bunch of lies. The bloody Sunday helped to realize this."

SVOBODNAYA ZONA on page 3 carries a 200-word declaration by the Baltic Republican Party Presidium supporting Yeltsin's actions, pointing out that the party is "concerned" about the Small Soviet's resolutions annulling the presidential decree of 21 September. The party believes that "any kind of support, including moral support for individuals sitting in the White House, is immoral and felonious," and that Oblast Soviet Chairman Semenov, as well as other oblast officials supporting former deputies' actions" will cease all contacts with groupings opposing the president" and "voluntarily subordinate themselves to the Edict No. 1400."

SVOBODNAYA ZONA on page 2 carries a 50-word statement by the Baltic Fleet press center saying that "no corrections were made regarding the fleet's routine plans" and that the Baltic Sea Military Council "is preoccupied with planned fuel and foodstuffs storage for the winter period."

Of the four oblast newspapers, only SVOBODNAYA ZONA and KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA carry editorial comments. SVOBODNAYA ZONA on 5 October on page 1 carries a 500-word editorial by chief editor Valeriy Biryukov in support of President Yeltsin. The editorial emphasizes that "we were shown what kind of future the Khasbulatov-Rutskoy team had in store for us, when a gunman dishonored the Russian flag and hoisted the USSR banner instead." Biryukov is "concerned" with the fact that resolutions blocking President Yeltsin's edict, adopted by Oblast Soviet deputies, are still formally valid on the oblast's territory. He also points out that Oblast Soviet Chairman Y. Semenov who went to Moscow to participate in a Federation Council's session, will "stand up for Khasbulatov's interests on behalf of Kaliningrad residents," as well as "defend the standpoint of former party apparatchiks" making up the majority of Oblast Soviet deputies. In Biryukov's words "although these people never asked our opinion, they decided for you and me what the attitude toward the legitimate head of state should be." He calls on the local constituency to "ponder over Russia's fate on the eve of elections" and vote for the people "not preoccupied with ideological dogmas."

KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA on 5 October, page 1, carries a note attributed to the editorial board which reads in full: "In light of the tragic developments in Moscow, we condemn those guilty of bloodshed. There can be no victors in these kinds of situations—they bring suffering to all Russians and inflict irrevocable damage to the prestige of Russia. We are advocating political resolution of acute problems existing in the state in general and in the supreme organs of power. We are advocating freedom of thought, freedom of choice, freedom of speech, stability, justice, democracy, and citizens' rights for information.

"Only the people are entitled to decide who deserves to rule the state. Thus, we are fully supporting the decision on general free elections. KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA will continue to uphold common sense and contribute to safeguarding peace in the region."

Kalmykia Chief Denies Involvement in Events

LD0810083093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 7 Oct 93

[From the "Ostankino" newscast]

[Text] Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, the president of Kalmykia, has categorically denied accusations leveled against him by some of the central mass media that in particular he was a noticeable figure and almost an organizer of the bloody drama in Moscow. He spoke of this in Elista on his return from the capital. He denied the accusation that he has been doing his utmost to split the Russian Federation. Ilyumzhinov expressed regret that his proposed zero option of returning to the state of affairs on 21 September and holding simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections received absolute support only from the federation's component territories, while the parties involved in the conflict had not heeded the voice of reason.

Chuvash Premier on Moscow, Republic Politics

PM0710112393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Valeryan Viktorov, chairman of the Chuvash Republic Council of Ministers, by Yevgeniy Skukin under the "Topical Interview" rubric; place and date not given: "President Unties Gordian Knot"]

[Text] [Skukin] Valeryan Nikolayevich, how did you react to the tragic Moscow events and what preceded them?

[Viktorov] I received the president's 21 September edict with a certain relief: A way out of what had seemed to be a deadlock had finally been found, and the duality of power, or more precisely, the anarchy, was overcome.

[Skukin] How did deputies from the Chuvash Supreme Soviet react?

[Viktorov] At first, opinions were expressed at the Supreme Soviet session that the edict should be deemed invalid on the republic's territory. Common sense prevailed, however. And after all, I too addressed the session. I informed the deputies of my own opinion and that of the Council of Ministers collegium. After the session, many deputies approached me and said that they had thought exactly the same thing themselves, but were afraid to say so.

[Skukin] How did the directors receive the edict?

[Viktorov] The latter's opinion is very important. Particularly for our capital, Cheboksary, where 70 percent of the republic's industrial potential is concentrated. I met with leaders of enterprises in an informal atmosphere, in a business club, and they told me unequivocally that it is impossible to work successfully in the face of anarchy.

After all that, there was a meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin in Samara, and leaders of the "Bolshaya Volga" association informed him of their viewpoint.

[Skukin] Valeryan Nikolayevich, what was the direct, emotional response, as it were, to the White House events?

[Viktorov] There was no fear, in any case. We could not contemplate that Rutskoy or the former Russian Federation Supreme Soviet could control the situation. But everyone was shocked that blood was shed. After all, even the extremists are Russians, albeit duped Russians.

[Skukin] What was the situation in the republic?

[Viktorov] We, the Council of Ministers leaders, assembled last Sunday and did not disband until morning. The situation in the republic was and is fully under control.

[Skukin] Was there no need to implement a state of emergency, like in Moscow?

[Viktorov] Absolutely none. It was peaceful in the daytime and at night. Except perhaps that a 2,000-strong communist rally gathered under anti-Yeltsin slogans. But that was on the outskirts of the city. They were not allowed to do this in the center. Together with Lev Smirnov, Cheboksary head of administration, I traveled around the city, and we strengthenened the protection of the radio and television center, the telegraph office, and newspaper editorial offices. The militia was on patrol. By and large the situation in the city was even more peaceful than it usually is.

That is how I left Cheboksary on Monday, when I flew to Moscow in the morning and watched the dramatic events in the capital from the 20th floor of my hotel. We heard about the authorities' proposal to lay down arms with satisfaction. It is a pity that all the gunmen did not follow it.

On Tuesday morning, our republic's minister of internal affairs rang me and said that there was full order in our republic.

Incidentally, there is full order in respect to the harvest in Chuvashia too. There is less than 1 percent of cereal crops left to harvest. The situation in the potato harvest is worse, because of the weather. But the weather has settled down recently, so we will not be left hungry.

[Skukin] Valeryan Nikolayevich, a couple of words about your attitude to early elections to both branches of power.

[Viktorov] It is not important whether they are held simultaneously or with an interval in between. What is important is that these elections have been deemed necessary. But in my opinion, the deputies must face new elections first and foremost. We have a farcical situation, and we need professionals in order to work.

Strictly speaking, we are starting preparations for the elections immediately. My deputy, Vladimir Midukov, has come to Moscow with me. He will work in the commission for the preparation for the elections to the State Duma. We will form new electoral precincts. The republic will be ready for the elections.

[Skukin] Finally, something about the republic's relations with the center.

[Viktorov] The conflicts which have flared up between the legislature and the executive are nevertheless the tip of the iceberg. The deep essence is mutual relations between the regions and the center. The main differences of opinion are over allocations for various programs and investments. Everyone is fed up with constantly playing the role of supplicant. Budget relationships must be constructed in a differentiated way.

The republic must know how much it should put into the federal budget in order for there to be an economic interest in obtaining a large income. At the moment, we ourselves receive subsidies. But in principle you must live within your means, and not by snatching something from another region.

In a word, it seems to be, as many powers as possible must be given to the localities. Then mutual relations between the center and the regions will be completely different.

Khabarovsk Rally Supports Yeltsin

OW0710221693 Vladivostok Radiostantsiya Tikhiy Okean Maritime Network in Russian 0815 GMT 5 Oct 93

[From the "Pacific Ocean" Program]

[Text] The participants of a meeting held in Khabarovsk by representatives of several democratically oriented parties and movements expressed their firm support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin. An address to kray residents by Amur region entrepreneurs was made public at the rally. The address called for support for the Russian president and for his decisive actions to establish order and stability in the country. The entrepreneurs called political parties and public organizations of the kray to refrain from calls for violence and economic sabotage.

International Affairs

Sevastopol Rally Condemns 'Boris the Bloody'

LD0810104093 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0810 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Sevastopol, 7 Oct—Approximately 200 people assembled for an unsanctioned rally on Nakhimov Square under the slogans: "Yeltsin Has Walked Over Corpses to Dictatorship," "Yeltsin Should Be Sitting in Lefortovo, Not Rutskoy," "Boris the Bloody Has Shot the People, the Constitution, and Hope for Democracy." The rally's participants commemorated those who died while defending the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet with a minute's silence. "We angrily condemn the anticonstitutional and bloody actions of Yeltsin, and the American-Zionist inciters and servicemen faithful to him, and call on Soviets at all levels, all patriotic democratic forces, all the peoples of Russia to stubbornly resist fascist Zionism and to rout them, at the future elections, as well. Our cause is the true one. Victory will be ours," says the resolution of the rally.

Sevastopol Issues Appeal to Black Sea Fleet

LD0710135693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1122 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 7 TASS—Ivan Yermakov, representative of the Ukrainian president in Sevastopol and Viktor Semenov, chairman of the Sevastopol City Council, have issued an appeal to officers and men of the Black Sea Fleet and to Sevastopol residents. The appeal deals with the latest developments in Moscow, ITAR-TASS learned from military sources in Sevastopol. It says: "These developments show what a mortal threat is coming from the criminal attempts of some irresponsible politicians to draw servicemen into political confrontation. Unfortunately, there are forces in our city, which are trying to draw us into the developments with unpredictable tragic consequences. The resolution, adopted on October 1 by the so-called 'Popular Veche (Assembly),' is proof to it. It urged officers and men of the Black Sea Fleet to come out 'openly and resolutely' in defence of the Russian Supreme Soviet (parliament). Moreover, it was announced that the 'Popular Volunteer Corps' would be created immediately to be sent to the barricades of Moscow."

The appeal urges sailors and Sevastopol residents not to let themselves and their children being drawn into political ventures, which may result in bloodshed.

Sailors Appeal for Ban of Officers' Assembly

LD0810102793 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Sevastopol [No dateline as received]—Personnel from the Ukrainian naval patrol ship "Hetman Sahaydachnyy" have sent an appeal to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

The sailors, in particular, write that, although they are not going to interfere in state affairs, less so in the affairs of a foreign state, at the same time they resolutely support the efforts of the presidents aimed at halting the actions by illegal structures and also persons who sow conflict and discord among people.

In connection with this, they are concerned over the activities of the Coordinating Council of the Black Sea Fleet Officers' Assembly. "We are sure that during the time of its existence the Coordinating Council of the Black Sea Fleet Officers' Assembly has caused grave harm to the resolution of the Black Sea Fleet issue, because it torpedoed almost all decisions concerning the fleet," the appeal reads further. Of late, the appeal says, the Coordinating Council has become a separate political force. Besides, it is well known for its active support of the policy of the former Supreme Soviet of Russia. Therefore, in the opinion of the sailors, it would be expedient to ban the council. The presidents' attention was also drawn to the "destructive, provocative role" of the newspaper "FLAG RODINYY" [FLAG OF HOMELAND], a publication of the Black Sea Fleet Military Council.

Black Sea Fleet Returns to Sevastopol

LD0810101193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2004 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The Black Sea Fleet ships which had taken part in a humanitarian operation on evacuating refugees from the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict returned to Sevastopol on Thursday. They evacuated approximately 15,000 refugees.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze expressed their gratitude to the Black Sea Fleet Command for the successfully accomplished operation.

The Mayor of Poti has sent a telegram to the Black Sea Fleet Commander. The telegram points out that the "selfless and courageous actions by the Black Sea Fleet sailors have saved thousands of innocent lives."

National Affairs

Presidential Decree on Government Leadership

LD0710205793 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1228 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev, 7 Oct—The Ukrainian president has issued a decree on organizing the work of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. The document states:

"In connection with Presidential Decree No. 383 of 27 September 1993 on the leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, I resolve:

The president of Ukraine determines the priority areas and directs the activity of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers in carrying out the Government's constitutional powers.

Meetings of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers are held under the Ukrainian president's leadership and will consider issues relating to the projects and plans of Ukraine's economic and social development; drafts of Ukraine's state budget and reports concerning its implementation; ensuring the implementation of the basic areas of domestic and foreign policy; carrying out market reforms; overcoming the economic crisis; the privatization of state property; the social protection of the population; investing in the Ukrainian economy; making use of international credits; ensuring citizens' constitutional rights, freedoms, and legality; the fight against crime; the protection of property and public order; proposals regarding the level of the domestic state debt; schedules of manufactured goods and services subject to state price regulation; drafts of the most important legislative acts concerning general state programs; proposals regarding the formation, reorganization, and liquidation of ministries, state committees, and other central bodies of the state executive power; and drafts of international treaties relating to issues that are within the government's competence.

Resolutions of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, adopted at these meetings, are signed by Ukraine's president. Other resolutions of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers are signed by Ukraine's acting prime minister and by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers' minister.

Instructions of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers are signed by Ukraine's acting prime minister.

Meetings of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers that consider other issues, and also meetings of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Minister's Presidium, are conducted by Ukraine's acting prime minister.

Draft decrees and instructions of the Ukrainian president regarding the most important issues in the economic and social sphere are to be considered at meetings of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers. The program for holding meetings of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers is approved the Ukrainian president.

Ukraine's president appoints and dismisses heads of Ukraine's state committees, deputy ministers of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers, and heads of the joint structural sub-divisions of the president and the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers' administration.

Decree on Cabinet Power

WS0710140193 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The Ukrainian president has issued a decree on the organization of work at the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. The document says the following:

In connection with the president's edict of 27 September 1993, No. 383 on the management of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, I hereby decree that:

Ukraine's president sets priorities and directs the activities of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers upon the execution of the government's constitutional powers. Meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers are held under the leadership of the Ukrainian president. These meetings are devoted to examining plans for economic and social development in Ukraine; state budget drafts and implementation of reports on them; primary directions of domestic and foreign policies; market reforms; overcoming the economic crisis; state property privatization; social protection; attracting investments to the Ukrainian economy; use of foreign credits; protection of citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms; maintaining law and order; combating crime; the protection of property; proposals concerning limits on the domestic debt; the list of goods and services subject to state price regulation; drafts of essential legal acts and all-state programs; proposals on the creation, reorganization, and liquidation of ministries, state committees, and other central bodies of the state and executive power; and drafts of international treaties lying within the government's competence. Resolutions by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers adopted at those meetings will be signed by the president. Other resolutions by the Cabinet of Ministers will be signed by the acting prime minister of Ukraine and the minister of the Cabinet of Ministers, while directives of the Cabinet of Ministers are executed by the acting prime minister.

The Cabinet of Ministers meetings addressing other issues, as well as meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers Presidium, are chaired by the acting prime minister. Drafts of edicts and directives by the Ukrainian president on the most essential economic and social issues are examined at the meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers. Schedules for the meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers and its Presidium, as well as the agenda of the Cabinet of Ministers, will be approved by the president. The Ukrainian president appoints and discharges heads of state committees, the deputy minister of the Cabinet of Ministers, and heads of the combined structural subunits of the president's administration and the Cabinet of Ministers.

Decree on Military Regulations

WS0810101193 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] To ensure the legal protection, development, and functioning of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, President Kravchuk has issued a decree introducing temporary drill regulations, interior service regulations, a manual of garrison and guard duties, and disciplinary regulations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. These regulations affect military units in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Border Troops, National Guards, and other military formations that were created in compliance with Ukrainian legislation. [Words indistinct] before the military regulations approved by Ukraine's Supreme Council come into force in compliance with the Law on Ukrainian Defense.

Cabinet Announces Appointments, Dismissals

AU0710171793 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 5 Oct 93 p 2

[New presidential and Cabinet of Ministers appointments and dismissals issued in Kiev on 30 September]

[Text] In accordance with the Ukrainian presidential edict of 30 September 1993,

SLYEPICHEV, Oleh Ivanovych was appointed Ukraine's minister of external economic ties.

Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers has appointed:

REHURETSKYY, Vasyl Vasylyovych as first deputy chief of Ukraine's Main State Tax Inspection.

PUSTOVOYTENKO, Valeriy Pavlovych—vice president of the Ukrainian State Building Corporation.

KUZMENKO, Serhiy Oleksandrovych—Ukraine's first deputy minister of power engineering and electrification;

DYNEYKIN, Hryhoriy Ivanovych has been dismissed from this post in connection with his transfer to another job.

KISTERSKYY, Leonid Leonidovych has been dismissed from his duties as chairman of Ukraine's National Center for Implementing International Technological Assistance in connection with his transfer to another job.

TABACHNYK, Dmytro Volodymyrovych has been dismissed from the post of press secretary of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers and chief of the Main Administration for Ties With the Press and Public at Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers in connection with his transfer to another job.

Officials View Kravchuk's Assuming Power

WS0710140293 Kiev KYYIVSKA PRAVDA in Ukrainian 29 Sep 93 p 1

[Interview with M.I. Mykhalchenko, head of the Presidential Service for Issues of Interior Policy, and V.M. Pylypchuk, head of the Legislative Committee for Economic Reform and Management, by Y. Lystopad on Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's assumption of power over the government; place and date not given: "The Step That Would Speed Up Reform"]

[Text] [Mykhalchenko] The president did exactly what he had to do given the current economic and overall situation in our country.

[Lystopad] Not long ago, the majority of the Supreme Council would not allow the president to do so...

[Mykhalchenko] That was a different situation. We know that early legislative elections will be held in six months. Reform must be sped up, and this is not possible without the coordination of activities of central and local executive authorities. That is why the president assumed power over the government.

[Lystopad] Is the president going to submit the composition of his new government to the legislature in the near future?

[Mykhalchenko] All changes will be made gradually. Having become a head of government, the president is entitled to appoint even those ministers that according to the Constitution should be approved by the Supreme Council.

[Lystopad] Yet, the legislature charged the president not only with changing the government but also with forming an entirely new government.

[Mykhalchenko] In all countries, when a no-confidence vote in the government is passed and its head is charged with creating a new government, it is up to him to decide what changes should be made and what candidacies will be proposed.

[Lystopad] Will the office of prime minister be preserved?

[Mykhalchenko] There will be an acting prime minister.

[Lystopad] Will the president become head of the new government?

[Mykhalchenko] He will be a head of executive authority, as provided for by the Constitution.

[Pylypchuk] I consider the president's decree assuming power over the government to be a steadfast step. He is assuming all responsibilities and will be the first one blamed if something goes wrong. This step will force Kravchuk to cooperate with reformists, even if he does not like them. Only people that know how to carry out reform are able to do so. Would you ask me to repair your television set? No, though I am a professor, I am an economist, not an electrician. It is the same case with the government. There are coal mining specialists, chemists, technicians, but still there should be more economists. Times of reform demand that cabinet members be top specialists in their fields. I will repeat: The president will be forced to include reformists in his team, and not only one, but several—to achieve some results. Moreover, they should be appointed to key offices.

The international community will accept this president's step, and Kravchuk will improve his image. However, if he allows reform to fail, he will lose his good reputation. There is the widespread belief, in our country at least, that the president was not able to execute reform due to his disagreements with the legislature and the government. Now, there will be no such problems. The president's activities will be judged without mercy.

Parliament Renamed Supreme Soviet

LD0710201493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1530 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Gordeyev]

[Text] Kiev October 7 TASS—The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet legislature passed at today's morning session a law "On the Name, Structure and Numerical Strength of Ukraine's New Parliament." Under this law, Ukraine's supreme standing legislature will be the Supreme Soviet consisting of 450 lawmakers. They are to be elected directly by the people for a term of four years. The law also sets that any Ukrainian citizen who is not younger than 25, has the right to vote and permanently resides on Ukrainian territory, may be elected people's deputy of the republic.

Early parliamentary elections in Ukraine are scheduled for March 27, 1994.

Legislature Disagrees on Draft Constitution

MK0710100293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

[Vladimir Skachko report: "New Cabinet of Ministers Nearly Formed. New Constitution Being Discussed"]

[Text] During the Supreme Soviet session, deputies confirmed the candidates proposed by the Ukrainian president. Vasiliy Onopenko has become justice minister; Grigoriy Pyatachenko—finance minister; Andrey Vasilishin—Internal Affairs minister; Yevgeniy Marchuk—chairman of the security service; Valeriy Gubenko—chairman of the State Committee for the Protection of the State Border; and Aleksey Kolos—chairman of the Customs Committee. Anatoliy Zlenko's candidacy for the position of foreign minister was not discussed because the minister was not back from the 46th UN General Assembly session. The president has so far not named a candidate for the new defense minister of Ukraine. He may be Anatoliy Lopata, head of Ukraine's armed forces General Staff, or Vitaliy Radetskiy, the new commander of the Odessa Military District. It is highly possible that Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, the current acting defense minister, will become minister.

On 5 and 6 October deputies discussed two drafts of Ukraine's new constitution and the course of the discussion demonstrated all the colors and shades of the political spectrum. It is this that puts in doubt a positive outcome of the discussion because virtually all the main points of the future fundamental law came under criticism. In particular, Deputy Yuriy Yelchenko sharply criticized the system of the government's subordination and its accountability to the president and parliament. Yuriy Yelchenko spoke against direct linkage between dismissing the president and dismissing the prime minister. A socialist deputy, Vladimir Marchenko, proposed that the institution of the presidency be excluded from the new constitution. He described the proposed constitution drafts as "leading to the establishment in Ukraine of a presidential monarchy." Some of the deputies demanded that the main, so-called loaded questions of the constitution be put to an all-Ukrainian referendum. They include the form of government, state system, state symbols, questions of sociopolitical orientation, etc. There is also no clarity as to who should pass the new constitution—the present parliament or a new one. It is not known what kind of electoral system there will be: a majority, proportional, or mixed one. Many deputies proposed that the number of members in the future parliament be expanded and that it be made unicameral or bicameral.

Since the number of those who wish to speak on the draft constitutions is very great and the deputies' views are often opposed, most probably no draft will be passed, and its text will perhaps be published in the press for yet another nation-wide discussion.

Consultation Held on National Security Concept

LD0710170093 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1228 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Kiev, 7 Oct—Vasyl Durdynets, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and participants in a working consultation discussed a series of proposals regarding preparations for examining measures at a plenary session of the Supreme Council regarding ensuring Ukraine's national security. Working groups have been set up to prepare a draft concept of Ukraine's national security and the draft of an appropriate Supreme Council resolution on this issue.

The participants of the session examined a plan of priority measures for ensuring Ukraine's state security. They also determined a list of draft legislative acts, which are to be elaborated and submitted for examination to the (?eighth) session of the Supreme Council. This will allow the necessary normative and legal base to be set up with regard to organizing the clear activity of state structures which are responsible for ensuring Ukraine's state security.

Assembly, Self-Defense Heads on Moscow Events

WS0710154193 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Lvov—On 5 October in Lvov, Y. Shukhevych, head of the Ukrainian National Assembly [UNA], A. Shkil, head of the Lvov Oblast UNA Committee, and O. Vitovych, commander of the Ukrainian Self Defense [UNSO] Lvov Brigade, held a news conference on the draft legislation "on implementing liability for mercenaries, organizing paramilitary units, and violating legislation on civic organizations," which is to be addressed by the Supreme Council.

It was pointed out that the draft legislation contradicts the international convention on hiring, financing, and training mercenaries, which was signed by Ukraine three months ago. In the UNA-UNSO leaders' opinion, the draft is deliberately aimed against Ukrainian organizations. They said that the Supreme Council's goal is "to eliminate truly Ukrainian forces from elections for the Ukrainian legislature."

"Repressions will begin immediately after this draft is adopted. Nonetheless, it is impossible to annihilate our idea"—said A. Shkil. "UNSO reserves the right to sabotage actions, and UNA maintains its prerogative to conduct protests at factories and acts of civil disobedience."

O. Vitovych said: "Lower levels of our organization have received appropriate instructions that will be executed before the UNA-UNSO leadership is arrested."

Speaking about the latest events in Moscow, leaders of UNA-UNSO stated: "We were expecting such events in Russia. Yeltsin's victory is not conclusive. There will be more conflicts in Russia, including national ones. From the point of view of Ukraine's interests, there were no winners. In case Khasbulatov and Rutskoy win, we will not be able to celebrate the third anniversary of Ukrainian independence. If Yeltsin prevails, Ukraine will suffer his economic pressure."

Yuriy Shukhevych also reported that UNSO units are being withdrawn from the Georgian-Russian conflict zone in Abkhazia, because of the internal conflict between supporters of Shevardnadze and Gamsahurdia. UNSO reserves the right to return if the Georgian-Russian clashes resume. Ukraine's reputation in Georgia has grown, thanks to UNSO activities, stated the UNA leader.

Major Party Leaders View Upcoming Elections

WS0710140093 Kiev UNIAN, OHLYADY, KOMENTARI, PROHNOZY in Ukrainian No 18 4 Oct 93

[Report by Viktor Dubovyy, Mariya Starozhytska, and Dmytro Yatsyuk: "It is Better To Reserve a Place in Line for the Legislative Microphones in Autumn"]

[Text] In the election race, 22 officially registered political parties have squared off. UNIAN correspondents asked the same two questions to most of their leaders:

1. What future do you see for your party in half a year?

2. What outcome do you predict for the legislative elections in March?

Volodymyr Hrynyov, leader of "New Ukraine":

1. Everything depends on the Electoral Law. If the law allows organizations similar to "New Ukraine" to take part in elections, we will fare well without having to change until the actual elections. Most probably, however, "New Ukraine" will run as part of a bloc of parties whose success will hinge on many factors, first and foremost being financial considerations.

2. Most probable is the victory of populist forces, because the Ukrainian economic situation will considerably worsen, which is evidenced by the lineup of a new government. However, the constructive forces also stand a chance of creating an influential legislative faction if only they manage to put their leaders' ambitions behind and take a pragmatic look at things.

Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the Ukrainian Socialist Party:

1. As is known, the number of our members is the largest and is still growing.

2. People will make the right choice in the elections. They are recovering their sight very quickly. The result of this—victory of the left forces—should be even more profound than in Poland.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of the Ukrainian People's Movement, Rukh:

1. Rukh will be more organized, because an election is always a test of political clout. This test is an opportunity to beef up and get more organized. Since elections are a catalyst for political activity, it will help us eliminate apathy and conformism. Rukh will become more active and numerous. We will stand for a proportional electoral system and a bicameral parliament.

2. We will not be defeated; we will win the elections either on our own or as part of an alliance with other political forces. The crucial thing in this situation is to prevent the ultra-left forces, that is the communists, and the ultra-right extremist forces from gaining a legislative majority.

Oleksandr Kotsyuba, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, member of the Politburo:

1. Let me note that our party will not accept the venturesome move by Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch, who refused to revoke the unconstitutional ban on the Communist Party. We, however, will proceed to the elections in a democratic manner. Registration of communists is actively conducted, and their number will reach the hundreds of thousands.

2. It is too early to talk about the outcome. It will depend on what electoral system will be chosen—majority, proportional, or mixed. The proportional system would be a falsification—about 30 of the registered parties have no more than a hundred members. I am for the majority-proportional system. But I think that a bloc of leftist forces will win, whether intentionally or not. I count on the balanced attitude of the Ukrainian people—the road on which Ukraine has proceeded over the last few decades shows that it achieved great scientific and technical potential under the leadership of the left forces, not under the loud babblers.

Stepan Khmara, leader of the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, UKRP:

1. The UKRP is a party with good prospects. We have maintained a clear and unbending line from the very outset—to safeguard Ukrainian interests in the most efficient way possible. The most important thing is not the number of our members but our goals.

2. I do not feel like talking about the elections. I had suggested that the legislature be dissolved after its first session. Excellent opportunities for that came along several times—after student hunger strikes and the abortive coup in Moscow. They were squandered, though. The next election will be a farce—the mafia, with Kravchuk at the helm, bought all the seats a long time ago.

Vitaliy Zhuravskyy, leader of the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, KhDPU:

1. Our party will be stronger with more people than it has now.

2. KhDPU candidates are competitive and will win in all districts where they run because they are popular with the people. Besides, they were not in the old Supreme Council. In general terms, democrats will not win, and the best they can do will be to forge a strong opposition. They lose a lot because of their leaders' personal ambitions and squabbles. However, if united, the democrats can take over a considerable part of the legislature.

Volodymyr Zolotaryov, leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party:

1. We are counting on a small but united faction. The party's influence will be growing, even though we understand that these are not our elections and will not be so for a long time. The party will be presented with new opportunities, including financial ones. Right after the elections, we will start preparations for the next.

2. The party that adopts a populist position will be victorious. The number of parties may double. Trade unions, commercial structures, and banks will seek to assemble their own parties. This might push Ukraine into the Latin American pattern. The new parliament will be even worse than the previous one and will not make it to the end of its tenure either.

Yuriy Shukhevych, leader of the Ukrainian National Assembly, UNA, and commander in chief of the Ukrainian People's Self-Defense, UNSO:

1. A lot more powerful than today. I think our campaign will acquaint Ukrainians with our platform, intentions, and goals. When we gain access to the media, we will win many followers.

2. The victors will be those who have money. Unfortunately, the national forces do not have any. However, I have no doubts that we will win a lot of seats in the legislature. UNA stands for the mixed electoral system, as in Germany. The parliament should have one chamber—one should not copy the West just for the sake of doing so.

Volodymyr Klymchuk, leader of the Ukrainian Liberal Democratic Party:

1. Given the current political situation in Ukraine, our party will be growing, if only very slowly. So far, however, our big entry into the political scene is a remote prospect.

2. Socialist parties will get the upper hand, mainly for demographical reasons. There are many pensioners in Ukraine—on the back burner in everyday life, they will win the elections.

Viktor Rodionov, leader of the Ukrainian National Conservative Party:

1. Our party has good prospects. Although it will not win the elections, the party will become stronger and more influential with every new election. Seventy years of communist rule has annihilated all the Ukrainian traits we had in the past. But after some time, the situation will return to normal and Ukraine to a civil society. Every civil society is conservative.

2. The elections will be won by the leftists, who promise more wonders.

Mykhaylo Hrechka, leader of the Ukrainian Party of Justice:

1. Our party is currently holding consultations with other centrist parties to arrange cooperation during the electoral campaign based on a specific electoral program.

2. It is too early to make any prognoses at this point. However, if the centrist parties form an alliance, they could win a majority in parliament.

Tamara Prosyanyk, head of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republican Party:

1. Our party is in a constant process of creative work, experimentation, and improvement. We have already begun specific preparations for the elections.

2. The outcome will depend on the Electoral Law. Of course, there will be difficulties because it is difficult to get rid of the old electoral system.

Mykola Azarov, acting head of the Labor Party:

1. We have the future of a normal centrist party.

2. It will be the Labor Party that will celebrate victory in the elections.

Andriy Nosenko, member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party [SDPU]:

1. I think that in half a year, our party will become largely homogeneous. Before the elections, political blocs will be formed. For example, we have already contacted the Ukrainian Party of Greens. We can seek an alliance with social democrats, national democratic forces, and the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine.

2. I think that no one will win the elections. In the long run, two blocs will emerge—socialist-communist and national-democratic (the Rukh, SDPU, "New Ukraine") and take half of the legislature each.

Yuriy Sakhno, head of the Secretariat of the Party of Democratic Rebirth of Ukraine:

1. We are moving toward the consolidation of the party's structure, and will perhaps ally with other political parties, trade unions, etc.

2. After the elections, the parliament will have 20-25 percent from the left, 15-20 percent from the right (the Congress of People's Democratic Forces and those further to the right), with the rest divided among centrist forces, including the Rukh. I think that the new parliament will be more structured. Even if there are 30 percent communists, the most important thing is that they be party members and entirely open about their membership.

Oleksandr Zoryanov, head of the Kiev regional branch of the Ukrainian Party of Beer Lovers:

1. We hope that the elections will be conducted according to the party lists. The public should try the proportional electoral system. If the elections are conducted according to the party lists, we believe that our party might receive several legislative seats.

2. The situation in Ukraine resembles the one in Poland on the eve of the last elections. Socialists have their reasons and something with which they can beat democrats. It would be dangerous to stand up against the Socialists because of their counterreaction. Any standoff is viewed negatively by the populace. This is why the majority will be grasped by the compromise-minded parties. One cannot rule out that the next Supreme Council might include many current deputies.

Vitaliy Kononov, leader of the Party of Ukrainian Greens:

1. As any other, our party exists to participate in the elections. Our future depends on their outcome.

2. I presume that national democrats will garner 25 percent of the votes, the communists 30 percent, incidental parties 5 percent, with the rest in the hands of the centrists—if they manage to put together their own bloc. Still, a lot will depend on the Electoral Law.

Tetyana Kyselyova, vice president of the Ukrainian Liberal Party:

1. Our party is preparing for the elections and working on its electoral platform.

2. We hope that the elections will be held according to multiparty principles, and that the outcome will be favorable for us.

Valeriy Kravchenko, deputy head of the Ukrainian Democratic Party [DPU]:

1. Since we predicted these elections, we have already started preparations and are going to approach them fully equipped. The party's future will largely depend on whether or not the democrats win. With a certain number of seats obtained, our ratings will improve. If not, things will be tougher for us. But the DPU is ready for this, too.

2. The election outcome will entirely depend on the Electoral Law. I will not make any predictions before I see it.

President's Press Service Charged With Bias

WS0710151293 Kiev RADA in Ukrainian 30 Sep 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "News, Facts" rubric: "RUKH-PRESS statement"]

[Text] Yesterday, RUKH-PRESS disseminated a statement claiming that the Ukrainian president's press service has been consistently refusing contacts with the information department of the People's Movement Secretariat (RUKH). While assuming that RUKH-PRESS does not exist, representatives of the service simultaneously demand that RUKH-PRESS be registered "as a press agency."

This is not the first time that RUKH-PRESS journalists have encountered the prejudice of the president's press service.

In connection with the above, RUKH-PRESS would like to report the following:

"1. RUKH-PRESS is the information department of the People's Movement Secretariat and carries out information-related activities accordingly to the Rukh's statute and program, as well as existing legislation. As is known, the information organs of numerous political parties, civic organizations, and state departments—including the press service of the Ukrainian president—conduct the very same activities."

"2. RUKH-PRESS maintains normal working relations with the information services of the Supreme and local councils, state administration, ministries, departments, civic organizations, and foreign representatives. No one other than the employees of the president's press service has ever stated that RUKH-PRESS does not exist or demanded that it change its status."

At the end, the statement points out that "taking into account the liquidation of the Cabinet of Ministers' General Department of Relations with Press and Population, coupled with the creation of the joint presidential-government press service, we believe that it is not conducive to the objective presentation of official activities and the establishment of a democratic society in Ukraine, especially if the newly created structure inherited contempt for the free dissemination of information."

Officers' Union Wants Morozov Back

LD0710131293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2120 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] A meeting of the central leadership of the Union of Officers of Ukraine (SOU) on 5 October adopted a statement with regard to the unexpected resignation of Kostyantyn Morozov, Ukraine's minister of defense. SOU expressed concern with this matter, declaring that "from the first days of Ukraine's independence, Colonel General Kostyantyn Morozov conducted a consistent military policy aimed at building up the armed forces and strengthening national security. He won respect and authority in the army and with the people by his honest and patriotic attitude."

SOU called the decision on his resignation premature and said that it goes against Ukraine's defense requirements and against guaranteeing stability at the present time of state formation. SOU called on the president of Ukraine to consider the possibility of Kostyantyn Morozov's continued work in the post of Ukraine's defense minister.

Regional Communist Groups Resume Activities

WS0710143793 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 2 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by UKRINFORM correspondent Adam Yanushevskiy: "Here They Come Again"]

[Text] Following a two-year break, regional communist organizations in three cities have resumed their activities. The reinstatement of former organizations is being conducted in villages and settlements. This information was presented at an oblast reestablishment conference of communists in Zhytomir. Deputies elected at rayon and city conferences analyzed the reestablishment process in party branches and discussed priorities for future activities. Special attention was paid to welfare issues, protection of constitutional rights, and preparations for the upcoming Supreme Council elections. Several proposals for curbing Ukraine's crisis were voiced. The conference adopted a resolution on increasing party activities among workers, young people, and veterans, as well as on creating a bloc of left-wing forces. Deputies issued an appeal to the Supreme Council and the president demanding the revocation of decrees outlawing the Communist Party of Ukraine. An oblast committee of the party was elected during the conference.

Crimean Communist Party Membership Grows

WS0710145193 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 2 Oct 93 p 2

[Article by UKRINFORM correspondent Lev Ryabchykov: "Up to 70,000..."]

[Text] The Communist Party of Crimea [KPK] has stated that it opposes the present authorities of the Republic. It cannot agree with the "passive watching and inert drift into the path of destructive processes—let along participate in them." Such a resolution was adopted at the first plenary session of the Republican Committee of the recently registered party.

The KPK has become one of the strongest political organizations in Crimea. Almost 300 people have recently reinforced the party's ranks, as was reported by Leonid Grach, its first secretary. Recruitment is to continue and membership in the KPK could reach 60,000-70,000 in the near future.

Belarus

BPM Says Democracy 'Defied' in Moscow, Urges Restraint

WS0710102493 Minsk RID in Russian 1415 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] The Belarusian People's Movement [BPM] has adopted an appeal to Belarusian citizens, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers, saying: "Blood is flowing in Karabakh and Osetia, Georgia and Tajikistan, Abkhazia and Yugoslavia. The streets of Moscow have been stained with blood. The rule of law has been crushed. Cannons have fired upon the legal legislature, which was defending the Constitution, the same Constitution to which Mr. Yeltsin pledged an oath. Oppositional newspapers and organizations have been banned. Democracy has been defied."

The BPM has expressed its determined protest against the campaign launched to discredit the legal power and democratic freedoms in the Republic of Belarus, and called upon all Belarusian citizens and public and political organizations to show restraint.

Kebich Stresses Necessity of Russian Cooperation

WS0610142693 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich said in an interview with Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that Belarus can survive neither politically nor economically without the cooperation of Russia. Belarus lacks energy and other material resources. This is one of the reasons why Belarus is interested in fortifying economic ties with Russia. Some CIS states have already agreed to create a unified monetary system. Kebich declared that he supports the strengthening of the CIS. Any of the erstwhile USSR republics will achieve stability only by restoring economic ties, Vyacheslav Kebich added.

Government Repeals Licensing of Exports to Russia

WS0610154893 Minsk CHYRVONAYA ZMENA in Belarusian 25 Sep 93 p 1

[Text] Aiming toward the creation of an economic union and trying to implement the agreement on the unification of the Belarusian and Russian monetary systems that was signed in September 1993, the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a decision to repeal the quoting and licensing of Belarusian goods exported to Russia, with the exception of technical products and consumer goods that are exported in accordance with intergovernmental agreements under existing regulations on licensing exported goods and services.

Shushkevich Praises Interparliamentary Assembly Work

LD0810085993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1444 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Chairman of Belarusian Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich highly estimated the work of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and its role in drawing CIS countries closer together. He told Interfax in an Interfax exclusive interview that the Inter- Parliamentary Assembly would evolve into an efficient consultative body similar to those in Europe.

"It is the Russian leader's affair to decide who and what bodies will represent Russia in the assembly," said Shushkevich commenting on the dissolvement of the parliament and the Congress of People's Deputies.

The CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya also views the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly as a vitally important CIS body. Referring to information obtained from the assembly's headquarters in St. Petersburg, he announced that on October 30, this organization's new chairman will be elected to replace ex-chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov. "Khasbulatov was elected for a term of 12 months. This term expired a long time ago," he said.

State Secretary Reports on CIS Economic Union

WS0710140993 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0800 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Zalamay, state secretary for CIS affairs, has met with local Minsk authorities. The central issue of the meeting was a discussion of the agreement on the creation of an economic union, which was signed by CIS leaders in Moscow. Vladimir Zalamay, in particular, noted that work on the document had been completed in just over a year and a half. The drafters of this agreement had met with many obstacles, the state secretary for CIS affairs stressed. Anyway, the majority of CIS leaders have arrived at the conclusion that this agreement could produce fruitful benefits. In Zalamay's opinion, the signed document is comprehensive but still very declarative.

[Words indistinct] with this aim, in Moscow, a decision was made to create a coordinating body which will also include Belarusian representatives. [passage indistinct] It will work in the following directions: The unification of monetary systems, the creation of a single customs zone, the transition to direct payments, and so on. In the opinion of the CIS heads of the state who signed this document, the resolution of these issues will produce results in a year or two. [passage indistinct]

Belarusian Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy, Minister of Housing Boris Batura, and other officials also gave their evaluations of the documents signed in Moscow.

People's Accord Party Says Early Elections Necessary

WS0710112393 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] It is well known that the Belarusian Supreme Soviet has promised to specify a new date for new legislature elections in March 1994. According to the Belarusian Party of People's Accord, the main condition for alleviating the country's predicament is to reach an all-nation accord on ways of reforming the economy and the sociopolitical system in Belarus. To reach such an accord, it is necessary to set a date for Supreme Soviet elections and to adopt a democratic law on elections. Complete information on ways of alleviating our economic deadlock is said to appear in the latest edition of ZHODA.

Popular Front Demands Ban of Pro-Communist Groups

WS0710102393 Minsk RID in Russian 1415 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] A RID correspondent has learned that deputies of the Belarusian Popular Front [BPF] opposition faction in the Supreme Soviet have demanded that an extraordinary Supreme Soviet session be convened and urgent measures be undertaken by the government to prevent the intrusion of Russian criminal groups and individuals into Belarus following the failed fascist-communist putsch in Moscow. The BPF deputies have demanded that the activity of pro- communist parties and organizations in Belarus be banned.

Pro-USSR Movement Chairman Discusses Plan

WS0710075193 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian 21 Sep 93 p 2

[Interview with Sergey Gaydukevich, chairman of the Belarusian Popular Movement, by Igor Gukovskiy under the "Politics" rubric; place and date not given: "The Bridges Have Been Burned; The BPM Is Ready To Fight"—first two paragraphs are RESPUBLIKA introduction]

[Text] On Sunday [19 September], 150 delegates representing the Belarusian Popular Movement [BPM] left for Moscow to participate in the work of the Congress of Peoples of the USSR.

"Unfortunately, some pressing affairs in Minsk do not allow me to personally attend this forum," BPM Chairman Sergey Gaydukevich told RESPUBLIKA correspondent Igor Gaydukovskiy. The BPM will be represented by BPM Cochairmen Leonid Shkolnikov and Viktor Chikin, among others.

[Gukovskiy] You can easily tell what ideas and proposals the Belarusian representatives are bringing to the congress in Moscow. Two movements—the Congress of Belarusian People and the Second Congress of Officers of Belarus—were recently organized by the BPM. The both congresses are pursuing the main task of restoring the fraternal union with Russia and other states of the former USSR.

[Gaydukevich] You are right, we do not hide our aims. In the near future, analogous meetings will be held in all the organizations that are BPM collective members. In several months, we are going to hold a joint congress of all the political and public forces supporting us in the Republic.

[Gukovskiy] What is your personal opinion of the public- political situation in the Republic?

[Gaydukevich] The winds of change are blowing more strongly. Having read the latest statements of the Supreme Soviet chairman and the Belarusian Government, I am convinced: The bridges have been burned. Both parties have opened fire. We who support the government are not afraid of such actions and are ready to fight with our opponents, both in Minsk and in the provinces.

Moldova

Presidential Official Claims Dniester Backed Rutskoy

AU0710142293 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1918 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, ROMPRES, 6/10/1993—The Khasbulatov-Rutskoy coalition was not supported in Moldova, except some persons from Dniester, therefore the interdiction of the Moldovan Communist Party was not legal, stated to BASA Viorel Ciubotaru, head of the Presidential Council. "As for me, I reject Marxist and Leninist views," stressed Ciubotaru. In his opinion, juridical bodies should pronounce on the interdiction of communist and extremist Russian organizations.

Dniester Officials Deny Troops Defended White House

AU0710125693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1918 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 6/10/1993—The Government of Transdniester and public organisations from this region did not send volunteers or militaries to participate in defending the Moscow White House, stated during a press conference in Tiraspol Igor Smirnov, president, and Grigore Maracuta, vice president of the Transdniester Supreme Soviet. The organizers of the press conference confirmed that part of the guilt for distributing wrong information about the participation of armed formations from Transdniester belongs to Moscow mass media. According to Smirnov, officers of various formations from "force" ministries of Tiraspol have been verified if they went out of Transdniester. The stocks of arms were also controlled and it was concluded that these formations were not sent abroad. Recently, mass media from Moscow and many

Russian high dignitaries, including President Yeltsin, pointed out the participation of mercenaries from Tiraspol. Grigore Maracuta told the journalist that on 4 October he called Boris Yeltsin supporting his actions to stabilize the situation. The Transdniester leaders added that due to the events in Moscow and in order to prevent provocations as well as due to the applications of Moldovan military forces, some measures were undertaken to keep Transdniester military forces ready. Commenting the recent declaration of the Tiraspol Minister of Security Vadim Shevtsov that "our souls are with the defenders of the White House, Smirnov said that no minister including Shevtsov, has the right to express his own sympathy towards any force in Russia and particularly towards supporters of Kasbulatov and Rutskoy.

Proof of Involvement Said To Exist

AU0710125893 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1918 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Tiraspol, BASAPRESS 6/10/1933—The government of the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic addressed to the Russian authorities a note. It denies the information about the involvement of Transdniester commandos in the events in Moscow on 3-4 October. According to informed sources, the 14th Army has some documents that prove the shipment of armament from the battalion Dniester to the defenders of the White House. Other sources who wanted to remain anonymous stated to BASAPRESS that some viewers of the Tiraspol TV recognized several officers of the Dniester battalion in the programs of the Russian and Ostankino TV.

Tiraspol Soviet Denies Involvement

AU0710213693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 7/10/1993—Power structures in the Dniester Republic did not support the rebels in Russia, states the declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic about events in Russia. TIRASPOL RADIO has broadcast this declaration last evening. According to the declaration, there is no document that could confirm the participation of Dniester detachments on the side of the Rutskoy-Khasbulatov coalition; this was fabricated by the Moldovan Ministry of Security to discredit the Dniester power structures. "The Moldovan republic of Dniester is for the non-interference in internal affairs of other states and for peaceful solution of all conflicts," states the declaration. OSTANKINO TELEVISION has broadcast a report made in the barracks of the Dniester Battalion. The officers and soldiers of the battalion denied their involvement in the Moscow events.

Alleged Defenders Reportedly Flee to Tiraspol

AU0710213193 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 7/10/1993—Several tens of combatants of the Dniester Battalion, defenders of the Russian White House, managed to leave Moscow, stated to BASAPRESS sources from Tiraspol. According to not verified information, the former followers of Khasbulatov and Rutskoy have been seen near the Russian town of Kozelsk. It is supposed that Russian and Ukrainian security bodies will try to stop their return to Tiraspol.

Moscow Halts Deliveries to Dniester

AU0710213793 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2015 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 7/10/1993—From our special correspondent: The Russian Government decided to stop deliveries of raw materials and products to the Dniester Republic, reliable sources in Tiraspol stated. The payments and discounts made between banks in Russia and the Dniester Republic were halted. The payments and discounts made via the military bank of the 14th [Russian] Army [currently stationed in Dniester] were halted as well. Russian authorities imposed these restrictions after the involvement of Dniester representatives in street fights in Moscow was confirmed. Russian and Ukrainian security bodies started investigations in this field.

FPG Backs CIS, Urges Dissolving Pro-Communist Soviets

AU0710130493 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1918 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 6/10/1993—The Gagauzian Popular Party (FPG) supports the Agreement concerning the creation of the Economic Union of CIS, approved by Mircea Snegur and Boris Yeltsin. "We condemn the Tiraspol regime for sending mercenaries to Moscow to kill democracy," states the message of the FPG addressed yesterday to the President of Moldova. The Gagauzian Popular Party proposes "to dissolve pro-communist soviets of all levels and install during the period of transition the regime of presidential governing."

Socialist Party Leader Wants Ban on Communist Groups

AU0710142693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1918 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS, 6/10/1993—Valeriu Senic, coordinating member of the Moldovan Socialist Party, showed his opinion on the interdiction of communist organizations in Russia. He said that the socialists condemn the left extremism as well as the right extremism. Senic stated to BASA that the actions of Rutskoy and Khasbulatov and those of Yeltsin are extremist. "A democratic regime cannot exist without a constructive opposition, and the Communist Party. If it gives up its proletariat dictatorship class mentality and other vices, could have a positive role in Moldova as well," said Senic. According to him, one should be careful not to confuse democracy with dictatorship in the evolution of events in Moscow and Moldova.

Parliament Attempts To Overcome Crisis

AU0710070893 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2010 GMT 5 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 5/10/1993—Yesterday, October 4th, an ordinary session of the Moldovan Parliament leadership took place. Representatives of parliamentary factions participated in it. They examined ways of overcoming the parliamentary crisis and ways of continuing the session, states a communique of the parliamentary press service. As a result of exchange of opinions, it turned out that from a perspective, all parliamentary factions realise the need to approve the law on elections as soon as possible; they plead for early elections. From another perspective, older misunderstandings and opposite positions which had earlier appeared among factions make useless a further continuation of parliament sessions. This situation proves the fact that certain forces and political leaders formally accept the idea of early elections but actually they do their best to block any parliamentary activity. The press service of parliament reminds the fact that pro-Soviet deputies from Russia unleashed a bloodshed as a response to the decree of President Yeltsin regarding the early elections, and violated the law doing this. "Let us make a comparison and we will affirm that the refusal of our deputies to perform their activity and the attempts to stop the reforms through parliamentary sabotage could lead to a situation when Moldovan people will just ignore the parliament and find by themselves reasonable and democratic ways of building a new civilized life," states the press communique of the Moldovan Parliament.

Session Postoned to 12 Oct

LD0610164093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1349 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] The Moldovan Parliament's session, scheduled for Wednesday, has been put of again until October 12.

The reason for this decision was the failure to find a compromise on the agenda during the meeting of the Presidium and faction representatives.

The parliamentary majority, constituting of the deputies representing the agrarian sector, independent deputies and the faction Accord, continue to insist on the dissolution of the Parliament, on the adoption of a new elections law and on early elections. For more than two months, the 120 deputies or so representing these factions, have not been participating in the parliamentary sessions, thus blocking the work of the Moldovan Parliament.

The parliamentary minority advocating unification with Romania opposes the idea of early elections and proposes that the problem of elections be considered after the adoption of a new constitution.

Parliament's Vice-Chairman Viktor Puscasu expressed doubt about the possibility of achieving a compromise by October 12. He told Interfax that the Parliament slowed down the democratic and social reform.

He believes that the Russian variant of tackling the political crisis cannot repeat itself in Moldova. He noted, however, that without violating the constitution it was impossible to find a way out of the situation.

"We have found ourselves in a legal vacuum," he said. "In civilized countries inefficient parliaments are dissolved. We have no such mechanism, however. One may get the impression that our obsolete constitution was adopted in the epoch of a primitive-communal system," he said.

He also thinks that the people must be given the right to express their will at a referendum.

"If the Parliament fails to solve the crisis, let the voters do so," said Puscasu.

Tiraspol Authorities Enforce Local Regulations

AU0610164693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2010 GMT 5 Oct 93

[Text] Tiraspol, BASAPRESS 5/10/1993—The official Tiraspol TV stated that a militia post subordinated to the authorities of self-proclaimed republic started to be active in Tighina [Bender]. This militia post asked the owners of cars to register them again. It declared invalid the registration documents issued by the police subordinated to the Moldovan Ministry of Interior. The persons who will neglect these orders will be subjects to fines and other sanctions. The Transdniester visa section demands foreign tourist companies register their documents and pay the taxes to Tiraspol authorities, regardless to the fact that they had paid the taxes fixed by Moldovan constitutional bodies.

Snegur Limits State Companies' Monopoly

AU0710140693 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1918 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 6/10/1993—Yesterday, President Mircea Snegur signed a decree compelling the Ministry of Economy to promote a policy for the development of competition and limit state monopolist activity, states the presidential press service.

According to the decree, the state monopolist activity will have no limits solely in the regulation of prices [sentence as received]. The necessity of this provision appeared as a result of the liquidation of the State Committee for Economic Reform. The government will present in parliament within two weeks the draft bill on the introduction of modifications in the Bill on the Limitations of Monopolist Activity and Development of Competition.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev on CIS Statement Supporting Yeltsin

OW0810010193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0330 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Statement by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev; place and date not given; from the "Utro" program's "Mir" interstate television company segment—live or recorded]

[Text] During these very complicated and really tragic days for Russia, I have kept in constant contact with President Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin, the chairman of the government. It was not possible to contact the Supreme Soviet building, but we kept a constant watch on all the events. I, my advisers, and other government leaders did not sleep last night, instead we carefully watched the events. During the night we spoke several times with Chernomyrdin, Soskovets, and the president's staff while monitoring the situation. In the morning, I tried to telephone all the CIS heads of state, or other government leaders—you must bear in mind there is a time difference of three to four hours between us and the states closer to Europe—and together we worked out and coordinated the text of an appeal on behalf of the heads of state in connection with these events. Please allow me to read it:

An Appeal by the CIS Heads Of State in Connection With Events in Moscow 3 and 4 October 1993:

The antidemocratic forces have overstepped the threshold of which we have often spoken. Blood was spilled in Moscow and the guilty have now put themselves outside the law. No political aims can justify the adventurism of the illegally armed formations who aborted the negotiation process and resorted to taking human life. Together with the people of Russia, with whom the fates of our nations are historically linked, we feel deeply for what has happened and express our condolences to the families of those who died. We call on all the citizens of Russia to show wisdom and self-control in these critical hours. We believe that the president and the Government of Russia will do everything to stop the provocateurs and defend democracy. We are prepared to make every possible political effort to prevent further loss of life. We hope that our appeal will be supported by the other CIS states.

It is signed by Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan; Karimov, president of Uzbekistan; Kravchuk, president of Ukraine; Akayev, president of Kyrgyzstan; Ter-Petrosyan, president Armenia; and Aliyev, acting-president of Azerbaijan.

Parliament To Outlaw Kazakh Mercenaries

LD0710130493 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0930 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Kazakhstan has decided to put a stop to the unlawful involvement of its citizens in armed clashes outside the republic. The session of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet, which opens at the beginning of next week, will consider, among other things, the question of introducing criminal penalties for those who hire themselves out as mercenaries.

New Democratic Party Formed, Outlines Interests

LD0710200393 Almaty KAZTAG in Russian 1200 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] A founding conference of a democratic party of Kazakhstan has been held in Almaty. It was created on the basis of the public movement "Azat." Kamal Ormantayev, one of the leaders of "Azat," became its chairman. "Our party," he said to a KAZTAG correspondent, "intends to contribute toward strengthening interethnic accord in the republic and is open to cooperation with those political forces that are interested in creating a civilized and prosperous country."

The party's priority will be to defend the rights of citizens of the ecological disaster zones, where the native population mainly lives, and in raising their living standards.

Tajikistan

Government Protests to Kabul Over 'Armed Provocations'

LD0710122393 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0900 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The Tajik Government has demanded that the Kabul authorities abide by the accords reached during August's visit to Afghanistan by the Tajik leader, Imamali Rakhmonov, which stipulated that armed provocations on the Tajik-Afghan border would be prevented. This is stated in a protest note lodged with the Afghan consulate in Dushanbe. The protest was prompted by the latest large-scale armed provocation from the territory of the neighboring state, carried out by Tajik opposition guerrillas and certain Afghan field commanders. The Tajik authorities are willing to have a political dialogue with the Afghan side, aimed at easing the tension on the Tajik-Afghan border. They express hope that the Tajik-Afghan border will be turned into a border of friendship and good-neighborliness.

Olimov Discusses Border Problems With Afghan UN Envoy

LD0710174993 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Tajik 1200 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] At the request of [Rashid] Olimov, foreign minister of the Republic of Tajikistan, a meeting with Dr. Rawan Farhadi, the permanent representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in the United Nations Organization, took place at the UN headquarters yesterday.

Rashid Olimov spoke about the latest situation on the Tajik-Afghan border in the course of the meeting. He pointed out that certain forces together with the Tajik opposition are trying to hamper the dialogue between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which is currently going on and which is fully supported by the Commonwealth of Independent States and other countries of the world. The minister said that the aim of the latest armed provocations on the border is to hamper the forthcoming visit to Tajikistan of Borhanoddin Rabbani, president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Olimov said that if the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan categorically condemns the latest attempts by some mojahedin and the Tajik opposition to violate the border of Tajikistan, all sides will support and approve of this. He also expressed a desire that the foreign minister of the Islamic State of Afghanistan should objectively assess the recent events [along the border] at the 48th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization.

The permanent representative of the Islamic State of Afghanistan pointed out that he will definitely inform Kabul about this.

Armed Infiltrators 'Contained' on Sari-Gor Plateau

PM0710135593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 3

["Statement by the Commander of the Russian Federation Border Guard Troops"—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline]

[Text] A large group of Islamic Revival Party gunmen and Afghan mojahedin numbering up to 300 men have broken through from Afghan territory to Tajikistan in the Moskovskiy Border Guard Detachment zone. Through the efforts of the Russian border guard troops and with the support of a subdivision of the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division and the Committee for the National Security of Tajikistan, the group was contained on the Sari-Gor plateau.

We been reliably informed that the actions of this grouping are aimed at establishing a strong point on Tajik territory in order to subsequently launch large-scale operations there both in the rear and directly on the Tajik-Afghan border.

In an attempt to avoid bloodshed and stabilize the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border by peaceful means, the Tajik gunmen and Afghan mojahedin have been instructed to lay down their arms and return to Afghanistan. We call on leaders of the Tajik opposition and the Afghan field commanders to support this act of good will. Otherwise measures commensurate with the prevailing situation will be taken against the grouping which broke through.

Rebels Take 6 Russians 'Hostages' to Afghanistan

NC0810092093 Paris AFP in English 0853 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Dushanbe, Oct 7 (AFP)—Tajik opposition rebels attacked a Russian border guard patrol near the southern town of Khorog and captured six hostages who were taken across the border into Afghanistan, a military spokesman said here Friday.

The hostages, captured Thursday, included an officer and five conscripts and a note of protest was sent to the Afghan consulate here demanding their return, General-Colonel Anatoliy Parakhin said.

Armenia

Yerevan Accepts, Baku Rejects CSCE Karabakh Plan

NC0710200193 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The deadline for replying to the schedule put forward at the informal talks held in Paris within the CSCE framework ends today.

Armenia has expressed its agreement to the schedule on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This was conveyed to the UN Security Council yesterday by the Armenian representative at the UN.

However, the Azerbaijani representative stated that his government cannot accept that schedule because the settlement process is not extended over the so-called Lachin corridor which was opened on Azerbaijani territory by Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian formations to link Armenia with Karabakh.

Turkey had expressed its satisfaction on 29 September with the CSCE Minsk Group meeting on the Karabakh conflict. The Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman explained that the agreements worked out in Paris on the establishment of the cease- fire, withdrawal of the Armenian forces from Azerbaijan, and the restoration of the energy, transportation, and communications routes fall within parameters that could generate mutual trust. Ataman noted that the examination of the CSCE Minsk Group's decision shows that the interested sides would accept these parameters, and added that the Minsk Group will again meet on 2 November.

Ter-Petrosyan To Meet With Yeltsin in Moscow

LD0710155293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1502 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vardan Aloyan]

[Text] Yerevan October 7 TASS—Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan is leaving for Moscow on Thursday he will attend a meeting of leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan, Eduard Shevardnadze and Geydar Aliyev, with President Boris Yeltsin, the press service of the Armenian president told TASS.

The meeting will take place at 0900 hours Moscow time (0600 GMT).

Border With Azerbaijan Reported To Be Quiet

NC0710191793 Yerevan SNARK in English 1300 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Yerevan, October 7 (SNARK)—Relative quietness still exists at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, the Armenian Defense Department told SNARK. SNARK's reporter from Stepanakert told quietness is at the Karabakh fronts where sides are following the agreement on the armistice. The agreement was concluded in the beginning of the week. It will last till November 5.

Karabakh Expresses Condolences to Russians

NC0710175593 Yerevan SNARK in English 1300 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Stepanakert, October 7 (SNARK)—"The people of Karabakh mourn for the men and women died in the struggle for Russia's revival and its democratic future", says the telegram of Karabakh Acting Parliament Chairman Karen Baburyan and Karabakh State Defence Committee Robert Kocharyan sent to Moscow.

The Karabakh leaders expressed their support to President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and underlined that Karabakh Armenians and the Russians "do have something spiritual and historical in common.

Foreign Affairs Minister Leaves for U.S. Visit

NC0710175793 Yerevan SNARK in English 1131 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Yerevan, October 7 (SNARK)—Today Armenian Minister for Foreign Affairs Vahan Papazyan left for the US to participate in the session of the UN General Assembly. The minister is to meet the UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and the US State Secretary Warren Christopher.

"Our task is to integrate into the world community as soon as possible and that would exclude any unilateral dependence from any other country", said Vahan Papazyan at his departure to New York.

National Financial-Investment Corporation Formed

NC0710220793 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1258 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Yerevan, 24 Sep (ARMENPRES)—Proceeding from the requirements of Armenia's 1993 socio-economic development plan, the Armenian Government has set up the National Financial-Investment Corporation of Armenia.

It is a state enterprise that is administered by Armenian laws and its own by-laws. The aim of the corporation is to help solve important socio-economic development problems, and to help implement programs aimed at creating a manufacturing industry based on intellectual, entrepreneurial and resource potential that would produce competitive goods.

[Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian at 1210 GMT on 7 October reports: "The Armenian Government has decided to appoint Arayik Artashesi

Ter-Martirosyan as chairman of the administrative board of the National Financial-Investment Corporation of Armenia."]

State Body Formed To Coordinate Diaspora Affairs

NC0710204793 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1210 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Yerevan, 7 Oct (ARMENPRES)—Henceforth Armenia will have a state organ to coordinate and regulate diaspora-related affairs. That state organ will be the Department for Diaspora Affairs established within the Armenian Foreign Ministry. This will enable the existing traditional and newly emerging social organizations in diaspora to have direct contact with the state structures.

Changeover From Old to New Banknotes Reported

NC0710194793 Yerevan SNARK in English 1421 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Yerevan, October 7 (SNARK)—The prices of notes, issued in 1961-1992, which are circulated in Armenia, are dropping. Today at the "black market" they give 190 old rubles for 100 new. The government and the Central Bank of Armenia refuted the information that the considerable quantity of new Russian rubles has been delivered to Armenia and in some institution the salary is paid in new notes. Simultaneously the rate of USD [U.S. dollars] was jumped to 2700 old rubles for one USD. So in Armenia, after yesterday's indexation, minimum wage became 3 USD per month.

Azerbaijan

Foreign Ministry Statement on Presidential Election

NC0710192993 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 7 Oct 93

["Text" of statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs; date not given]

[Text] In accordance with Azerbaijan's law on presidential elections and the resolution the Republic's parliament adopted on 1 September 1993, presidential elections were held in the Republic on 3 October 1993. The names of three candidates, Kerrar Adilov, Geydar Aliyev, and Zakhir Tagiyev, were included on the secret ballots.

The presidential elections in the Republic attracted significant international attention. Many foreign representatives, including renowned political and social figures, diplomats, members of parliaments, scholars, and journalists, arrived in Azerbaijan to observe the elections. Among them were a large group of deputies from the Turkish parliament, deputies who represented all the political forces in Turkey, deputies from Kazakhstan's parliament and Germany's Bundestag, the British representatives of the Helsinki Human Rights Group, representatives of the International Labor Organization, and representatives of social organizations from Germany, the United States, [name indistinct], Greece, and other countries.

It must be stressed that the officials of the Embassies of Turkey, France, Russia, Iran, Egypt, the United States, Sudan, Greece, Germany, the PRC, Israel, Slovakia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Britain and the UN representative in Baku were also able to follow the presidential elections as were the other official observers. [Name indistinct], representative of the CSCE Democratic [word indistinct] and Human Rights Office, established coordination among the foreign observers.

According to the many reports by the official representatives of foreign countries and the international news agency correspondents, the presidential elections were held in accordance with the laws and democratic principles. No violation of the law on presidential elections and the constitutional rights of the members of the electorate was registered during the voting.

The necessary measures were taken to enable the refugees and displaced persons, who have been forced by the occupation of Azerbaijan's territories by the Armenian Armed Forces to leave their places of permanent residence, to vote in the areas where they currently live. The representatives of Azerbaijan's political parties and movements were included in the electoral district committees for the sake of openness in the voting.

It must be stressed that [words indistinct] to all the foreign observers [words indistinct] to visit [words indistinct] and Azerbaijan's rayons to [words indistinct] and observe the opening of the ballot boxes. The foreign observers and journalists visited dozens of polling stations, observed the progress of voting, held talks with the members of the electorate from various strata of people, met with the three candidate presidents, and got acquainted with their preelection platforms [preceding word in English]. The Republic's television network directly covered their talks with the candidate presidents.

A large group of foreign observers and journalists visited the polling stations in Ganja, Sumgait, Nakhichevan, Barda, and Agdzhabedi.

The progress of voting was also covered by international news agencies, including AP, BBC, [two names indistinct], CNN, AFP, [name indistinct], and other news agencies.

Regardless of the complex social and political situation that has been created by Armenia's aggression, Azerbaijan's citizens displayed a high sense of political awareness in the elections. There were 97.7 percent of the eligible voters in the Republic voting in the elections.

The majority of the voters, that is, 98.8 percent, supported Geydar Aliyev. In view of that, Geydar Aliyev was elected Azerbaijan's president.

The Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to make it known that the presidential elections were held in accordance with the accepted democratic norms in the world. Furthermore, the ministry wishes to express its conviction that the outcome of the elections will contribute toward the enhancement of democratic principles in the Republic and toward the prosperity of all the people in Azerbaijan.

CSCE Group To Visit Conflict Zone With Armenia

LD0810103693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1016 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sevindzh Abdulayeva and Viktor Schulman]

[Text] Baku October 8 TASS—On Friday, a special mission of the CSCE has flown to the zone of the Azeri-Armenian conflict and other regions where refugees are temporarily stationed.

On Thursday, the CSCE mission arrived in Baku to familiarize themselves with the situation in the region and hold consultations with Azeri leaders to discuss the results of the Paris meeting of the CSCE Minsk group on Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Azeri side declared that it was not satisfied with a new schedule of urgent measures suggested during the meeting in Paris and refused to sign the document.

In the opinion of the leader of the Azeri delegation to the meeting, state adviser for foreign policy issues Vafa Gulizade, the schedule for the withdrawal from seized territories (from October 24 until November 7) was not realistic.

Besides, the document said nothing about occupied Azeri towns of Shusha and Lachin, which liberation had been envisaged in four previous schedules suggested by the "nine" countries and which were blocked by the Armenian side.

According to the state adviser, conditions for the liberation of Azeri territories stipulated in the Paris schedule, including opening the gas pipeline, lifting blockade from railroads and highways, run contrary to well-known resolutions of the U.N. Security Council demanding unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories.

Confidential sources reported that contentious issues would be discussed during consultations between the CSCE special mission and Azeri President Gaydar Aliyev. The meeting scheduled for Friday, was postponed in connection with Aliyev's departure to Moscow.

Baku Scheduled To Answer Minsk Group on Measures

NC0710174493 Baku TURAN in English 1101 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Baku, October 7 (TURAN)—"On Thursday an official Baku have to express its reaction on the project of the schedule of urgent measures, suggested by the Minsk Group of the CSCE," Vafa Gulizade, the state advisor on foreign political matters said in his interview to the national TV.

To V. Gulizade's words, the last variant of the schedule of urgent measures cause the disappointment of Baku, as not a single of the Azeri party's suggestions was taken into consideration in the schedule. In particular, the suggested variant of the schedule ignores the problem of liberation of Shushinskiy and Lachinskiy regions of Azerbaijan, occupied by the Armenians. Though, State Advisor V. Gulizade said, the so-called "Minsk Group" was created exactly for solving this problem.

This evening G. Aliyev will receive the CSCE delegation.

Authorities Seize, Receive Illegal Arms

NC0710174893 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1900 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] Several people who recently moved from the occupied areas to Mingechaur have committed crimes with their illegal arms. For example, Ates Berkhudarov, a citizen from Agdam, has killed Geydar Aga-Mirzayev from Agdam and Musa Ibragimov from Kelbadzhar. Tahir Abdullahev has killed Irfan Kuliyev from Yevlakh Rayon. Two other people were seriously wounded in the incidents.

Measures have been taken to impound the illegal arms in the possession of the people. Lieutenant Colonel Khalil Khalilov, chief of police in Mingechaur, has informed an AZERTAC correspondent that 15 automatic firearms, two handguns, 30 hand grenades, and a large quantity of ammunition have been impounded from the citizens during the past two months. Five military telephones, four hand grenades, three poisoned blades, and a large quantity of ammunition were seized in schools No. 2 and No. 3, in which refugees have been accommodated. Meanwhile, three citizens have voluntarily surrendered their firearms to the police department.

The measures taken by the police and the awards given to those who have voluntarily surrendered their arms have encouraged the citizens in Sumgait to hand over their arms. Colonel Mahir Adilov, head of the police administration in the city, has informed an AZERTAC correspondent that more than 60 Kalashnikov automatic firearms, nine [word indistinct], 12 machine guns, several grenade launchers, and tens of thousands of other items of combat equipment have been recently handed over to the police in the city.

Former Soviet Republics Owe Baku 24 Billion Rubles

NC0710175393 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1900 GMT 6 Oct 93

[Text] The Azerbaijan Council of Ministers has discussed the payment of the debts of the former USSR republics to Azerbaijan. Prime Minister Suret Guseynov chaired the meeting. It was noted that the republics paid 3.7 billion rubles on their debts as a result of the measures Azerbaijan put into effect during the past two months. However, Ukraine, Russia, and several other countries still owe a total of 24 billion rubles to Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijan Council of Ministers Press Center has informed the KHABAR SERVICE NEWS AGENCY that the failure of the former USSR republics to repay their debts was due to several reasons. The participants of the meeting noted that a monetary system must be established to create an opportunity for strengthening relations between Azerbaijan and the CIS countries. That will facilitate the settlement of financial issues.

New Publication VATANDAS Expresses Objectives

NC0710131693 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televisiyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 1 Oct 93

[Excerpt] Another newspaper, VATANDAS [Citizen], has been added to the many mass media organs in Azerbaijan. The newspaper's objective is to contribute to the establishment of a just community, state, and society. Its first edition was published today. The charity fund named after Tagiyev is its publisher.

VATANDAS published the statement made by the founding committee of the newly established Azerbaijan Democratic Independence Party [Azerbaijan Demokratik Istiklal Partiyasi] in its first edition. The newspaper said that it is being published to remind Azerbaijan's sons and daughters that they are the citizens of this homeland. Regardless of their political inclinations, everyone will be able to express his views through VATANDAS. [passage omitted]

Georgia

Shevardnadze Departs To Meet Yeltsin in Moscow

LD0710143593 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1400 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] We have just been informed that Eduard Shevardnadze has gone to Moscow.

Today, 7 October, Eduard Shevardnadze, the chairman of the Georgian parliament and head of state has left for Moscow. The head of state will have a meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow. They will confer on the issue of future Russian-Georgian relations.

Discusses Talks, Ties

LD0810103493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 8 Oct 93

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, head of Georgia, has stated in his interview to INTERFAX that during his meeting of the Transcaucasian leaders with the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin today problems connected with the building of new relations between the states are to be discussed. Upon his arrival in Moscow last night, Eduard Shevardnadze noted that currently all the necessary conditions for the development of cooperation in all areas between the Transcaucasian republics and Russia have been created. As INTERFAX learned, it is envisaged that during the meeting of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Russia in the Kremlin the critical situation that has developed in the Caucasus as a result of escalation of the armed conflicts will be discussed. It is also expected that questions of concluding bilateral agreements on the deployment and status of the Russian troops in the Caucasus will be examined.

On Importance of Russia

PM0810133993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 Oct 93 p 1

[Interview with President Shevardnadze by Yadviga Yuferova and Sergey Chernykh; place and date not given: "Shevardnadze to Yeltsin: Will You Be the Fourth?"]

[Text] [Shevardnadze] Despite the fact that there is an enormous, very deep crisis in Georgia, now is a unique time to build new relations with Russia.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is this view of the head of state's understood in Georgia, which is being rent by conflict and is prepared to look for an external enemy to explain away its internal crisis?

[Shevardnadze] I think so. Georgia needs Russia, Georgia cannot exist without Russia. We must discuss important matters. Including the use of military force—I will at least be raising this issue.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, we are talking to you at a time when a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent has been released after having been unjustifiably detained by the Republic of Georgia Information and Intelligence Service...

[Shevardnadze] I regret the incident.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] And we hope that KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's own correspondent and all other newspapers' own correspondents will have normal conditions created for them to do their job as journalists. [Interview ends]

...The representatives of the "Caucasus trio" [Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan] have very different and very similar problems. There is no doubt that the heads of Armenia and Azerbaijan will be discussing measures to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nor is the possibility of a Russian military contingent reappearing on Azerbaijani and Nagorno-Karabakh territory being ruled out.

Things are far more complex in Georgia. Russia will be giving the republic both humanitarian and military aid on probably all its territory apart from Abkhazia. At least during the first stage. It is only with Russia's help that Georgia will be able to restore its territorial integrity.

State Troops Fight Against Gamsakhurdia Supporters

Zviadists Shell Troops in Poti

LD0710171393 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1030 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Poti, 7 Oct—An Iberia correspondent reports from Zugdidi that from 1100 on 4 October, state troops subjected Poti to shelling. There are dead and wounded among civilians. About 20 residential buildings have been destroyed.

One of the shells struck an ambulance which was carrying the wounded. The ambulance was burned and its passengers, the wounded and a nurse, were killed.

Ten combatants from the armed formation supporting Gamsakhurdia were killed on 5 October.

Tbilisi: Towns Not Retaken From Rebels

NC0710180493 Yerevan SNARK in English 1131 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Tbilisi, October 7 (SNARK)—The Georgian leader's press centre has not affirmed some foreign news agencies information on the fact that Georgian troops adhere to the government have swept the armed supporters of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia out off the towns of Senaki, Khoni and Abasha today.

Battles Southwest of Lanchkhuti

LD0710143793 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1400 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] It emerged from a telephone conversation with the Lanchkhuti administartor, Anzor Chiladze, that fierce battles continued near the villages of Supsa [southwest of Lanchkhuti] and Grigoleti [about 10 km south of Poti by the sea] in the morning of 7 October. There are casualties on both sides.

Clashes Continue in Western Areas

LD0810122793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1138 GMT 8 Oct 93

[By GIA for TASS]

[Text] Tbilisi October 8 TASS—The situation in regions and towns of western Georgia remains tense, deputy head of the administration of the Ozurget region, Avtandil Glonti, said in an interview with the GEORGIAN INFORMATION AGENCY (GIA).

He said that fighting between government troops and armed formations of Gamsakhurdia's supporters had been going on in the daytime and in the evening of October 7. According to Glonti, government troops have taken under control the village of Grigoyletia and a sports base where the headquarters of anti- government formations were previously located and came up close to the outskirts of the town of Poti controlled by detachments loyal to Loti Kobalia.

Early on October 8, a correspondent of the GIA contacted the town of Zugdidi by telephone. Leader of "Georgia's information Service" Merab Chukha said that the situation in Poti remains calm and that its enterprises and organisations were operating normally.

The situation in the area of the Tskhenistskali river, one of the front lines of confrontation, remains tense. Sources from the operational headquarters of government troops stationed in Samtredia told GIA that shooting continued near the Tsekheniskali river late on October 7 and in the night of October 8. A number of shells fired by the opposite side exploded in residential districts on the outskirts of the town of Samtredia. Casualties among peaceful civilians were reported and a number of houses were damaged.

There are casualties in villages of the Abashsk region situated in the vicinity of the Tskhenistskali river.

Zviadists Reportedly Kill Five Russian Troops

LD0710191793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1734 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By GIA correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Tbilisi October 7 TASS—Five servicemen of the Russian troops deployed in the Transcaucasus were found killed in Georgia, reporterdly by supporters of Georgia's ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Major-General boris Dyukov, first deputy commander of the Russian Army Group, gave details of the incident in an interview with GIA news agency.

He said "a truck carrying Russian servicemen dropped behind when the regiment was being redeployed from Kutaisi to Batumi. An armored combat vehicle went off in search of the lost truck. Shortly after that, the truck returned but the armored vehicle with seven servicemen was missing. Later, five soldiers were found killed not far from the village of Khoni. The version put forth by military lawyers that armed formations of Zviadists (Gamsakhurdia's supporters) were involved in the action is backed by the latest information, namely that one of the two remaining soldiers was in captivity in Zugdidi."

Dyukov noted that "as long as the case is being investigated and military investigators and representatives of the Army command are proceeding with their work, the final verdict should not be passed. But I can state already now that this act of provocation was carried out in the zone of Zviadists' military activities, while we stay away from this war."

Further on Deaths

LD0810134593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1701 GMT 7 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Oct—Further details were revealed today of the deaths of five Russian military servicemen whose bodies were found in the area of the town of Samtredia (western Georgia). An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned from sources close to the command of the Group of Russian Troops in the Caucasus (GRTC), that, according to a preliminary investigation, the crew of an APC-80 of a GRTC unit comprising Major Sabchuk, Senior Lieutenant Popov, Sergeants Borisov, Rou, and Kutsenko, and Privates Litvinov and Shagiakhmetov was detailed to search for an army truck which had become detached from the column. On 4 October, at 0900, in the area of the village of Khoni (30 km from Kutaisi) they were surrounded and fired upon by the "Bat" armed grouping, which is a part of Loti Kobalia's "army," supporting Georgian ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The crew of the APC-80 was given an ultimatum—surrender or die. The Russian servicemen fought an unequal battle in which, according to unconfirmed information, a tank, an APC and a "Grad" launcher were destroyed and several dozen attackers were wiped out.

When the cartridges of the Russian APC crew ran out the Zviadists took six servicemen prisoner. Private Shagiakhmetov succeeded in hiding and got back to his own men.

[words indistinct] Sabchuk, gravely wounded and in a critical condition, is in Kutaisi. The bodies of the five dead have also been taken there.

According to operational information of the Russian military, Kutaisi is almost blocked by Loti Kobalia's "army" and other groupings of Zviadists, numbering up to 10,000 men. This is making the investigation extremely difficult.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted. The GRTC command has appealed to Aslan Abashidze, chairman of the Adzharian Supreme Soviet, asking him to help in the evacuation of the bodies of the dead soldiers and officers and in rescuing Major Sabchuk.

Abkhaz Separatists Make Changes in Leadership

LD0810102193 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1900 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] KONTAKT news agency has been informed by reliable sources that the Gudauta group sacked Abkhazian Interior Minister Aleksandr Ankvab and information and intelligence service chief Gennadi Berulava. (An Akrba) has been appointed interior minister and Tarba, son of Abkhaz state university docent Boris Tarba, has been appointed head of the information and intelligence service.

It is also known that a commercial firm, Menatep, is operating in Moscow. A Sukhumi native, Zaur Mekvabia, is a representative of this firm, which cooperates with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's party [Russian Liberal-Democratic Party] and finances the Abkhaz separatists. The latter are also financed by Yuriy Lakoba and Besik Tarba, natives of Sukhumi now resident in Moscow.

This information was supplied by the KONTAKT news agency.

UN Envoy's Abkhazia Peace Process Efforts Outlined

AU0710124793 Paris AFP in English 1232 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Geneva, Oct 7 (AFP)—UN special representative Eduard Brunner opened a second day Thursday of talks with a delegation from Georgia's breakaway Abkhazia region to try to get a peace process moving, a UN spokesman said.

Both Brunner and Anri Zherzhenia, the head of the Abkhazia delegation who is the chief prosecutor of the self-proclaimed republic in western Georgia, are to hold press conferences at midday, spokeswoman Therese Gastaut said.

Brunner described his meetings with the Abkhazian delegates as "private, exploratory talks." He will meet with representatives of the Georgian government probably sometime next week.

"My aim is simply to get them face to face," he said before Thursday's session.

Zherzhenia replaces Abkhazia's vice president Socrates Dzhinzholiya who was initially scheduled to attend.

Wednesday's meeting lasted 90 minutes, but Brunner said afterwards there was nothing concrete to announce.

Attempts to launch peace negotiations Septmeber 30 were postponed because of an escalation in the Georgian conflict after Abkhazian rebels seized the regional capital of Sukhumi on September 27 following two weeks of combat.

Correspondent: Sukhumi Georgians in Danger of 'Genocide'

PM0710153993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Oct 93 First Edition p 5

[Special correspondent Aleksey Chelnokov report: "Sukhumi in the Hands of Looters"]

[Text] Sukhumi—Despite assurances from the Abkhazian authorities, Sukhumi has been swamped by a wave of looting. Lawlessness reigns. No one can be sure of his safety: The price of a person's life here has been devalued to the worth of the clothes he is wearing.

"Nevertheless, the situation in Sukhumi is being stabilized," Beslan Bargandzhiya, assistant chairman of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet, said. "Order is being instilled in the city, and reconstruction work is beginning."

You still come across corpses swollen in the heat in some places. But the central streets have already been cleared. The sidewalks there are now being washed with a disinfectant solution. But not even the pungent liquid washes away the dense putrid smell which seems to have been absorbed into the city's pores.

The storming of Sukhumi, which began 16 September, lasted just under two weeks. Practically the entire resort city, which once showed up white among the subtropical greenery, was destroyed during the artillery preparation. Undamaged houses can be found only on the outskirts. The center has suffered particularly badly. Entire districts have been razed to their foundations by Grad rocket launchers. Just four walls are left of the Government House, previously a respectable multistory building (the victors were unable to raise their banner on the spire in the manner of those who stormed the Reichstag). The remains of dozens of its defenders are evidently buried beneath the collapsed concrete partition walls.

All lines of communication and the television center have been totally destroyed. The city has neither water nor lights. Every last store is closed. The city's residents seem to be living on past stocks. With the onset of darkness exchanges of fire flare up in various parts of the city. An artillery cannonade and mortar shell explosions can sometimes be heard. As an Abkhazian Army soldier said: "They are finishing off Georgians ensconced in basements." Bearded men with assault rifles and green bandannas on their head—a sign of membership of the Abkhazian Army—chat idly at intersections. Every other passerby is armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, and some with a grenade launcher or a machine gun. You rarely encounter a woman.

My colleague—a woman journalist for Abkhazian television, half Georgian and half Russian (she did not want her name to appear in the newspaper)—hid from the pogrom perpetrators in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry sanatorium.

"Two Abkhazians came into my apartment and warned: If we see you in two hours' time, we will kill you. Thank God they did not kill me straightway."

She said that patrols of Abkhazian formations check passports in the street and shoot everyone whose passport has "Georgian" in the "nationality" column.

The last groups of refugees were taken out of the city at the end of September. Thanks to the endeavors of officers of the Russian Federation State Committee for Emergency Situations, approximately 15,000 Georgians were evacuated by sea. But a government decree terminated the activity of the Russian part of the Joint Commission on Settling the Situation in Abkhazia 1 October. The people of Georgian nationality who remain in the city (according to existing information, several hundred people are still hiding in basements, in surrounding forests, and in the Defense Ministry sanatorium) could well supplement the lists of victims of genocide.

Before my eyes a half-drunk volunteer militiaman shot dead a decrepit old man who was dragging a small cart with firewood. Why? He had evidently decided that his nose was of a typically Georgian shape. The Russian paratroopers from whose vehicle I observed this only ground their teeth. They have been ordered to observe neutrality. Corpses are being buried in truck gardens. According to eyewitnesses, up to 10 bodies are washed ashore at Novyy Afon every day.

The total powerlessness of the victorious Abkhazian Government has left the city easy prey for robbers. Broken windows and walls smashed by shells have laid homes shamelessly bare before hordes of looters.

The main military formations of the Abkhazian Army have fortified their position along the border with Georgia. The echelon of gunmen who followed them into Sukhumi is a rabble of criminals. Lines of trucks packed to bursting with plundered goods stretch from Sukhumi to Gudauta. Vehicles are already being taken away, regardless of nationality. On Prospekt Mira, the city's central street, I saw a KamAZ truck towing six stolen Zhigulis.

The city commandant's office has formed guard subunits. But how is it combating the looters? Viktor Kulik, a guard platoon commander, replied:

"The most we can do is try to persuade a robber to go somewhere else. Far more frequently we have to console those who have been robbed—be thankful that you were not killed."

There has now been a reshuffle in the Abkhazian power ministries. Since 3 October the security organs have been headed by Astamur Tarba, and the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs by Givi Agrba, the city's former commandant. Guard battalions seem to be being set up in the city (according to B. Bargandzhiya, assistant [chairman] of the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet, they are made up of men unfit for combat service in the army).

Refugees From Abkhazia Number 100,000; More on Way

LD0810102093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0910 GMt 8 Oct 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi, 8 Oct—Today the number of Georgian refugees received from Abkhazia to date reached 100,000 people. A proportion of them has been temporarily accommodated in transit camps. No fewer than 30,000 more people are coming. This information was gathered by employees of the "Santeli" operational rescue service of the republic's Red Cross by way of aerial observations from helicopters and from radio telegrams from the rescue teams who were taken to the disaster zone by air.

Armed Persons Raid Explosives Warehouse

LD0710145593 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1030 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 7 Oct—An IBERIA correspondent was told from the press center of Georgia's Interior Ministry that today, several armed persons in army uniforms raided the "Saknavtobpizika" [Georgian Oil Physics] warehouse of explosives in Shavnabada [near Tbilisi] and took detonators, gunpowder, and a seismic charge—in total, 18 kinds of different explosives.

Former Dissident on Proof of Russian 'Aggression'

AU0710113093 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 28 Sep 93 p 1

[IPRINDA report under rubric "According to Reports from Correspondents and Information Agencies": "Dzh. Kashiya: 'The Aggressor is Russia!'"]

[Text] In a conversation with an IPRINDA agency correspondent, the well-known former dissident Dzhairi Kashiya stated that the Georgian side had at its disposal video, photographic, and other documentary materials confirming Russia's participation in aggression against Georgia. He also said that these materials were fully sufficient in order to convene the International Court of Justice.

In answer to the correspondent's question as to whether the West was ready to support such an initiative by Georgia, Kashiya stated that there were many experts in the West who were ready to help Georgia. He intends to discuss this problem in the near future with the head of state.

Officials Release KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Reporter

LD0710140793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] After being held for 72 hours by the staff of the republican information and intelligence service, Sergey Chernykh, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's own correspondent in Georgia, has been released. They tried to establish that the journalist was guilty of intelligence activity for Russia. The editor-in-chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the staff of the Russian embassy in Georgia came out in defense of Sergey Chernykh. As a result, the journalist was released once he had given written assurance that he would not leave the country. Eduard Shevardnadze told him that he regrets what has happened.

SDPG Chairman on Need To Create 'Eurasian Home'

AU0710125593 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 30 Sep 93 p 1

[Interview with SDPG Chairman Guram Muchaidze by Tinatin Gviniashvili and Viktoriya Vazagashvili; place and date not given]

[Text] [SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] **Batono [polite form of address] Guram, on what is your concept of Georgia's joining a "community" based?**

[Muchaidze] We are raising the idea of creating a Eurasian home. The SPDG [Social-Democratic Party of Georgia] political council has frequently expressed its concern about the exacerbation of relations between Russia and Georgia. National extremist forces in both states are to blame for this. Following the liberation of Georgia by Russia from the Bolshevist-imperial yoke, favorable conditions appeared for the establishment of friendly relations between Russia and Georgia on a voluntary basis. During difficult times for Georgia, Russia more than once acted as guarantor of its integrity. We hope that today, also, Russia will give effective aid to Georgia, which has been and remains the bulwark of peace and calm in the Caucasus.

Embarking on the path of profound democratic transformations, Russia is today capable of playing the role of not only guaranteeing Georgia's integrity but also its independence. This is its new historical function, one that, unfortunately, has not been fully understood by individual politicians in our states.

More and more of the masses are beginning to realize that the achievement of state independence is a lengthy process that requires mutual support on the basis of modernization of economic ties that have developed over decades. I have often said in Parliament that when people are deprived of the ability to recognize the truth through abstract thought, life teaches them bitter empirical lessons. These lessons suggest to many that the political arena of the former Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics cannot be a simple arithmetical sum of independent states. It is from this that our conviction arose for the necessity of creating a common Eurasian home on the ruins of the former USSR, a genuinely democratic community of independent states.

If the leaders of Russia and Georgia do not join this objective process and are unable to establish friendly relations between our states, by the will of the nation, they will bear personal responsibility for the blood and tears that are being shed.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] **Will the Eurasian home not become some kind of conglomeration of incompatible entities?**

[Muchaidze] Profound integrating processes are taking place in the world that are not dependent on the subjective role of politicians. The western states have already formed a European home, although this process is not yet complete there. Life convinces one that, in the modern world, not a single state is able to exist in isolation from others.

The scientific and technological revolution that is taking place before our eyes is integrating states. We are no exception. All this serves as an objective basis for our desire to create a Eurasian community.

A Eurasian home is not only a conglomeration. It should have common coordinating bodies.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] **Who supports you and can you give specific names?**

[Muchaidze] In principle, we have many supporters in all the states of the former USSR. Our party is a collective member of the International Movement for Democratic Reforms. Last year, at the congress of this organization, the "Eurasian Home" charter was adopted. This document was sent to the presidents and heads of the states of the former USSR. Many responded at that time and gave a positive assessment. Today, almost everyone shares our position. Yeltsin supports such a community and Mr. Shevardnadze, the Georgian head of state, must determine his position in the very near future.

[SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA] **What will the formation of a Eurasian community specifically give Georgia?**

[Muchaidze] Not a single state of the former USSR will be able to extricate itself from the serious crisis situation alone. If we are unable to unite our efforts to preserve and strengthen the independence that has been gained, we will all be transformed into colonial appendages of the western states. In order to avoid this, we should help one another and, by means of coordinated actions, save our peoples. History will not forgive us if we lose time and the chances that are left for salvation.

CDUG Leader Says CIS Membership 'Unjustified'

AU0710132093 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 28 Sep 93 p 1

[Excerpt] Events are currently developing much faster than one could have expected. Hardly had we managed to imbibe the statement made by Otar Patsatsia, head of the republic's government, at the meeting in Moscow of the heads of state and governments of the CIS member countries about Georgia's intention to become an associate member of the commonwealth, when Russian television announced some fresh news. This time it was stated with a certain feeling of elation that the Georgian Cabinet of Ministers supported the idea of Georgia becoming a full-fledged member of the commonwealth.

It would not be superfluous to say in advance that this formulation of the question is fundamentally lacking in juridical force and is only the expression of the opinion of the majority present at the exchange of views in the Cabinet of Ministers on Sunday [26 September]. So, the question as to whether Georgia should join the CIS, evidently, will have to be resolved by the legislative body.

What is the difference between associate and full-fledged membership of the CIS? Judging by everything, an associate member can choose which agreements it concludes. According to information that has been received, at the Moscow meeting, the Georgian delegation signed only certain interstate agreements of an economic character, in particular on questions concerning the development of machine-building, metallurgy, and the coal industry, on mutual deliveries of harvesters, and so forth.

Vice Premier Amiran Kadagishvili, whom we contacted, informed us that the question of full-fledged membership of the CIS is currently being examined. The appropriate documents are being studied. It will be possible to speak about this in more detail in a few days.

In short, the situation in the republic resembles a knot that is being tied even tighter. On the one hand, there is the pain and tragedy of Abkhazia and, on the other, the apparent inevitability of concluding a multifaceted agreement on entry into the CIS.

Nevertheless, to join or not to join is the question that one can hear being discussed everywhere, both in the corridors of power and in bread queues and on public transport. SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA correspondents asked the representatives of certain political parties to give their standpoint regarding this question.

Irakliy Shengelaya, chairman of the CDUG [Christian-Democratic Union of Georgia]:

I, personally, as the chairman of the CDUG, and the union as a whole hold a common position: Georgia's entry into the CIS will not resolve the problems it is facing and is, to put it mildly, unjustified.

First, the CIS, as a commonwealth, does not resolve the problem of the territorial integrity of one state or another. The principle of territorial integrity is characteristic of not only the newly formed former socialist states but also European states. One example of this is the disintegration of Belgium. This attests to the fact that certain forces are trying to re-examine the principle of the inviolability of borders. So, the question of the territorial integrity of Georgia is not connected with its joining the CIS.

Second, the majority of those in favor of Georgia joining the CIS are under the illusion that this act will ostensibly enable it to escape the economic crisis. This view cannot be justified.

The CIS is an amorphous body both politically and economically. When the states belonging the CIS were unable to resolve the economic problems, there arose the idea of creating a new type of ruble zone. So far, six states have joined this zone.

A single ruble zone is supposed to function according to the following principles: A single financial and credit policy, a single budgetary policy, and a single policy of economic development. The single policy will be implemented by that state on whose money the states belonging to the zone will exist. This state is Russia. Here is the formula: One monetary unit—one state. This is a part of those views held by our party and me personally.

Those ministers who say in their speeches that Georgia will enter the CIS zone and all sectors will immediately start functioning are simply acting dishonestly.

One has to understand that centralized distribution is something that has been confined to history. All relations between states, if they form a community, are conducted according to world prices.

It remains for us either to create in reality a single state similar to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics but with the appendages of private ownership or to become a state with a European orientation. One has to speak about this directly and honestly.

Lastly, I can in no way justify statements made by people who say one thing and do another. The majority of those speaking at the meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers said that the CIS was bad but that we were forced to join it in order to save people from starvation. [passage omitted]

Estonia

Government Expresses Desire To Join NATO

LD0710124493 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0700 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] A joint session of the North Atlantic Assembly is due to begin. An Estonian delegation headed by [Parliament Speaker] Ulo Nugis will also be attending. The meeting in Copenhagen will be discussing the admittance of new members to NATO. As is known Estonia has also expressed a wish to join.

Tallinn Reinforces Russian Ban on Opposition Papers

PM0710160793 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 93 p 7

[Galina Sapozhnikova report: "Putsch Came Just at the Right Time for Laar"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian Government has banned the circulation on its territory of a number of Russian newspapers—the ones that Yeltsin closed down yesterday. In doing so, Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar cited the Estonian-Russian treaty of 12 January 1991, which obliges both sides to curtail any activities on their respective territories which are hostile to the other partner. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the security police will ensure that the directive is implemented. The fact that the Estonian Government is being so quick to show solidarity with the Russian Government at a time when Russian-Estonian relations are somewhat strained owing to troop withdrawals and the infringement of Russians' rights in the republic is causing some local journalists to worry whether the ban on the circulation of Russian publications will lead to the dissolution of the republic's own opposition press.

Rita Blumberg, senior supervisor of the Estonian Association for Press Circulation, has announced that subscribers to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and PRAVDA will get their money back. However, these publications were not actually included in the 1994 subscription catalog—not out of political considerations, but because supplies are irregular.

Velliste Returns From Norway Talks on NATO, Russia

WS0810091693 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1920 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Tallinn, October 7—Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Trivimi Velliste returned from a two-day state visit to Norway, on Thursday, where he held talks with his Norwegian counterpart Johan Jorgen Holst. Velliste told a news conference that they discussed fostering trade between the two countries and adopting visa-free travelling.

According to Velliste, relations between Estonia and NATO and situation in Russia were also discussed, as both Norway and Estonia share borders with Russia. Velliste said that Holst confirmed his support to Estonia in the matter of Russian troop pullout.

NATO Commander Meets Defense Minister

LD0710145893 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1200 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Vice Admiral Sir Peter Woodhead, NATO's deputy supreme allied commander in the Atlantic has been visiting Tallinn for two days. He had meetings with the Estonian defense minister and the Riigikogu [parliament] state defense commission chairman. The visitor had meetings at the Foreign Ministry and the defense forces' headquarters.

Summing up the outcome of their meeting, Rein Helme, [parliamentary] state defense commission chairman, said the admiral [as heard] had said that both the Estonian effort at state-building and organization of her defense forces deserve not only moral but also extensive material support.

Officials Deny 'Impending Cabinet Shuffle'

WS0710134893 Tallinn BNS in English 1107 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] TALLINN, Oct 07, BNS—Estonian officials denied reports of an impending Cabinet shuffle and the possible replacement of the prime minister.

Government spokesman Ain Saarna said if that's true, he's been living under an information block for the last year.

"It is natural that in no democratic country can the ruling coalition stand solely on the premier's decisions and commands," Saarna said. But he dismissed speculation of a schism in the ruling coalition.

Saarna's comments come in the wake of a report Wednesday by the Tallinn-based KUKU radio station. The station reported, with reference to a person close to the ruling Pro Patria party, that the party is racked with serious disagreements and that a Cabinet shuffle involving the replacement of the prime minister can be expected in February.

KUKU also reported that the current bank scandal in which the government has disputed the Bank of Estonia's sale of Savings Bank shares to the Hansapank is also connected with Pro Patria's internal discord.

Saarna told BNS that there have been and will be differences of opinion within Pro Patria. But he called the report "an attempt to drive a wedge between the parties on the eve of elections," referring also to the internal split of the Estonian National Independence Party.

The dispute between the government and the central bank is, in Saarna's opinion, "inflated," and it stems from those who are interested in the fall of the government.

The premier's adviser Tiit Pruuli also said that he had not heard of a single conference discussing the replacement of the prime minister.

Official 'Puzzled' by Confusion Over Minister's Appointment

WS0710143993 Tallinn BNS in English 1420 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Excerpt] TALLINN, Oct 07, BNS—The government spokesman, Ain Saarna, said today he was puzzled by the confusion surrounding the appointment of Peeter Olesk as a minister without portfolio.

As reported earlier, President Lennart Meri rejected Olesk's nomination Wednesday [6 October] as population minister. The head of the presidential chancellery told Prime Minister Mart Laar by letter that Olesk "hadn't been presented to the president."

The premier sent a letter to the president Sept. 30 proposing Olesk's appointment as the minister without portfolio, said Saarna.

The official statement released by the presidential chancellery says that Meri will receive Olesk Friday, Oct. 8.

Meri resolved a juridical dilemma Wednesday by relieving Juri Luik of his post as minister without portfolio—the post Olesk was supposed to take. Luik continued to hold the office after he was appointed defense minister,

Saarna expressed his regret at the inconvenience caused for the ministerial candidate. "Olesk has (experienced) a lot of unnecessary trouble even before the confirmation of his appointment," Saarna said.

The government spokesman said some unidentified forces have tried to draw the ministerial appointments and a disagreement between the government and the central bank into the election campaign for local offices.

"It obviously is a case of election propaganda that has become too malicious," Saarna told BNS. "It will soon threaten the foundations of Estonian statehood."

Parliament Deputy Chairman Tunne Kelam, a member of the Estonian National Independence Party, told BNS Wednesday that the president's decision surprised him. Kelam's talk with a presidential adviser Tuesday left him with the impression that Olesk's nomination would not be rejected. [passage omitted]

Latvia

Ulmanis Addresses Latvian Diplomats on Foreign Policy

LD0710194893 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1000 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] A meeting continued today in Riga of the ambassadors and charges d'affairs of the Republic of Latvia accredited in foreign countries. State President Guntis Ulmanis and Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs took part in its opening yesterday. The participants in the meeting yesterday also listened to several reports made by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ambassadors and charges d'affairs accredited in foreign countries addressed the meeting today. As journalists are not yet allowed to attend the meeting, we offer you an excerpt from what State President Guntis Ulmanis said at yesterday's opening of the meeting.

[Begin Ulmanis recording] The second (?option) is that our state should not so much ask for help, as we should show what we can do for ourselves and how we can use this help in a rational and efficient way. Only then can we become an authoritative state, a state which would be duly respected, and a state which would be able to use its own resources, its own local labor force, the potential of its own people, and to direct the country along the road to welfare.

During my latest visit to the United States I was offered huge sums in assistance, huge loans and so on, and the like at almost every meeting. But I always remembered the Broceni epic and the story, and in each case I drew analogies comparing that event with all those offers which we had been receiving until the last day.

Speaking about the Latvian state, I would not like to agree that we are a small state with small problems and small demands. I think that we are a small state but we have very large (?success) abroad. I would like you to [word indistinct] implement this idea and this mission.

Speaking about specific problems, in my opinion the latest events in Russia are evidence of the fact that the east—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the whole CIS bloc—are today cornerstones of our foreign policy. It would be naive to say and think that the latest events in Russia are the last stage of Russia's activities on the road toward the restoration of communism. Therefore, I think that basically we need now to assess the events of the past days and we should speak about those events and work on them. I think that now and also in future, our ambassadors to Russia and our ambassador to the United States will have a huge amount of responsibility.

Do you remember the word Skrunda? We have many times discussed the withdrawal of Russian troops and we have discussed relations with Russia, but until today we cannot agree on one word—Skrunda. I think that this word will soon be as familiar to the world as many others which the world already knows. I have a request, especially to three ambassadors—the ambassadors to the United Nations, the United States, and Russia—to work on these issues in order for them to have enough information and enough arguments, so that in the course of the next few weeks we could take this issue off the agenda.

I very much hope that the government and parliament will draw conclusions from the events in Russia, and that we will also make corresponding decisions on banning all the organizations, parties, societies, and associations which are also very actively working now following the course of events in Russia.

Speaking of other missions and embassies, I think that we have to actively continue the work related to human rights, and I think that after the latest meeting at the United Nations, and as a result of many meetings with representatives of many states, we have achieved a little success in moving this issue forward to our advantage. At least I have the impression that people in the world are beginning to understand that Latvia and Latvians are not the greatest haters of human rights, and that we will also continue this process in a civilized and acceptable way. [end recording]

Several Pro-Communist Organizations Active

LD0710175993 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] The analysis of current information at the disposal of the Interior Ministry is evidence that formations based on imperial- minded officers of the Russian Army, persons who have retired from the Soviet Army, functionaries of the former CPSU, and others who have not reconciled themselves to the break-up of the USSR, are now active in Latvia. Under the slogan of protecting the Russian- speaking population, the above-mentioned organizations are deliberately putting into the heads of our state's Russian-speaking population the idea that human rights are being violated in Latvia, and are sending letters to misinform international organizations and Russian officials urging them not to withdraw the Russian Army from Latvia.

Because the Justice Ministry has refused to register any such organizations, they are operating illegally. In addition, until September this year, the above-mentioned organizations were based in a building belonging to the Northwestern Group of [Russian] Forces, at 4 Torna Street [in Riga]. The command of the Northwestern Group of Forces has given them premises at the Riga commandant's office at 1 Vainodas Street.

During the past six months alone, these organizations held 22 gatherings hostile to the Latvian state. The publications DEN, OPPONENT and others, which the Russian Government banned after the uprising attempt on 3 October, were also distributed at the gatherings. Leaders of the above-mentioned organizations keep in touch with similar organizations in Russia. Relevant structures of the Latvian Interior Ministry are taking prompt measures to restrict and discontinue activity of radical left underground structures in Latvia. In this connection, relevant information has been handed over to the Latvian procurator's office.

President Accredits Envoys to UK, Norway; Discusses Issues

LD0810022193 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Today, State President of Latvia Guntis Ulmanis presented letters of accreditation to Janis Lusis, the ambassador of Latvia to the Republic of Ireland, and Imants Gross, the ambassador to the Kingdom of Norway.

Since Lusis is also ambassador of Latvia to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and his residence will continue to be in London, Ulmanis' and Lusis' conversation after the ceremony mainly touched on relations between Latvia and Great Britain. Ulmanis was interested in how the British press reflects the problems of Latvia and the other Baltic countries. Lusis emphasized that Great Britain's attitude to the Baltic countries is on the whole positive, and special acknowledgement has been earned by the action of the Baltic countries in coordinating both internal and external policy. Lusis predicted that the next year will be especially important for Latvian-British relations, because a visit of the Latvian president to Great Britain is envisaged. Ulmanis requested that preparatory work be started soon for this planned visit to proceed as successfully as possible.

Ulmanis' and Gross' discussion after the ceremony concerned the most important issues whose solution involves Norway, among them the construction of the northern gas pipeline. According to the plan, the northern gas pipeline from Norway through Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic countries will supply gas to central Europe. The implementation of this project will allow the supply of gas to the Baltic countries too and reduce their dependence on Russia's energy resources. Gross also fulfills the duties of Latvian ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden.

Navy Receives Control of Russian Communcations Center

LD0510195393 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 5 Oct 93

[Text] An agreement has been signed whereby the communications center of the [Russian] Baltic Fleet at Daugavgriva is being handed over to the Latvian Navy. This agreement was reached today at the headquarters of the Daugavgriva naval base during a meeting with the chief of the communications administration of the Baltic Fleet, Aleksandr (?Dyushetov). The communications center is to be placed at the disposal of the Latvian Navy by an existing international [word indistinct].

Lithuania

Seimas National Security Committee Chairman Resigns

LD0810090993 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] Gediminas Kirkilas, chairman of the Seimas National Security Committee officially announced his resignation at today's evening sitting of the seimas. He stressed that his decision was final and irreversible. He did not mention any reasons for his resignation, only that he had personal reasons.

Kirkilas announced his resignation after finishing the reading of a report on the work of the National Security Committee. This report took less than 10 minutes to read. Replying to questions from seimas members, Kirkilas agreed that there was much unfinished work to do in the committee. The most important was the preparation of the national security concept and of the defense doctrine resulting from this concept. Kirkilas expressed his wish to work in the group preparing these documents.

The seimas did not discuss the resignation request. This will be done when a written statement is received and the issue included in the agenda.

Officials Want Russia To Extradite 'State Criminals'

WS0710134693 Tallinn BNS in English 1107 GMT 7 Oct 93

[Text] VILNIUS, Oct 07, BNS—Lithuanian officials say they hope Russia will begin extraditing several dozen state criminals in the wake of Moscow's failed hard-line revolt earlier this week.

Key among those are several people suspected of assisting in the attempted coup in Lithuania in January 1991.

Viktoras Markovas, chief prosecutor of the Lithuanian Investigation Department, said the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow will be asked to arrange a new meeting between Lithuanian investigators and the leadership of the Russian prosecutor's office.

Lithuania and Russia signed an agreement on legal assistance in 1992, but it was not ratified by the Russian lawmakers and remains ineffective.